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FROM THE EDITORS
Thirty years ago, the Goldwater-Nichols Act fundamentally reshaped the way 
the U�S� military goes about its business� Virtually everyone now on active duty 
is a child of the Goldwater-Nichols era� Distinct service cultures are still very 
much with us, but “jointness” is deeply embedded in the way our current mili-
tary operates and thinks, as well as in the incentive structures that shape officers’ 
careers� It is legitimate to ask whether this has tended to obscure the unintended 
consequences and opportunity costs of our current joint system� In “The Effect of 
the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 on Naval Strategy, 1987–1994,” Steven Wills 
traces the impact of this historic legislation on the Navy’s capacity to engage in 
strategic planning at the end of the Cold War� The emergence during this period 
of the regional combatant commands as the nexus of war planning reflected both 
the Goldwater-Nichols reforms and a dramatically altered strategic environment; 
a predictable consequence of this was a gradual decline in the strategic planning 
capability and capacity of the Navy Staff� As Wills indicates, the impact of all this 
on the Navy has been particularly challenging given the inherently global nature 
of American naval power� In very recent years, one should note, the Navy broadly 
has come to recognize the need to reconstitute a cadre of strategic thinkers and 
planners within its own ranks if it is to sustain its proper role in shaping America’s 
response to an increasingly threatening global strategic environment� Steven 
Wills is a retired surface warfare officer and a doctoral candidate in military his-
tory at Ohio University�
China’s ongoing efforts to establish a permanent presence in the South China 
Sea continue to pose a fundamental challenge to regional security and the inter-
national legal order� In trying to understand how the Chinese may employ force 
in the future to advance these efforts, it is important to give careful attention to 
their past behavior in the region� Toshi Yoshihara, in “The 1974 Paracels Sea 
Battle: A Campaign Appraisal,” provides a detailed analysis of China’s brief clash 
with the South Vietnamese navy over control of the Paracel Islands—the first-
ever employment of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) against a foreign 
power� China’s victory, against a better-armed adversary, is a point of pride for 
today’s PLAN and has generated a substantial Chinese-language literature, much 
of which is exploited here for the first time� Toshi Yoshihara is a professor in the 
Strategy and Policy Department of the Naval War College�
NWC_Spring2016Review.indb   5 3/8/16   10:29 AM
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To understand the evolution of China’s naval capabilities over recent decades, it 
is important not to neglect the evolution of China’s naval leadership. In “Who’s at 
the Helm? The Past, Present, and Future Leaders of China’s Navy,” Jeffrey Becker 
offers a detailed assessment of the growing profile of the PLAN throughout the 
Chinese military establishment and the striking improvements in the profession-
alism of the current and emerging cohorts of China’s naval leadership, above all 
through enhanced professional military education and greater interaction with 
foreign navies. Jeffrey Becker is an analyst at the Center for Naval Analyses China 
Studies Division.
Too often forgotten today, but also of considerable interest, is the maritime 
dimension of the final stages of the Chinese civil war. In “The Battle of Quemoy: 
The Amphibious Assault That Held the Postwar Military Balance in the Taiwan 
Strait,” Maochun Miles Yu tells the story of the disastrous 1949 attempt by the 
People’s Republic of China to dislodge a substantial Kuomintang force from the 
island of Quemoy, strategically situated just offshore of the port of Amoy, the 
natural embarkation point for an eventual invasion of Taiwan contemplated at 
the time by Chinese communist leader Mao Zedong. The outcome of this battle 
had long-term consequences: it secured Taiwan as an independent Nationalist 
entity and revived flagging American support for the cause of Chiang Kai-shek. 
Maochun Miles Yu is a professor at the U.S. Naval Academy.
In today’s Navy, Alfred Thayer Mahan is more revered than read. Much of this 
reflects his ponderous and discursive writing style, but also the impression that 
his thought is hopelessly dated by the prejudices of his time, particularly his fa-
vorable view of American imperialism. In “National Interest and Moral Respon-
sibility in the Thought of Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan,” Thomas F. X. Varacalli 
makes a compelling case that Mahan’s grand strategic vision was more nuanced 
and complex than is generally credited, and indeed that it offers an interesting 
synthesis of elements of contemporary international relations theory that are 
usually seen as incompatible. Thomas F. X. Varacalli is a doctoral candidate in 
political science at Louisiana State University.
IF YOU VISIT US
Our editorial offices are now located in Sims Hall, in the Naval War College 
Coasters Harbor Island complex, on the third floor, west wing (rooms W334, 
335, 309). For building-security reasons, it would be necessary to meet you at 
the main entrance and escort you to our suite—give us a call ahead of time (401-
841-2236).
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PRESIDENT’S FORUM
IN THE FIRST WEEK OF JANUARY, Admiral John Richardson, the 
thirty-first Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), released a docu-
ment entitled “A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority.” Representing his 
“commander’s intent” for our Navy as we move forward under his leadership, the 
document provides a framework for thinking about the challenges we face and 
the manner in which he wants us to address them. To maximize awareness of this 
document, we are reprinting it here in the “President’s Forum” for your review 
and reflection.
I believe it is important to note that the CNO’s guidance is not a “campaign 
plan” or a “strategy,” but has been explicitly conceptualized as a “design.” With 
this document, the CNO has set the example for effective leadership in a complex 
world through its emphasis on decentralized execution and continuous assess-
ment, learning, and adaptation. Acknowledging the increasing complexity of the 
national security environment, and abiding by the tenets of mission command, 
the CNO framed his guidance by identifying clear objectives, organizing broad 
lines of effort (LOEs), specifying the initial key tasks associated with each LOE, 
and outlining the core attributes we all must demonstrate for our Navy to suc-
ceed. The CNO’s “design” approach provides enough specificity to gain synergy 
across the Navy, while at the same time it provides enough flexibility for organi-
zations to apply the design in a manner consistent with their unique situations.
Here at the Naval War College, we have a professional responsibility to apply 
this Design to all our efforts across the campus. With the Design’s emphasis on 
learning and leader development, we are uniquely positioned to contribute, and 
in many ways we are already executing consistent with the CNO’s guidance. I 
believe, however, that there are still areas in which we can improve our alignment 
The CNO’s Design and the Naval War College
6750_President'sForum CMYK.indd   9 3/11/16   10:36 AM
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with the specific objectives of the four LOEs and the key tasks supporting each� 
In the months to come, we will review all our education, research, and leader- 
development efforts from the perspective of the Design, and determine the 
changes necessary to ensure we are moving forward in accordance with the 
CNO’s guidance� Our collective efforts to focus and act on these changes will en-
sure the Naval War College steadies on a course that will help the Navy maintain 
maritime superiority in the decades to come�
I hope you enjoy this issue of the Review, and I encourage vibrant discussion 
in the pages of future issues regarding the Design�
P� GARDNER HOWE III
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, Naval War College
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A DESIGN FOR MAINTAINING MARITIME SUPERIORITY
MISSION
The United States Navy will be ready to conduct prompt and sustained combat 
incident to operations at sea� Our Navy will protect America from attack and pre-
serve America’s strategic influence in key regions of the world� U�S� naval forces 
and operations—from the sea floor to space, from deep water to the littorals, and 
in the information domain—will deter aggression and enable peaceful resolution 
of crises on terms acceptable to the United States and our allies and partners� If 
deterrence fails, the Navy will conduct decisive combat operations to defeat any 
enemy�
INTRODUCTION
For 240 years, the U�S� Navy has been a cornerstone of American security and 
prosperity� To continue to meet this obligation, we must adapt to the emerging 
security environment� The initiatives laid out in this Design represent initial 
steps along a future course to achieve the aims articulated in the Revised Co-
operative Strategy for the 21st Century (CS-21R) in this new environment� It’s a 
tremendously complex challenge� As we get underway, we must first understand 
our history—how we got to where we are� Moving forward, we’ll respect that we 
won’t get it all right, and so we’ll monitor and assess ourselves and our surround-
ings as we go� We’ll learn and adapt, always getting better, striving to the limits 
of performance� This cannot be a “top-down” effort; everybody must contribute�
STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT
On the eve of the 20th century, the United States emerged from the Civil War and 
laid the foundation to become a global power, but its course to continued pros-
perity was unclear� Navy Capt� Alfred Thayer Mahan helped to chart that course, 
arguing that American growth required access to overseas markets, which in turn 
required a preeminent navy to protect that access� America became a nation with 
global interests, and the seas were the path to new frontiers�
The essence of Mahan’s vision still pertains: America’s interests lie beyond our 
own shores� What was true in the late 19th century holds true today—America’s 
success depends on our creativity, our entrepreneurism, and our access and rela-
tionships abroad� In an increasingly globalized world, America’s success is even 
more reliant on the U�S� Navy�
In fulfilling our mission, it’s important to start with an assessment of the se-
curity environment� It is tempting to define the challenge solely in terms of our 
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allies, partners, and competitors—the state and non-state actors on the world 
stage� While these are critical, it is even more important to understand the dra-
matic changes that have taken place on the stage itself—the character of the envi-
ronment in which competition and cooperation occur� Fundamentally, the world 
has become dramatically more globalized, and this trend is accelerating� Our way 
ahead must account for this new reality� In particular, this Design will address 
three major and interrelated global forces that are increasingly used, increasingly 
stressed, increasingly important, and increasingly contested� These three forces 
energize the quickly changing environment in which the Navy must operate, and 
if required, fight and win�
The first global force is the traffic on the oceans, seas, and waterways, in-
cluding the sea floor—the classic maritime system� For millennia, the seas have 
served to connect people and societies to help them prosper� As the global econ-
omy continues to expand and become more connected, the maritime system is 
becoming increasingly used by the United States and the world as a whole� Ship-
ping traffic over traditional sea lanes is increasing, new trade routes are opening 
in the Arctic, and new technologies are making undersea resources more acces-
sible� This maritime traffic also includes mass and uncontrolled migration and 
illicit shipment of material and people� The maritime system is becoming more 
heavily used, more stressed, and more contested than ever before�
A second increasingly influential force is the rise of the global information 
system—the information that rides on the servers, undersea cables, satellites, and 
wireless networks that increasingly envelop and connect the globe� Newer than 
the maritime system, the information system is more pervasive, enabling an even 
greater multitude of connections between people and at a much lower cost of 
entry—literally an individual with a computer is a powerful actor in this system! 
Information, now passed in near-real time across links that continue to multiply, 
is in turn driving an accelerating rate of change—from music to medicine, from 
microfinance to missiles�
The third interrelated force is the increasing rate of technological creation and 
adoption� This is not just in information technologies, where Gordon Moore’s 
projections of exponential advances in processing, storage, and switches continue 
to be realized� Scientists are also unlocking new properties of commonplace ma-
terials and creating new materials altogether at astonishing speeds� Novel uses for 
increasingly sophisticated robotics, energy storage, 3-D printing, and networks of 
low-cost sensors, to name just a few examples, are changing almost every facet of 
how we work and live� Genetic science is just beginning to demonstrate its power� 
Artificial intelligence is just getting started and could fundamentally reshape the 
environment� And as technology is introduced at an accelerating rate, it is being 
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adopted by society just as fast—people are using these new tools as quickly as 
they are introduced, and in new and novel ways�
These three forces—the forces at play in the maritime system, the force of the 
information system, and the force of technology entering the environment—and 
the interplay between them have profound implications for the United States 
Navy� We must do everything we can to seize the potential afforded by this envi-
ronment� Our competitors are moving quickly, and our adversaries are bent on 
leaving us swirling in their wake�
And the competitors themselves have changed� For the first time in 25 years, 
the United States is facing a return to great power competition� Russia and China 
both have advanced their military capabilities to act as global powers� Their 
goals are backed by a growing arsenal of high-end warfighting capabilities, many 
of which are focused specifically on our vulnerabilities and are increasingly de-
signed from the ground up to leverage the maritime, technological, and informa-
tion systems� They continue to develop and field information-enabled weapons, 
both kinetic and non-kinetic, with increasing range, precision, and destructive 
capacity� Both China and Russia are also engaging in coercion and competition 
below the traditional thresholds of high-end conflict, but nonetheless exploit the 
weakness of accepted norms in space, cyber, and the electromagnetic spectrum� 
The Russian Navy is operating with a frequency and in areas not seen for almost 
two decades, and the Chinese PLA(N) is extending its reach around the world�
Russia and China are not the only actors seeking to gain advantages in the 
emerging security environment in ways that threaten U�S� and global interests� 
Others are now pursuing advanced technology, including military technologies 
that were once the exclusive province of great powers—this trend will only con-
tinue� Coupled with a continued dedication to furthering its nuclear weapons and 
missile programs, North Korea’s provocative actions continue to threaten security 
in North Asia and beyond� And while the recent international agreement with 
Iran is intended to curb its nuclear ambitions, Tehran’s advanced missiles, proxy 
forces, and other conventional capabilities continue to pose threats to which the 
Navy must remain prepared to respond� Finally, international terrorist groups 
have proven their resilience and adaptability and now pose a long-term threat 
to stability and security around the world� All of these actors seek to exploit all 
three forces described above—the speed, precision, and reach that the maritime 
and information systems now enable, bolstered by new technologies—to counter 
U�S� military advantages and to threaten the rules and norms that have been the 
basis of prosperity and world order for the last 70 years�
There is also a fourth ‘force’ that shapes our security environment� Barring an 
unforeseen change, even as we face new challenges and an increasing pace, the 
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Defense and Navy budgets likely will continue to be under pressure� We will not 
be able to “buy” our way out of the challenges we face� The budget environment 
will force tough choices, but must also inspire new thinking�
Looking forward, it is clear that the challenges the Navy faces are shifting in 
character, are increasingly difficult to address in isolation, and are changing more 
quickly� This will require us to reexamine our approaches in every aspect of our 
operations� But as we change in many areas, it is important to remember that 
there will also be constants� The nature of war has always been, and will remain, 
a violent human contest between thinking and adapting adversaries for politi-
cal gain� Given this fundamental truth, the lessons of the masters—Thucydides, 
Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, Mao, Corbett, and, yes, Mahan—still apply� America’s im-
portance to the world holds fast� Our nation’s reliance on its Navy—our Navy—
continues to grow�
WHY A “DESIGN?”
The scope and complexity of the challenges we face demand a different approach 
than that offered by a classic campaign plan� This guidance frames the problem 
and a way forward while acknowledging that there is inherent and fundamental 
uncertainty in both the problem definition and the proposed solution�
Accordingly, we will make our best initial assessment of the environment, for-
mulate a way ahead, and move out� But as we move, we will continually assess the 
environment, to ensure that it responds in a way that is consistent with achieving 
our goals� Where necessary, we will make adjustments, challenging ourselves to 
approach the limits of performance�
This Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority will guide our behaviors 
and investments, both this year and in the years to come� More specific details 
about programs and funding adjustments will be reflected in our annual budget 
documents�
CORE ATTRIBUTES
One clear implication of the current environment is the need for the Navy to 
prepare for decentralized operations, guided by commander’s intent� The ability 
to achieve this end is reliant on the trust and confidence that is based on a clear 
understanding, among peers and between commanders and subordinates, of the 
risk that can be tolerated� This trust and confidence is enhanced by our actions, 
which must reflect our core values of Honor, Courage, and Commitment� Four 
core attributes of our professional identity will help to serve as guiding criteria 
for our decisions and actions� If we abide by these attributes, our values should 
be clearly evident in our actions�
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• Integrity: Our behaviors as individuals and as an organization align with our 
values as a profession� We actively strengthen each other’s resolve to act con-
sistently with our values� As individuals, as teams, and as a Navy, our conduct 
must always be upright and honorable both in public and when nobody’s 
looking�
• Accountability: We are a mission-focused force� We achieve and maintain 
high standards� Our actions support our strategy� We clearly define the 
problem we’re trying to solve and the proposed outcomes� In execution, we 
honestly assess our progress and adjust as required—we are our own toughest 
critic�
• Initiative: On their own, everybody strives to be the best they can be—we 
give 100% when on the job� Our leaders take ownership and act to the limit 
of their authorities� We foster a questioning attitude and look at new ideas 
with an open mind� Our most junior teammate may have the best idea; we 
must be open to capturing that idea�
• Toughness: We can take a hit and keep going, tapping all sources of strength 
and resilience: rigorous training for operations and combat, the fighting 
spirit of our people, and the steadfast support of our families� We don’t give 
up the ship�
FOUR LINES OF EFFORT
The execution of this Design is built along four Lines of Effort that focus on war-
fighting, learning faster, strengthening our Navy team, and building partnerships� 
These lines of effort are inextricably linked and must be considered together to 
get a sense of the total effort� The corresponding objectives and first year tasks 
listed under each line of effort define how we will begin to move forward�
Strengthen Naval Power at and from Sea: Maintain a fleet that is trained and 
ready to operate and fight decisively—from the deep ocean to the littorals, from 
the sea floor to space, and in the information domain� Align our organization to 
best support generating operational excellence�
1� Maintain and modernize the undersea leg of the strategic deterrent triad� 
This is foundational to our survival as a nation�
2� In partnership with the Marine Corps, develop concepts and capabilities 
to provide more options to national leaders, from non-conflict competi-
tion to high-end combat at sea� Operations short of conflict should be 
designed to contain and control escalation on terms favorable to the U�S� 
Combat at sea must address “blue-water” scenarios far from land and 
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power projection ashore in a highly “informationalized” and contested 
environment� All scenarios must address the threat of long-range preci-
sion strike� Test and refine concepts through focused wargaming, model-
ing, and simulations� Validate these concepts through fleet exercises, unit 
training, and certification�
3� Further advance and ingrain information warfare� Expand the Electro-
magnetic Maneuver Warfare concept to encompass all of information 
warfare, to include space and cyberspace�
4� To better meet today’s force demands, explore alternative fleet designs, 
including kinetic and non-kinetic payloads and both manned and un-
manned systems� This effort will include exploring new naval platforms 
and formations—again in a highly “informationalized” environment—to 
meet combatant commander needs�
5� Examine the organization of United States Fleet Forces Command, Com-
mander Pacific Fleet, and their subordinate commands to better support 
clearly defining operational and warfighting demands and then to gener-
ate ready forces to meet those demands�
6� Examine OPNAV organization to rationalize our headquarters in support 
of warfighting requirements�
Achieve High Velocity Learning at Every Level: Apply the best concepts, tech-
niques, and technologies to accelerate learning as individuals, teams, and organi-
zations� Clearly know the objective and the theoretical limits of performance—set 
aspirational goals� Begin problem definition by studying history—do not relearn 
old lessons� Start by seeing what you can accomplish without additional resources� 
During execution, conduct routine and rigorous self-assessment� Adapt process-
es to be inherently receptive to innovation and creativity�
1� Implement individual, team, and organizational best practices to inculcate 
high velocity learning as a matter of routine�
2� Expand the use of learning-centered technologies, simulators, online 
gaming, analytics, and other tools as a means to bring in creativity, opera-
tional agility, and insight�
3� Optimize the Navy intellectual enterprise to maximize combat effective-
ness and efficiency� Reinvigorate an assessment culture and processes�
4� Understand the lessons of history so as not to relearn them�
Strengthen Our Navy Team for the Future: We are one Navy Team—comprised of 
a diverse mix of active duty and reserve Sailors, Navy Civilians, and our families 
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—with a history of service, sacrifice, and success� We will build on this history to 
create a climate of operational excellence that will keep us ready to prevail in all 
future challenges�
1� Aggressively pursue implementation of the core tenets of the “Sailor 2025” 
program—fully integrated and transparent data and analytics, increased 
career choice and flexibility, expanded family support, and tailored  
learning�
2� Accelerate “Sailor 2025” efforts to leverage information technology to en-
hance personnel system and training modernization efforts�
3� Strengthen and broaden leadership development programs to renew 
and reinforce the Navy Team’s dedication to the naval profession� Leader 
development will be fleet-centered and will begin early in our careers, fo-
cusing on character and commitment to Navy core values� Character and 
leadership will be rewarded through challenging assignments and  
advancement�
4� Strengthen organizational integrity by balancing administrative require-
ments with the benefits gained from the time spent� The goal will be to 
return more time to leaders and empower them to develop their teams�
5� Strengthen the role of Navy leaders in leading and managing civilian 
professionals as key contributors to the mission effectiveness of our Navy 
Team�
Expand and Strengthen Our Network of Partners: Deepen operational relation-
ships with other services, agencies, industry, allies, and partners—who operate 
with the Navy to support our shared interests�
1� Enhance integration with our Joint Service and interagency partners at all 
levels of interaction, to include current and future planning, concept, and 
capability development and assessment�
2� Prioritize key international partnerships through information sharing, 
interoperability initiatives, and combined operations; explore new oppor-
tunities for combined forward operations�
3� Deepen the dialogue with private research and development labs, and 
academia� Ensure that our Navy labs and research centers are competitive 
and fully engaged with their private-sector partners�
4� Increase the volume and range of interaction with commercial industry� 
Seek opportunities through non-traditional partners�
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DESIRED OUTCOME
A Naval Force that produces leaders and teams who learn and adapt to achieve 
maximum possible performance, and who achieve and maintain high standards 
to be ready for decisive operations and combat�
CONCLUSION
We will remain the world’s finest navy only if we all fight each and every minute 
to get better� Our competitors are focused on taking the lead—we must pick up 
the pace and deny them� The margins of victory are razor thin—but decisive! I 
am counting on your integrity, accountability, initiative, and toughness to execute 
the lines of effort described in this Design, execute our mission, and achieve our 
end state� I am honored and proud to lead you�
JOHN M� RICHARDSON
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n late 1990, veteran U�S� Navy strategist Captain Peter M� Swartz was preparing to 
return to the United States after a three-year joint assignment at the U�S� mission 
to NATO in Brussels, Belgium� Swartz desired to return to the Office of the Chief 
of Naval Operations (OPNAV) and to the business of naval strategy in which he 
had been so engaged during the previous decade� Swartz was advised strongly 
by his mentor in Brussels, Admiral Jim Hogg, the U�S� military representative to 
NATO’s Military Committee, to take instead a position as a special assistant to the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), General Colin Powell, U�S� Army� 
Swartz reiterated that he was not interested in yet another joint job but instead 
desired to return to the business of creating and disseminating naval strategy� He 
checked, however, with various Navy colleagues and friends� He was surprised 
at how many old Navy friends told him the job working for General Powell was 
“a plum assignment”; they unanimously urged him to take it� One front-running 
naval officer went so far as to suggest that if Swartz did not want it, he should 
let that officer know immediately, so he could bid for it� Admiral Hogg grew 
impatient and gave Swartz one more day to make up his mind� He accepted the 
position�
Swartz plunged immediately into his new job, which involved a very close and 
positive working relationship with General Powell—just when Saddam Hussein 
was wreaking havoc on Kuwait and threatening Saudi Arabia� As Swartz found 
his way around the Pentagon again, he noticed a very high level of Navy talent 
on the Joint Staff—talent that had never been assigned there by the Navy in all 
his previous experience in the Pentagon during the 1970s and 1980s� In contrast, 
Steven Wills
THE EFFECT OF THE GOLDWATER-NICHOLS ACT 
OF 1986 ON NAVAL STRATEGY, 1987–1994
I
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when he returned to visit his old haunts and reestablish his Washington Navy 
network, he was nonplussed by the decline in the experience base and educa-
tional background in some OPNAV shops�
Swartz had an occasion in September 1990 to visit the Joint Staff J8 office 
to get input on a project he was working on for General Powell� While there, 
he spoke to Commander Joe Sestak, whom he knew by reputation and whose 
Harvard doctoral dissertation on the Seventh Fleet Swartz had previously read 
and exploited� Swartz commented to Sestak that he found the disparity of talent 
between OPNAV and the Joint Staff both new and disconcerting; he feared for 
the future intellectual prowess of those in OPNAV and other key Navy institu-
tions� This was a particular concern for Swartz since he had participated in and 
fostered that prowess during his years in OPNAV in the 1980s as an author of 
and advocate for the Maritime Strategy� Sestak responded, “Captain, you’ve been 
away� Goldwater-Nichols happened while you were gone, don’t you remember? 
Do you remember how hard you and your colleagues fought against it? Do you 
remember that you lost?”1
INITIAL IMPACT
Sestak’s short response encapsulated a significant period of change for the 
Navy from 1989 to early 1994� The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 significantly 
changed the way the nation, and particularly the U�S� Navy, approached the busi-
ness of strategy� Alterations to the military chain of command that the legislation 
brought about had officially separated the leaders of the Navy from the service’s 
operational forces as regional, combatant commander–based strategy replaced 
that of centralized, service-based global leadership� The physical domains 
of those regional commanders also increasingly cut across traditional naval 
geographic command boundaries� In addition to removing the responsibility 
for strategy from the Navy’s leadership, the Goldwater-Nichols Act effectively 
dispersed the naval service’s informal but highly effective cohort of strategic 
experts who had been responsible for decades of naval strategy, removed them 
from naval control, and scattered them in assignments on the Joint Staff and the 
regional and functional commanders’ (CINC) staffs� The personnel changes the 
legislation brought about forced many strategy experts like Swartz into joint jobs 
instead of their traditional billets on the OPNAV staff�
This initially had a very positive effect: seasoned, knowledgeable, and experi-
enced naval strategists were now populating influential joint staffs, where their 
capabilities and concepts ensured that the nation continued to deploy and use 
its naval power sensibly� OPNAV office OP-06, the professional home of naval 
strategic concepts during the Cold War, still had a reasonably positive reputa-
tion and attracted some of the Navy’s brightest officers at the end of the 1980s� 
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However, as young officers sought important jobs in Washington, they increas-
ingly recoiled from assignment to OPNAV, instead embracing joint strategy duty 
as an essential ticket on the way to flag rank� Many continued to look for joint as-
signments for their next tour in Washington, while others sought billets in those 
OPNAV offices with strong connections to their warfare communities� Thus, after 
Goldwater-Nichols the “bench” at OP-06 began to weaken, and entering the 
1990s its strength continued to slide�
This combination of change in command structure, alteration of traditional 
naval concepts of the battle space, and migration of Navy strategy experts from 
OPNAV to the Joint Staff altered the Navy’s concept of strategy� The Navy’s most 
senior officers no longer controlled the forces they built, trained, and equipped� 
The concepts of naval strategy that remained in the wake of Goldwater-Nichols 
were regional rather than global in character� Finally, the legislation’s joint per-
sonnel requirements effectively served to disband the Navy’s carefully construct-
ed cohort of strategic experts, dispersing them throughout the joint force� While 
perhaps useful in the first decade after the end of the Cold War, these changes 
would have significant impacts in the first decade of the twenty-first century as 
the Navy sought new strategic solutions to a dwindling budget and an aging, 
contracting force structure�
GENESIS OF THE LEGISLATION
The Goldwater-Nichols Act was the most significant shake-up in the Depart-
ment of Defense since its creation in 1949�2 The failure to achieve desired results 
during the Vietnam War may have been the early catalyst for the defense reform 
movement of the late 1970s, but events that followed provided further impetus 
for change� A series of military disasters since the end of the Vietnam War— 
including the failure to rescue hostages in the SS Mayaguez and Iran hostage 
crises of 1973 and 1979–81, respectively, and problems with interservice plan-
ning and communication during the 1983 Lebanon peacekeeping mission and 
invasion of Grenada—provided significant impetus for reform�3 The impression 
of excessive defense spending resulting from soaring Reagan administration mili-
tary budgets caught the eye of some members of Congress and helped generate 
additional legislative-branch interest in defense reform�4 
The reform movement had strong support within Congress and from some 
key Reagan administration officials and the defense intellectual community� 
Congressional supporters such as cosponsors Senator Barry Goldwater (R-Ariz�) 
and Representative Bill Nichols (D-Ga�), Senator Sam Nunn (D-Ga�), and Repre-
sentatives Ike Skelton (D-Mo�) and Les Aspin (D-Wis�) felt that greater central-
ization of power in the CJCS office would improve the quality of advice available 
to the nation’s civilian leadership� Goldwater called the legislation “the only 
NWC_Spring2016Review.indb   23 3/8/16   10:29 AM
28
Naval War College Review, Vol. 69 [2016], No. 2, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol69/iss2/1
 2 4  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
goddamn thing I have ever done in the Senate that was worth a damn�”5 Reagan 
administration members such as National Security Adviser Robert McFarlane 
supported reform efforts, as did former Deputy Defense Secretary David Pack-
ard, whom President Reagan appointed chairman of a presidential blue-ribbon 
commission on defense reform� Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger was not in 
favor of reform at first, but later shifted his position—for practical reasons, rather 
than due to an actual change in his beliefs�6
The Navy and Marine Corps leadership, including Chief of Naval Operations 
(CNO) Admiral James D� Watkins and Marine Corps Commandant General P� 
X� Kelley, were generally op-
posed to the legislation, as 
they believed it restricted 
their traditional freedom of 
action and gave other services 
uninformed control over ship-
building and naval and marine operations� Navy Secretary John Lehman offered 
the most vocal criticisms of the proposed legislation and quickly became the 
effective leader of the opposition� He stated that the proposed legislation would 
create inefficient bureaucracy in the Defense Department and reduce the quality 
of military advice offered to the president� Lehman also opposed concentrating 
so much power in the office of the CJCS, which would restrict advice flowing to 
the president to “the opinion and decision of one man, the chairman himself, and 
his general staff bureaucracy�”7 Lehman’s opposition campaign was so well orga-
nized and effective that Senator Goldwater wrote directly to Defense Secretary 
Weinberger and President Reagan to complain that the efforts of Lehman’s staff 
were illegal�8
Despite opposition, and reinforced by findings from Packard’s Blue Ribbon 
Commission on Defense Management, the legislation passed Congress by a sig-
nificant bipartisan majority in both the House of Representatives (383–27) and 
Senate (95–0)�9
Although hailed as a great triumph for the defense reform movement, the 
Goldwater-Nichols Act was more of an incomplete armistice than a “victory on 
the Potomac,” as the act’s author James Locher contended in his 2002 book� In 
fact, defense reformers had a considerably more radical plan to change funda-
mentally the structure of senior military leadership and the armed forces’ orga-
nization for combat� The Senate Armed Services Committee Staff study entitled 
Defense Organization: The Need for Change, authored by Locher, contained 
ninety-one specific recommendations� It specifically suggested the disestablish-
ment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) in favor of a Joint Military Advisory Coun-
cil independent of all service functions; a reorganization of the military along 
The legislation’s joint personnel requirements 
effectively served to disband the Navy’s care-
fully constructed cohort of strategic experts, 
dispersing them throughout the joint force.
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mission, rather than service, lines; and removal from the chain of command of 
service component commanders located within the unified commands�10
Locher has officially dismissed these proposals as diversionary “bullet traps” 
designed to divert antireform opponents from more-moderate goals�11 Yet 
similar recommendations appear in the memoirs of Senator Goldwater as well 
as those of Senator John Tower�12 There had also been strong arguments from 
analysts influenced by the policies of Defense Secretary Robert S� McNamara 
for reorganization of the Defense Department around joint missions rather than 
geographic or service constructs ever since the Symington Commission of 1961, 
which recommended the abolition of the separate civilian military departments, 
the replacement of the JCS with a group of senior officers separated from their re-
spective service affiliations, and the reduction in authority of the individual ser-
vice chiefs to mere administrative and logistics duties�13 This evidence suggests 
that pro-reform advocates had a much longer list of objectives that were not met 
in the Goldwater-Nichols legislation� The inability of the reform camp to imple-
ment fully the more comprehensive reforms suggests that Secretary Lehman’s 
opposition movement was highly effective in preventing significant alteration to 
U�S� defense organization� The partial reform that was implemented made for an 
uncertain climate as the military services grappled with the problem of creating 
strategy in the post–Cold War era�
SUBSTANCE AND EFFECTS OF THE ACT
The legislation had three significant effects on the creation of military strategy 
within the services and in the Department of Defense at large� It elevated the CJCS 
to the position of principal military adviser to the president� It gave each regional 
combatant commander greater power over his or her organization and regional 
strategy at the expense of service chiefs� These first two changes further restricted 
service leaders’ abilities to influence the development of strategy and formula-
tion of the defense budget, as well as the roles and force structure of the services� 
Finally, the Goldwater-Nichols Act had the effect of diverting talented officers 
from their traditional roles on service staffs to the heretofore less-desirable 
joint and CINC staffs� The services’ own abilities to create and advocate new 
comprehensive, global, strategic concepts withered in this new environment�
As the 1980s came to a close it became evident the Navy would need to imple-
ment the provisions of the Goldwater-Nichols legislation in an environment in 
which “senior four-star officers no longer had control of the fleet�”14 While the 
service chiefs had been organizationally removed from the military chain of com-
mand in 1958 as part of the Eisenhower reform package, they retained significant 
influence over operational forces� This influence was apparent in the production 
and evolution of the 1980s-era Maritime Strategy� While anchored in the Navy’s 
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traditional responsibility to provide naval force through the six-hundred-ship 
Navy concept, the Maritime Strategy also served as a “contingent warfighting 
doctrine” describing how the U�S� Navy proposed to combat the Soviet Union 
across the multiple regional commands�15
The Maritime Strategy was the latest in a series of naval strategic documents 
from the late 1940s to the 1980s that sought to articulate the Navy’s place in Cold 
War national strategy� These documents generally had been produced at the 
behest and under the guidance of the CNO and the Secretary of the Navy� Some 
regional combatant commanders resisted this influence at the time� They, not the 
CNO, were responsible for the employment of combat units against the enemy� 
Future CJCS, then–Pacific commander Admiral William Crowe responded to a 
1984 presentation of the Maritime Strategy, saying, “I’m not sure why the CNO 
needs a maritime strategy; I need one, but he doesn’t�”16 This was an ironic state-
ment, since Admiral Crowe, while serving on the OPNAV staff (OP-06; Deputy 
Chief of Naval Operations for Strategy, Plans, and Policy) during the mid-1970s, 
had been responsible for creating the OPNAV staff office specifically charged 
with strategy creation (OP-603) and filling it with strategy experts�17 Dividing 
up the fleet into theaters subject to the individual war-fighting concepts of indi-
vidual CINCs, not to mention the CINCs’ reluctance to deploy their own ships 
across CINC boundaries, hamstrung the Navy’s attempts to organize, train, and 
equip its forces to deter or confront the Soviet Union�
The Goldwater-Nichols Act seemed, at the time, to settle this argument in 
favor of the primacy of the CJCS and combatant commanders over the service 
chiefs� The legislation elevated the chairman from a position of first among 
equals to that of principal military assistant to the president and gave the chair-
man the authority to convene, set the agenda for, and preside over the meetings 
of the JCS�18 While individual members of the JCS were not prohibited from 
offering separate advice to the president on their own initiative, the chairman’s 
own advice took priority in presidential review over that offered by other service 
chiefs�19 The chairman was also given significant authority over the strategic 
planning and assessment functions of the JCS, with responsibility for providing 
strategic direction and preparing strategic, logistics, and mobility plans for the 
armed forces�20 The Goldwater-Nichols legislation did not make the chairman 
a “supreme commander of the military services,” as some reformers proposed, 
but it did demand that combatant commanders communicate with the Defense 
Secretary and president through the CJCS officeholder, thus making the chair-
man a “de facto” supreme commander in the eyes of some�21 The service chiefs 
retained their authority to train, equip, and provide forces to the combatant com-
manders, but responsibility for strategy appeared, at that time, to reside firmly in 
joint hands� These provisions would make comprehensive, global, service-based 
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strategic concepts much more difficult to create and implement in the post-
Goldwater-Nichols era�
EFFECTS ON PLANNING
The effects of the legislation soon manifested themselves in the first post-
Goldwater-Nichols Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan in early 1987� Intelligence 
reporting at that time indicated that a Soviet attack would be evident at least two 
weeks before it started, thus giving planners time to reinforce Western forces on 
the Central European front�22 This appraisal led to some planning reassessments 
regarding where to focus primary U�S� efforts early in a global conflict� Believ-
ing that constrained resources might force decision makers to choose between 
preparing for a global and preparing for a regional war, Joint Staff planners in 
1987 had attempted to incorporate greater emphasis on regional planning in the 
National Military Strategy Document (NMSD) for fiscal years 1990–94�23 The 
continued reduction of the Soviet threat, particularly the Soviets’ decreasing abil-
ity to project power rapidly into Central Europe and the Persian Gulf, allowed 
Joint Staff planners to focus more on regional strategies� The director of the Joint 
Staff Planning Office (J5) in 1989, Major General George Lee Butler, made the 
projection of increased warning time a justification for greater focus on regional 
planning�24
The impending end of the Cold War and expected drawdown in defense 
spending occupied the efforts of other Joint Staff offices� The new office of the 
Force Structure, Resource, and Assessments Directorate (J8), a direct product 
of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, conducted a review of several force-reduction 
strategies entitled the “Quiet Study�” However, the departing chairman, Admiral 
Crowe, did not want to recommend force reductions in the absence of a new 
presidential strategy�25 But J8 conducted a second Quiet Study that further fo-
cused on regional instead of global conflicts�
The study’s conclusions were embraced by the new chairman, whose own 
assumptions on the change to regional strategy were closely aligned with the 
language of the Quiet Study 2 report� The appointment of General Colin Pow-
ell to the chairmanship by President George H� W� Bush in 1989 significantly 
aided in the transformation from global to regional-based strategy� General 
Powell embraced the new authority granted him under Goldwater-Nichols “with 
alacrity” and used it to advance a post–Cold War agenda of change�26 General 
Powell expanded the J5 and J8 projects into a combined effort that eventually 
recommended a 25 percent cut in overall military strength in conjunction with 
the change to a regional strategic focus� A briefing entitled “A View to the 90s” 
was produced that encapsulated the views of the chairman as well as Defense 
Secretary Richard Cheney, who largely agreed with Powell’s assessment� These 
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changes also were incorporated into the president’s National Security Strategy 
and the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG), which were both products of the 
Goldwater-Nichols legislation�
THE BATTLE IS JOINED
General Powell’s full presentation of these changes at a 26 February 1990 meeting 
of the Joint Chiefs and regional commanders was the services’ first chance to op-
pose or propose changes to the chairman’s concept� The Navy, under the leader-
ship of CNO Admiral Carlisle Trost, disagreed with the naval force structure out-
lined in “A View to the 90s�” Admiral Trost believed the Soviet Union still posed a 
global naval threat, and he had two specific complaints about the proposed force 
structure—which related directly to the effects of the Goldwater-Nichols Act� 
First, and most important, “the Navy had not been a part of the development of 
the force before it was ‘laid on the table’ with the strategy, and thus was not privy 
to the analysis that validated its size and capabilities�”27 Second, due to this lack of 
naval participation, the proposed naval force was too small to be effective in the 
rotational forward presence mission it was intended to fill�28
Admiral Trost was fighting an uphill battle� Before his planned testimony on 
force posture in April 1990, Senate Armed Services Committee members Sena-
tors Sam Nunn and John Warner (R-Va�) both said that the “Chiefs needed ‘to 
come up here with a different story this year, it’s time to reduce�’”29 It was passage 
of the Goldwater-Nichols Act that enabled Powell to create naval force structure 
recommendations without input from the Navy’s service chief, and made possible 
congressional favoring of Powell’s proposal over the objections of the responsible 
service chief� As one chief noted, “[T]he planning for the defense build-down was 
a case of someone determining in advance what was needed, and then seeing that 
the result was produced�”30
General Powell further strengthened the hand of joint versus service-based 
planning in the research, planning, and implementation of the first national mili-
tary strategy (NMS) associated with the new NMSD and DPG� There was broad 
agreement that a change in focus from global to regional-based strategies was 
in order, although some global plans against residual Soviet action persisted�31 
These concepts formed the basis of the 1991 Contingency Planning Guidance 
(CPG) document, which “established a new framework for operational planning 
based upon both the changes that had taken place in the strategic environment 
and expected force reductions�”32 The CPG in turn was the basis for the Joint 
Strategic Contingency Planning document that was the basis for the new, 1991 
NMS that was adopted on 27 January 1992�33 The latter document directed the 
regional commanders in chief to “prepare operational plans that focused on re-
gional threats�”34 The service chiefs all objected to the new strategy, to a degree, 
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but when confronted with President Bush’s demand to reduce the defense budget 
owing to the end of the Cold War, they quickly assented and moved to protect 
their respective budgets�35 The results of the Gulf War also appeared to “validate 
the conceptual underpinnings of the new military strategy,” discouraging further 
argument over its scope and implementation�36
These changes were especially hard on the Navy� It struggled to adjust to a new 
national military strategy, a new force structure determined by outsiders, and a 
fundamental shift in the service’s own maritime strategy concepts� Admiral Frank 
Kelso II, who replaced Admiral Trost as CNO in 1990, had planned to write a 
comprehensive naval plan on a logical reduction of naval forces for the postwar 
world, but could not gain the concurrence of the Secretary of the Navy and the 
Secretary of Defense fast enough to get ahead of General Powell’s efforts�37 The 
results of Kelso’s efforts later appeared in the Naval Institute Proceedings in April 
1991� Kelso said, “I never got approval to publish the article in time for it to have 
the effect I desired� It was finally published after General Powell came up with a 
450-ship Navy that he called a base force� The article had absolutely zero effect 
or impact, because it was not a ‘put your step forward�’ It was ‘Okay, you’ve been 
drug down ship by ship now�’ In other words, it came after the fact that the reduc-
tions had started�”38
Not only was the senior naval leadership no longer in command of the fleet, 
those leaders’ opinions on naval strategy and force structure were rejected in fa-
vor of those of an army general� While defense cuts were inevitable in the wake of 
the Cold War, as they had been after the Second World War, in this case the CJCS 
rather than the CNO or even the Secretary of the Navy made the recommenda-
tion to Congress and the president about what naval forces would be retained� 
The Navy’s inability to exert influence on its own size, composition, and missions 
would negatively impact the ability of naval leadership to create strategy from 
1991 onward�
THE NEW PERSPECTIVE
The chairman’s new powers also extended to the strategic orientation of the ser-
vices� Before 1986, naval officers involved in strategic and operational planning 
had been accustomed to think of broad ocean areas as single conceptual units, 
and the older naval organization of the Atlantic and Pacific commands had rein-
forced that way of thinking�39 The chairman’s new powers, however, included the 
right periodically to review and adjust the missions, responsibilities, geographic 
boundaries, and force structure of each combatant command�40
The Navy had historically seen the whole of the world’s oceans as a unitary 
theater of action uniquely suited to naval control� The service had not, however, 
fully articulated this concept on paper until the creation of the first version of 
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the Maritime Strategy in October 1982�41 Naval leaders had also been loath to 
give land-based commanders any control over ocean areas, owing to their belief 
in a unitary global ocean battle space�42 But while a global Cold War supported 
the Navy’s view, its end allowed for the development of a number of regional 
strategies�
General Powell’s “A View to the 90s” briefing was based on his vision that the 
disintegration of the Soviet empire called for new regional strategies that should 
assume the United States would remain a superpower because of its military 
capabilities, forces, and alliance relationships�43 His solution to this challenge 
involved reshaping not only the force structure but the geographically defined 
battle space in which that force operated� Naval historian John Hattendorf de-
scribed the effect of this change on the Navy as one of “structural change in 
command authority” that “had the intended effect of increasing joint strategic 
and operational planning in specific geographical locations,” but “also had the 
unintended effect of making it more difficult to implement coordinated concepts 
for oceans—the natural geographical unit of maritime space�”44
This process had begun even before Powell was appointed chairman� The 1987 
review of combatant command (COCOM) boundaries required by the Goldwater- 
Nichols Act generated several disputes between the services� The Army attempted 
to revive a previous plan for a subordinate unified Northeast Asia Command cen-
tered on the Korean Peninsula, but this requirement was rejected in the course 
of the Joint Chiefs’ review�45 Of more concern was an appraisal of whether U�S� 
Central Command (USCENTCOM) should assume responsibility for the eastern 
Mediterranean water space directly adjacent to the “confrontational” states of 
Israel, Syria, and Lebanon�46 CNO Admiral Trost counterproposed that both the 
Red Sea and the Persian Gulf be reassigned to U�S� Pacific Command, arguing 
that “USCINCCENT could not carry out his mission without command of the 
seas stretching all the way back to the California coast, which was USCINCPAC’s 
responsibility�” In the end, the JCS review made only a moderate change—it 
assigned limited areas of the Gulfs of Oman and Aden to USCENTCOM 
—and even so Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger had to intervene person-
ally to settle the situation�47 The Navy’s objections to the proposed changes to 
COCOM oceanic boundaries demonstrated the service’s concept of a unified 
ocean area of responsibility within which the inherent maneuverability, reach, 
power, and flexibility of naval forces could be optimally deployed and redeployed 
to meet the nation’s challenges�
The Navy had mixed success in retaining its traditional maritime responsibili-
ties during General Powell’s 1991 COCOM review� The new Strategic Command 
and U�S� Atlantic Command (USACOM) had force structures favorable to naval 
leadership, but USACOM acquired maritime geographic responsibilities over the 
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objections of the Navy and Marine Corps leadership� General Powell in particular 
desired that the Navy gunnery range in Vieques, Puerto Rico, be available for 
joint exercises�48
CHANGES THROUGH THE ’90s
These adjustments to COCOM boundaries and areas of responsibility were 
minor in comparison with changes in the late 1990s� But it was the chairman’s 
greater Goldwater-Nichols-mandated authority that made them possible, and 
they supported the continued shift from a global to a regional-based strategy in 
the aftermath of the Cold War�
The 1992 presidential DPG read, “We can shift our defense planning from a fo-
cus on the global threat posed by the Warsaw Pact to focus on the less-demanding 
regional threats and challenges we are more likely to face in the future�”49 This 
document further identified four elements of the regional defense concept: plan-
ning for uncertainty, shaping the future security environment, maintenance of 
“strategic depth,” and continued U�S� leadership to maintain security and prevent 
the rise of a successor to the Soviet Union�50
Although the CINC positions were originally designed as regional command-
ers for a global conflict with the Soviet Union, they took on new prominence after 
1991 as the active facilitators of a new world order friendly to U�S� interests� This 
new role was stated in a 16 April 1992 memo by Under Secretary of Defense for 
Policy Paul Wolfowitz on the contents of the 1992 DPG: “The perceived ability 
of the U�S� to act independently, if necessary, is thus an important factor, even in 
the cases where we do not actually do so�” Wolfowitz continued:
Our forward presence helps to shape the evolving security environment� We will con-
tinue to rely on forward presence of U�S� forces to show U�S� commitment and lend 
credibility to our alliances, to deter aggression, enhance regional stability, promote 
U�S� influence and access, and, when necessary, provide an initial crisis-response 
capability� Forward presence is vital to the maintenance of the system of collective 
defense by which the United States has been able to work with our friends and allies 
to protect our security interests, while minimizing the burden of defense spending 
and of unnecessary arms competition�51
While the new post–Cold War national strategy and national military strategy 
were the original products of the civilian presidential administration and de-
fense secretariat, the principal military inputs came from the office of the chair-
man and the Joint Staff� The services provided only limited input, confined to 
a defense of their spending programs� In comparison with the environment in 
which the Navy had produced the Maritime Strategy, it had now lost control of 
the argument about the size and composition of its force and how and where it 
would fight�
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THE NAVY’S LEGACY OF STRATEGISTS
This change in the Navy’s fortunes was not due to a deficiency in qualified stra-
tegic thinkers� The service had cultivated a cadre of experts since the days of 
War Plan ORANGE, when Navy strategists such as Charles “Savvy” Cooke and 
Richmond K� Turner accurately anticipated the maritime strategy and course of 
the future Pacific war of 1941–45�52
This tradition continued throughout the Cold War, with the service mentoring 
and sustaining a number of experts in naval strategy� While these officers were 
assigned operational, fleet-related billets in the course of their regular career 
paths, they were also rotated through a small number of strategic planning offices 
on the CNO’s staff� They often worked in concert with civilian academics at the 
Naval War College, the traditional home of naval strategic thought and culture 
since the days of Alfred Thayer Mahan in the late nineteenth century�
These officers were the product of what naval historian John Hattendorf called 
“[a] resurgence of strategic thinking in the U�S� Navy” in response to the tenure 
of Secretary of Defense Robert S� McNamara (1961–68), during which long-
range planning had been reduced to a series of five-year planning cycles�53 CNO 
Admiral Elmo Zumwalt first sought to create a new cadre of strategists through 
the Naval War College� This effort was not entirely successful� The overall cur-
riculum of the War College improved thanks to the efforts of then-President Vice 
Admiral Stansfield Turner, but the school did not attract enough of the Navy’s 
best to create a new strategic culture rapidly�54 Zumwalt’s other focus, however—
on strategic problems in the Pacific and Indian Oceans—did create the desired 
strategic culture through the CNO office staffs that worked on these issues�
The CNO OP-06 and the newly created OP-00K (CNO Executive Panel) of-
fices in particular were a veritable breeding ground for naval strategic thinkers 
over the course of the 1970s and early 1980s� These officers worked in close 
cooperation with the Office of Naval Intelligence and the Center for Naval Analy-
ses, and did much of the planning and staff work that led to and included the 
Maritime Strategy of the 1980s� The Navy did have a strategy subspecialty code 
that officers could acquire through appropriate military or civilian education, but 
this cadre of strategic experts was informally organized� This was especially true 
in the case of the strategy experts assigned to the CNO’s staff� Captain William 
Spencer Johnson, who served multiple assignments in the OP-06 office in the 
1970s and 1980s, recalled that the executive assistant to the flag officer in charge 
of OP-06 kept a wooden box in his office with file cards detailing those who had 
served in OP-06� This simple filing system recorded their current service billets 
and when they would again be available for service on the OP-06 staff� The ad-
miral in charge of OP-06 essentially had unofficial detailing authority over these 
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officers, and with the support of Naval Personnel Command could order their 
return when requested�55
The officers who headed the OP-06 office included a number of former fleet 
commanders, such as Admirals James “Ace” Lyons, Henry “Hank” Mustin, and 
Charles Larson, as well as future CJCS Admiral William Crowe� Staff members 
such as Captains Swartz and Johnson completed multiple tours within the OP-
06 organization over the course of their careers�56 Multiple assignments within 
OP-06 produced a strong but unofficial strategic community of talented men and 
women within the larger CNO staff�
The efforts of Under Secretary of the Navy Bob Murray stimulated the CNO, 
Admiral Hayward, to create the CNO’s Strategic Studies Group (SSG) in the 
summer of 1981� The group 
was convened under Mur-
ray’s leadership and mentor-
ship, assisted by Commander 
Kenneth McGruther, Naval 
Reserve Commander John 
Hanley, and others� The initial purpose of the group, according to Commander 
McGruther, was to “reinforce in the Soviet mind the perception that it could not 
win a war with the United States, both before a war, to enhance deterrence, and at 
all phases of the war should it occur�”57
The first SSG became very influential in determining how elements of the 
new Maritime Strategy would eventually be employed� Murray desired that the 
group work on problems of strategy that would be broad enough to be useful, 
but narrow enough in scope to be reasonably accomplished� The SSG could not 
accomplish these goals in isolation and would need to travel globally and discuss 
its proposals with multiple senior officers and staffs�58 The SSG continued oper-
ating over the course of the 1980s and supported further improvements in the 
emerging maritime strategy�
The other important product coming from both the OPNAV strategy offices 
and the SSG was the officers themselves, those who gained great professional ex-
pertise from their assignments to these groups�59 They constituted an expanding 
cadre of strategic-minded officers trained both to create strategy and to anticipate 
responses to that strategy from opponents� The interaction of the OPNAV strat-
egy offices such as OP-603, the SSG, and naval intelligence experts channeled the 
inspiration for a new naval strategy to confront the Soviet Union into plans and 
war-fighting doctrine useful to operational commanders� This group’s combina-
tion of operational, academic, and cooperative experience was well suited to the 
rapid and effective production and updating of strategy-related materials�
“The planning for the defense build-down was 
a case of someone determining in advance 
what was needed, and then seeing that the 
result was produced.”
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The changes wrought by the Goldwater-Nichols legislation would eventually 
transform this group over time from an officially constituted forum to an ad 
hoc assembly maintained by the members themselves� This alteration occurred 
through modification of both missions and personnel composition of these co-
operative strategic entities�
One of the most contested aspects of the legislation was the establishment of 
a rigorous qualification, assignment, and management program for joint-duty 
officers� Owing to a perceived predilection in the services to assign less-qualified 
officers to the Joint Staff, Congress required the Secretary of Defense to submit an 
annual Joint Officer Management report to the legislative branch� This document 
was to report joint-duty officers’ number, promotion rate, and promotion rate in 
comparison with non-joint-qualified officers, and to which billets each service 
assigned such officers� This focus on joint assignments caused a significant shift 
in where the talented officers of each service were assigned�
The OP-06 office had risen to prominence during the 1980s in the course of its 
work with the Maritime Strategy� CNOs Hayward and Watkins as well as Secre-
tary Lehman valued its inputs and contributions (along with those of the 00K of-
fice) to the creation of the NMS and its communication to a wider audience� The 
emphasis demanded by Goldwater-Nichols on joint versus service-centric ac-
tivities, however, helped bring about a significant reorganization in the OPNAV 
office structure that weakened the influence of OP-06 on both naval and wider 
strategic concerns�
Over the period of 1992–93, CNO Kelso conducted a major reorganization 
of the OPNAV staff structure in response to the Goldwater-Nichols Act provi-
sions; it was conceptualized and implemented by Vice Admiral Bill Owens, one 
of the members of the first SSG� OP codes became N-coded offices that mirrored 
the Joint Staff� A new and powerful N8 office (Integration of Capabilities and 
Resources) was constructed from the warfare “baron” offices of OP-02, -03, and 
-05 (Deputy CNOs for submarine, surface, and air warfare, respectively); Owens 
was the first to head the new office�60 N8 was considerably more powerful than 
the old OP-06 in a new world in which Goldwater-Nichols had determined that 
services only built, trained, and equipped forces, but did not conduct strategic 
planning for their use� OP-06 itself became N3/N5 and lost influence, as OPNAV 
had considerably less influence on the Joint Staff now that it worked for the CJCS 
alone and not the collective Joint Chiefs�61
The SSG also changed in form and content, but perhaps less directly than the 
offices of the OPNAV staff� The SSG moved from being a Cold War naval strategy 
and operations think tank to being a wider DIME (i�e�, diplomacy, information, 
military, economics) effort�62 It acquired its first members outside the Navy and 
Marine Corps in 1993 and its focus became a global search for places where naval 
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forces would be relevant� Much of this change was precipitated by the end of the 
Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, but some was in response to the 
activities of the empowered office of the CJCS� The chairman, rather than Navy 
flag officers, now made force-structure recommendations�
BUDGET AND OTHER CHALLENGES
Admiral Kelso had replaced Admiral Trost as CNO in June 1990 and was imme-
diately confronted by a host of direct and indirect challenges to the maintenance 
of a robust naval force structure� Kelso acknowledged in his Senate confirmation 
hearing that the Maritime Strategy was “on the shelf,” and that the six-hundred-
ship Navy concept should be replaced by a more flexible number�63 The end of the 
Maritime Strategy and change of CNO leadership created a power struggle in the 
OPNAV staff as competing offices sought to present new strategic visions to the 
CNO� This struggle produced a general document known as “The Way Ahead�”64
Budget estimates, however, continued to stymie the CNO’s efforts to support 
his vision functionally� Kelso had hoped to kick off the 1991 budget season with 
a positive and influential Total Force Assessment briefing to accompany the 
Navy’s budget proposals� Instead, he got a sobering and dismal appraisal of what 
force the Navy might field in the post–Cold War era� Captain Richard Diamond, 
the OP-603 branch chief who gave the brief, recalled that Kelso responded to its 
contents with a “barrage of scatological invectives and expletives�” One particular 
slide, entitled “The Coming USN Budget Train Wreck,” predicted that the Navy 
“was about to face a major budget crisis that made a new strategic rationale 
mandatory”; it caused the CNO to “go into overdrive” in his negative response�65 
The slide “flipper” for that brief, Commander Paul Giarra, USN (Ret�), said, “The 
CNO left the room without providing any guidance to the assembled three-star 
officers present for the brief,” and for a time this caused great uncertainty�66
Even so, if the challenges had been limited to dramatically shrinking bud-
gets, Admiral Kelso might have had greater influence on controlling the Navy’s 
response to the empowered CJCS, but his immediate focus was on troubling 
service-specific issues� He was, in particular, distracted by negative publicity 
about the USS Iowa B-turret explosion, the Tailhook scandal, and the crash/death 
of F-14 pilot Lieutenant Kara Hultgreen, USN� In such an environment, Admiral 
Kelso could not concentrate on strategy as well as he needed to�67
EFFECT ON THE STRATEGY COHORT
The legislation affected not only the Navy offices that created strategy but also the 
careers of individual naval officers engaged in that effort� The new emphasis on 
joint, vice service, offices that the Goldwater-Nichols provisions demanded cre-
ated a significant impact on officers in the ranks of O-4 (lieutenant commander) 
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to O-6 (captain) who would normally have been recruited to serve in OP-06 (now 
N3/N5) and other purely service staff positions� Those officers were now drawn 
to joint positions to meet the new requirements that demanded joint service as 
a precursor to consideration for flag rank� The service solution was to “shorten 
some assignments and eliminate others” so that joint assignments could be fitted 
into the same nominal twenty-year career plan demanded by the 1980 Defense 
Officer Personnel Management Act�68
The addition of joint assignments was further complicated by an overall man-
power reduction at the end of the Cold War� The number of Navy joint billets 
for officers in the ranks of O-4 to O-6 increased by 10 percent over the period 
1989–99 in spite of a nearly 15 percent overall postwar decline in the number 
of officers in those ranks�69 
These changes also seem 
to have affected the overall 
amount of service-based ex-
pertise that the average naval 
officer acquired over the course of his or her career� A 2001 analysis suggested, 
“[t]he prescribed tour lengths in Goldwater-Nichols tend to deepen officers’ joint 
opportunities but may limit the breadth of experience�”70
The experience of the strategy cadre of OP-06 would not initially seem to sup-
port this assumption� The individuals who spearheaded the drive to create the 
NMS in the 1980s found continued employment in the strategy business during 
the 1990s� As noted at the outset, Captain Swartz, after some initial misgivings 
about having two consecutive joint assignments, became one of General Colin 
Powell’s special assistants� Captain Diamond became OP-603 (the Strategic Con-
cepts office of OP-06) in February 1990 and exerted significant influence on the 
development and coordination of the follow-on strategic concept to the NMS 
known as “� � � From the Sea�”71 Commander Sestak contributed what Diamond 
referred to as “the bumper sticker” for the new strategy in the phrase, “The Navy/
Marine Corps Team is the Enabling Force for Follow-on Joint Operations�”72 Dia-
mond, along with Swartz and other OP-60, OP-00K, and SSG alumni, founded a 
regular naval strategy discussion group that first began meeting in 1988�73
Yet while these officers continued their strategic vocation in both Navy and 
later joint offices involved in producing strategic work, their shoes were not be-
ing filled by a new generation of Navy-created strategy experts� The provisions 
of the Goldwater-Nichols Act appear to be the direct cause of this change, in the 
eyes of some of these experts� Captain R� Robinson “Robby” Harris, a former 
member of the SSG and 00K, has suggested that the OPNAV staff in general is “a 
shadow of what it was twenty years ago in both quantity and background” owing 
to the changes caused by the legislation’s joint-officer requirements�74 The new 
The Navy had historically seen the whole of 
the world’s oceans as a unitary theater of ac-
tion uniquely suited to naval control.
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requirements for joint assignment appeared to have harmed the ability of the 
Navy to send officers to multiple tours within OPNAV strategy offices� Captain 
Johnson believes that the joint requirements prevented the Navy from sending 
officers to multiple assignments in OP-06 where they would have acquired fur-
ther strategic competence and maintained corporate memory in naval strategic 
planning�75 Before Goldwater-Nichols, Johnson asserts, it was commonplace for 
strategy-coded officers to have multiple OPNAV tours in strategic planning of-
fices�76 Now there is barely time for one such assignment if an officer is also to 
meet the joint requirements necessary for eligibility for flag rank� This lack of 
repeat experience in OPNAV has further weakened the Navy’s ability to create 
strategy on its own� Secretary Lehman says the joint requirements have created 
excessively large staffs that draw too many officers from experience-generating 
operational billets�77 Together, these changes have meant a Navy with fewer stra-
tegic planners and possibly less operational experience, and have forced it to fill 
a much larger staff pool, thus leaving it bereft of its own strategic veterans�
THE PRICE PAID
Of course the armed forces of the United States were going to face significant cuts 
in the wake of the Cold War� A new strategy would have emerged in response to 
this sea change in international affairs alone� The Goldwater-Nichols legislation, 
however, significantly complicated that process for the U�S� Navy�
The Navy had been the most significant source of organized opposition to 
the legislation, and its senior officers, at the end of the 1980s and in the early 
1990s, remained antagonistic to the law’s tenets as it struggled to adjust to a new 
international situation and a new internal Defense Department organization� 
The legislation did not have the same impact on Navy strategy as the end of the 
Cold War, but the empowered CJCS, new concepts in combatant commander 
area of responsibility, and the personnel changes demanded made the process of 
creating new strategies for the naval service, especially those involving a global 
responsibility, more challenging in the years after 1992� The Goldwater-Nichols 
Act gave the CJCS the decisive voice in determining naval force structure and 
how maritime geographic areas of responsibility were divided�
Further, the legislation altered the career paths of naval officers by mandating 
joint assignments as a precursor to flag rank� This action caused a practical mi-
gration of talented, career-minded officers out of service offices such as OP-06, 
where they had been carefully trained, mentored, and subsequently assigned 
important Navy follow-on assignments, into joint billets in which the Navy could 
no longer make direct use of their talents� These officers continued to contribute 
to the process of strategy creation in the 1990s, but there was no longer a strong 
service staff organization to mentor and aid them in their development�
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These changes caused by the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 fundamentally al-
tered the process by which the U�S� Navy developed both strategy and the people 
involved in that creative process� While these changes did not have a significant 
negative impact in the first decade after the end of the Cold War, they later af-
fected the Navy’s ability to emulate the Maritime Strategy experience and again 
produce war-winning global strategic concepts in response to regional threats 
that can no longer be contained by regional planning alone—concepts that ef-
fectively employ the inherent mobility, flexibility, and power of a globally deploy-
able, free-ranging, offensively oriented fleet� 
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 On 19 January 1974, the Chinese and South Vietnamese navies clashed near the disputed Paracel Islands� The short but intense battle left China in 
control of seemingly unremarkable spits of land and surrounding waters in the 
South China Sea� The skirmish involved small, secondhand combatants armed 
with outdated weaponry� The fighting lasted for several hours, producing modest 
casualties in ships and men� The incident merited little public attention, espe-
cially when compared with past titanic struggles at sea, such as those of the two 
world wars� Unsurprisingly, the battle remains an understudied, if not forgotten, 
episode in naval history�1
But its obscurity is undeserved� Newly available Chinese-language sources 
reveal a far more complex naval operation than is commonly depicted in West-
ern scholarship�2 Hitherto-unknown details of the battle illustrate how Chinese 
strategists tailored their tactics so as to coerce, deter, and defeat a rival claimant 
in the South China Sea� Notably, China employed a mix of conventional and ir-
regular forces to meet its operational objectives� Such hybrid methods not only 
were common in Chinese naval history, but also foreshadowed the kinds of 
combined maritime warfare China has employed 
recently against its neighbors in maritime Asia, 
including Japan, Vietnam, and the Philippines� In-
deed, Chinese operations in the Paracels represent 
an archetype that could be employed again in the 
future� It thus behooves policymakers to pay atten-
tion to China’s naval past�
The battle was the first step in China’s decades-
long effort to establish and expand its presence 
A Campaign Appraisal
Toshi Yoshihara
Professor Yoshihara, of the Strategy and Policy fac-
ulty at the Naval War College, holds the John A. van 
Beuren Chair of Asia-Pacific Studies and is an affili-
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in the South China Sea� In 1988, China seized six reefs and atolls of the Spratly 
Islands after another skirmish with the Vietnamese at Johnson South Reef� In 
late 1994, the Chinese built structures on Philippines-claimed Mischief Reef, 
leaving a weak Manila no choice but to accept the fait accompli� In 2012, China 
compelled the Philippines to yield control of Scarborough Shoal after a standoff 
at sea over fishing rights in the area� Beginning in late 2013, China embarked on a 
massive land reclamation project in the Spratlys, building up artificial islands that 
added up to thousands of acres of land� Some of the man-made islands feature 
military-grade runways, deep-draft piers to accommodate warships, facilities to 
host garrisons, and other support infrastructure� China’s extension of its mari-
time power into the South China Sea, which has gathered momentum in recent 
years, began with the foothold gained in the Paracels� 
The conflict and its aftermath also left an outsize and lasting legacy in Asian 
international relations� The territorial dispute that gave rise to fighting forty years 
ago remains unresolved and continues to stoke Sino-Vietnamese enmity� When 
Beijing placed an oil rig in waters close to the Paracels in May 2014, violent pro-
tests targeting Chinese businesses broke out across Vietnam� At sea, Vietnamese 
maritime law enforcement vessels sought to break the security cordon formed 
around the rig by Chinese civilian, paramilitary, and naval vessels� Amid the 
standoff, bilateral relations plunged to new lows� The contest, then, is far from 
over; and the passions the dispute still stirs up trace back to 1974�
The Paracels battle erupted at an inflection point in the history of China’s tur-
bulent politics� The nation was still reeling from the Cultural Revolution when 
the fighting broke out� The radical political movement had so ravaged military 
readiness that the Chinese navy nearly paid for it with defeat in the Paracels cam-
paign� Mao Zedong devoted attention to the crisis, issuing his last military orders 
during the conflict before his death two years later� Deng Xiaoping, rehabilitated 
from the purges of the Cultural Revolution, oversaw the naval campaign� Liu 
Huaqing formulated fortification plans for the Paracels not long after the smoke 
had cleared from the battlefield� Deng, the architect of China’s reform and open-
ing, and Liu, the father of the modern Chinese navy, would later navigate their 
nation out of the dark era under Mao� Their roles in this clash likely served them 
well as they positioned themselves to lead China�
For the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLA Navy, or PLAN), the campaign is 
etched into the service’s institutional memory, constituting an essential part of the 
navy’s “glorious history�”3 The “counterattack in self-defense” vanquished South 
Vietnam’s navy and secured China’s control over the Paracels�4 It is considered 
the PLA Navy’s first sea battle against an external enemy� (The fighting against 
the Nationalists along the mainland coast in the 1950s and 1960s is regarded 
as an extension of the Chinese civil war�) The battle was also the first time that 
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the PLAN—then largely a coastal-defense force composed of obsolescent Soviet 
vessels—operated so far from China’s shores� The disparity in naval power that 
seemingly favored South Vietnam, (Republic of Vietnam, or RVN) has helped 
Chinese commentators mythologize the triumph�
The battle’s legacies, ranging from regional animosity to China’s strategic 
position in the South China Sea, call for a closer reexamination� The availability 
of relevant Chinese literature now makes it possible to extract insights from the 
clash� Reconstructing a clearer picture of the Sino-Vietnamese encounter at sea 
helps to discern the ingredients of the Chinese navy’s operational success� More-
over, a retrospective analysis draws out the continuities in China’s use of force and 
coercion at sea� In particular, Beijing’s combined employment of military and ci-
vilian vessels in 1974 suggests a durable operational preference for hybrid warfare 
that is evident today in territorial disputes involving China� Such predispositions 
carry implications for the various rival claimants in the South China Sea and for 
the United States as the arbiter of security and stability in maritime Asia�
To maximize the analytical value of the naval skirmish, this article first re-
views the geographic setting and the historical context of the Paracels dispute� It 
recounts in greater detail the tit-for-tat maneuvers near the islands that brought 
China and South Vietnam to conflict� The article then elaborates on the naval 
battle and its aftermath, as the Chinese have retold them� It furnishes an as-
sessment of the battle, critically analyzing China’s civil-military relations, the 
operational performance of the PLAN, the role of friction and chance, and the 
importance of paramilitary forces to Beijing� Finally, the article concludes with 
some thoughts about how the battle may inform China’s future strategy in the 
South China Sea and its implications for stakeholders in maritime Asia�
SOURCES AND METHODS
In recent years, Chinese historical accounts of the Paracels sea battle have prolif-
erated across publicly available sources, including PLAN publications, academic 
journals, professional periodicals, and popular magazines� Participants in the 
campaign, from local commanders to tactical personnel, have agreed to inter-
views or produced their own eyewitness accounts, reflecting on their personal ex-
periences� They have revealed fascinating details about the engagement and have 
forthrightly offered critical assessments of how the Chinese waged the campaign� 
A general openness to debate on politically neutral topics, including naval 
affairs, partly explains this willingness to engage in frank discussions about 
the battle� For over a decade the Chinese leadership has permitted a relatively 
freewheeling discourse among officials, scholars, and commentators of various 
stripes, encouraging them to hold forth on China’s seaborne future� President 
Xi Jinping’s vow to transform China into a maritime power has further spurred 
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seapower advocates to retail narratives that justify the nation’s turn to the seas� 
China’s operational success in 1974 tells an uplifting story that dovetails with 
recent Chinese efforts to promote the navy as a prized national project and to 
enhance the society’s “maritime consciousness�” And, in light of Beijing’s ambi-
tions and growing capacity to influence events in the South China Sea, the history 
of the Paracels battle resonates with Chinese audiences�
The attention lavished on this incident opens a window onto China’s interpre-
tations of its own naval history�5 Indeed, the literature helps to discern lessons the 
Chinese have drawn from this battle as well as to identify lessons they may have 
neglected or chosen to ignore� If these lessons—and false lessons—hold value for 
China’s policymakers and military commanders, the battle may offer insights into 
current Chinese strategy in offshore disputes� Equally important, Beijing’s grow-
ing assertiveness in maritime Asia, including its construction of artificial islands 
in the Spratlys, is likely to increase policy demands in Washington and other 
Asian capitals to understand better how China views its seascape�
Some caveats about sources and methods merit mentioning� This article is 
based almost entirely on Chinese writings of the battle, including the PLAN’s 
record of events, recollections of the participants involved in the clash, and sec-
ondary sources� China’s sparse experiences at sea, especially in the first decades of 
communist rule, may have compelled Chinese analysts to dramatize overly, and 
thus potentially distort, their nation’s naval successes� Not surprisingly, Chinese 
accounts frequently portray the enemy unflatteringly while playing up China’s 
virtues� Xenophobic biases and cheap propaganda points abound� What follows, 
therefore, is not a neutral perspective�
While the Vietnamese side of the story is not represented here, this article 
draws on the few available English-language memoirs by RVN naval officers who 
were involved in the clash�6 It pays special attention to recollections that diverge 
sharply from the Chinese version of events� Moreover, discrepancies exist among 
the various Chinese descriptions of the battle� To the extent possible, this article 
identifies those differences, recognizing that a definitive story is not possible 
without access to official archives in both China and Vietnam� This is a first cut at 
an important but largely underappreciated episode in China’s march to the seas�
THE GEOSTRATEGIC CONTEXT
The Paracel (西沙) Islands are roughly equidistant from China and Vietnam, lo-
cated 300 kilometers south of Yulin, Hainan Island, and 370 kilometers east of Da 
Nang� The archipelago is composed of coral islands, reefs, and banks divided into 
two island groups� To the northeast is the Amphitrite (宣德) Group, in which 
Woody (永兴) Island is the largest feature� To the southwest is the Crescent (永
乐) Group, consisting of Pattle (珊瑚), Money (金银), and Robert (甘泉) Islands 
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on the western side and Drummond (晋卿), Duncan (琛航), and Palm (广金) 
Islands on the eastern side. About eighty kilometers of water separate the Am-
phitrite and Crescent Groups.
Chinese writings emphasize the geostrategic value of the Paracels, which sit 
astride critical lines of communications. According to the PLAN’s official en-
cyclopedia, “The Paracel Islands serve as China’s natural protective screen and 
outpost. Sea and air routes heading to Singapore and Jakarta from China’s coast 
must pass through this area, giving it an important status.”7 Located about 660 
kilometers southwest of the Pratas Islands, 550 kilometers west of Scarborough 
MAP 2
Source: “Paracel Islands,” in Central Intelligence Agency, The World Fact-
book, www.cia.gov/.
MAP 1
THE PARACEL ISLANDS
Source: Adapted from “Paracel and Spratly Islands: 1988,” Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection, www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/.
MAP 3
Source: “Paracel Islands, South China Sea,” [CartoGIS] Maps Online: ANU 
[Australian National University] College of Asia & the Pacific, asiapacific 
.anu.edu.au/mapsonline/.
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Shoal, and 700 kilometers northwest of the Spratly Islands, the centrally posi-
tioned archipelago is viewed as an essential stepping-stone to other Chinese-
claimed islands across the South China Sea�
After the Second World War, the islands changed hands repeatedly, with coun-
tries asserting a confusing array of claims and counterclaims to the Paracels� In 
1947, the Nationalists on the Chinese mainland seized control of Woody Island, 
while the French, employing local Vietnamese troops, occupied Pattle Island at 
the other end of the Paracels� The communist conquest of Hainan Island, one of 
the last holdouts of the Chinese civil war, rendered untenable the Nationalist out-
post on Woody Island� PLA troops seized the island after the Nationalist forces 
evacuated it in 1950� In the 1951 San Francisco peace treaty, Japan renounced all 
its rights and claims to the Paracels and Spratlys but left the transfer of title unre-
solved� South Vietnam and China subsequently issued official declarations that 
incorporated the Paracels as sovereign territory, in 1956 and 1958, respectively�8
In the meantime, China and South Vietnam occupied two halves of the Para-
cels� In 1955, a Chinese state-owned company began to mine guano on Woody 
Island for use as fertilizer back on the mainland� The following year, the French 
transferred Pattle Island to the Republic of Vietnam� In early 1959, Saigon’s navy 
forcibly evicted Chinese fishermen from Duncan Island, thereby conferring 
on South Vietnam control over the Crescent Group� Throughout the 1960s, an 
uneasy stalemate prevailed as both sides built modest facilities and episodically 
patrolled the waters around the islands�9 It is likely that the substantial U�S� naval 
presence in the region and Washington’s backing of Saigon deterred China from 
rolling back South Vietnam’s control of the disputed islands�
In the 1970s, the promise of offshore oil intensified the dispute in the South 
China Sea� In mid-1973, Saigon granted energy exploration rights to Western 
companies and conducted geological surveys of the waters near the Crescent 
Group� That year, Beijing explicitly claimed the maritime resources present in 
waters adjacent to Chinese territory� China, too, began drilling an oil well on 
Woody Island in December 1973�10 The convergence of geopolitics, economics, 
and competing territorial claims soon drew China and South Vietnam into an 
escalating crisis�
PRELUDE TO BATTLE
In the summer of 1973, a series of provocations and reprisals set the two sides 
on a collision course� In August, South Vietnam seized six islands in the Spratlys, 
and a month later issued a formal declaration extending Saigon’s administra-
tive control over ten islands there� In October, two Chinese fishing trawlers, 
Nos� 402 and 407, appeared near the Crescent Group and began to work there� 
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The crewmen planted Chinese flags on islands over which the Vietnamese had 
established nominal control� They also set up a logistics team on Duncan Island, 
reestablishing a presence there, from which South Vietnam had evicted them 
more than a decade before�11 In November, South Vietnamese warships began 
to harass the Chinese fishing boats, ramming them and arresting fishermen on 
board� Some of the captured Chinese were reportedly brought to Da Nang, where 
they were forced to confess their alleged crimes and acknowledge Saigon’s sover-
eignty over the islands�
On 10 January 1974, the crews of the two Chinese fishing boats constructed a 
seafood processing plant on Robert Island�12 The following day, the Chinese for-
eign ministry reiterated China’s indisputable sovereignty over the Paracel Islands, 
the Spratly (南沙) Islands, and Macclesfield (中沙) Bank� Four days later, the 
RVN Navy dispatched the frigate HQ-16 to the Crescent Group� Upon encoun-
tering fishing boats Nos� 402 and 407 near Robert Island, HQ-16 ordered the 
two vessels to leave the area�13 The frigate then fired warning shots at them and 
shelled Robert Island, blasting the Chinese flag planted there� On 17 January, the 
destroyer HQ-4 arrived on the scene to support HQ-16� Commandos on board 
HQ-4 landed on Robert and Money Islands, pulling down Chinese flags there� 
The following day, HQ-4 and HQ-16 rammed fishing vessel No� 407, damaging 
it� That evening, frigate HQ-5 and fleet minesweeper HQ-10 joined in�14
After receiving reports from Nos� 402 and 407 about the RVN’s naval activities, 
China began to sortie its forces� On 16 January, the South Sea Fleet ordered two 
Kronshtadt-class submarine chasers, Nos� 271 and 274, to reach Woody Island as 
soon as possible� The two warships hurried to their destination from Yulin naval 
base on Hainan Island� After picking up armed maritime militia, ammunition, 
and supplies at Woody Island the next day, Nos� 271 and 274 proceeded to the 
Crescent Group� The commanders were under strict instructions to follow three 
don’ts: (1) don’t stir up trouble; (2) don’t fire the first shot; and (3) don’t get the 
worst of it�15 J-6 fighters (the Chinese version of the MiG-19) provided air cover 
during the flotilla’s transit, but their limited range permitted only five minutes of 
loiter time over the Paracels�16 The warships would have to fend for themselves�
The two sub chasers reached the Crescent Group on the evening of 17 Janu-
ary and landed four armed militia platoons (each numbering ten members) on 
Duncan, Drummond, and Palm Islands in the wee hours of 18 January�17 At about 
the same time, two Guangzhou-based Type 010 oceangoing minesweepers, Nos� 
389 and 396, rushed to the Paracels to reinforce Nos� 271 and 274�
In a sign of the PLAN’s desperation, the No� 389 boat had just undergone 
major shipyard repairs and was not yet certified for sea duty� Worse still, the 
South Sea Fleet’s most capable frigates, the Type 065s, were unavailable owing 
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to unspecified mechanical problems� 
Instead, the PLAN had to fall back on 
two Hainan-class sub chasers, Nos� 281 
and 282, attached to a coastal garrison 
division in Shantou, nearly nine hundred 
kilometers from Hainan� The pair sped to 
Woody Island, refueling along the way in 
Zhanjiang and Yulin�
China’s navy was clearly scrambling to 
assemble its forces� The Cultural Revolu-
tion was largely responsible for the fleet’s 
state of disrepair� Nonetheless, the pieces 
were in place for confrontation� The hast-
ily organized flotilla, four vessels in for-
ward positions and two in the rear, were 
to protect the fishing boats and resupply 
the maritime militia on the islands�
THE BATTLE
On the morning of 19 January, the South 
Vietnamese warships approached the 
Chinese flotilla from two directions� 
HQ-4 and HQ-5 circled around Money 
Island and Antelope Reef from the south toward Palm and Duncan Islands, while 
HQ-10 and HQ-16 cut across the central lagoon of the Crescent Group from the 
northwest� Sub chasers Nos� 271 and 274 were directed to monitor HQ-4 and 
HQ-5 while Nos� 396 and 389 shadowed HQ-10 and HQ-16� In a bid to break 
the stalemate, HQ-16 forced its way past the two Chinese ships and launched two 
rubber boats carrying commandos to land on Duncan and Palm Islands�18 The 
Vietnamese assault forces ran right into the Chinese militia, which had dug in 
the day before� On Duncan Island, bayonet-wielding militiamen drove the com-
mandos off the beach� On Palm Island, the defenders shot dead one Vietnamese 
and wounded three others, forcing the landing party to retreat to its mother ship� 
During the maneuver to land the commandos, HQ-16 rammed and damaged 
No� 389�19 
Up to this point, the confrontation at sea had involved only maneuver, with 
no shots fired in anger� Chinese naval commanders, moreover, followed orders 
not to initiate the fight� Unable to dislodge their foes at sea and ashore, the RVN 
warships repositioned themselves into battle formation and charged the PLAN 
units� Bearing down on the Chinese vessels, they unleashed the initial salvo� The 
Source: John E. Moore, ed., Jane’s Fighting Ships, 1975–76 (New York: Franklin 
Watts, 1975).
No� 271 and 
No� 274
Class: Kronshtadt-class submarine chaser
Displacement: 310 tons  
Armament: one 3�5-inch gun
No� 389 and 
No� 396
Class: Type 010 ocean minesweeper
Displacement: 500 tons
Armament: two 37 mm guns
No� 281 and 
No� 282
Class: Hainan-class submarine chaser
Displacement: 500 tons
Armament: two 3-inch guns
PLAN ORDER OF BATTLE
HQ-5 and 
HQ-16
Class: Barnegat-class seaplane tender
Displacement: 1,766 tons 
Armament: one 5-inch gun
HQ-4 Class: Edsall-class destroyer escort
Displacement: 1,590 tons
Armament: two 3-inch guns 
HQ-10 Class: Admirable-class minesweeper 
Displacement: 650 tons
Armament: one 3-inch gun
Source: Moore, Jane’s Fighting Ships, 1975–76.
RVN NAVY ORDER OF BATTLE
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Vietnamese directed their fire at the ships’ bridges, killing No� 247’s political 
commissar, Feng Songbai, on the spot�20 After taking direct hits, minesweeper 
No� 389 caught fire and began to take on water�
The PLAN units immediately returned fire and surged toward the opponent’s 
warships� The commanders received orders to “speed forward, fight close, and 
hit hard�”21 The smaller, faster, and nimbler Chinese vessels purposefully sought 
close combat (贴身战, literally, “stick-to-body combat”) against the larger, lum-
bering, and slower-firing RVN units�22 The tactic was to draw so near that the 
enemy’s main deck guns would overshoot their targets� By fighting while shelter-
ing in these blind spots, the Chinese effectively nullified the superior range and 
lethality of the enemy’s firepower� The PLAN commanders chose a knife fight 
against an adversary expecting a gunfight�
The RVN vessels sought to keep their distance, but the Chinese ships quickly 
homed in from several thousand meters to hundreds of meters�23 Sub chasers 
Nos� 271 and 274 concentrated their fire on HQ-4 while Nos� 396 and 389 at-
tacked HQ-16� The PLAN units took aim at communication gear, radars, and 
command posts to blind and deafen the enemy� In the intense exchange of fire, 
HQ-4 started to fill with smoke�24 To the north, Nos� 396 and 389 drove off 
HQ-16 after fierce fighting and then turned on HQ-10�25 In the melee, HQ-10’s 
magazine exploded from a direct hit� By this time, the combatants were tangling 
only tens of meters from each other� At such close range, No� 389’s crew raked 
HQ-10’s deck with small-arms fire, killing the ship’s captain�26
HQ-16 retreated to the open sea after No� 396 turned back its attempts to 
reach HQ-10� Following some more exchanges of fire, HQ-4 and HQ-5 also left 
the scene, leaving behind the crippled HQ-10� In the meantime, No� 389 was in 
trouble� The badly mauled ship listed heavily and its crew could not extinguish 
the fire� Despite the risk of an explosion, trawlers Nos� 402 and 407 helped beach 
the heavily damaged minesweeper on Duncan Island� Sub chasers Nos� 281 and 
282 arrived from Woody Island belatedly, at around noon, and attacked HQ-10 
three times, sinking the ship just south of Antelope Reef�27 HQ-16, HQ-4, and 
HQ-5 loitered to the west of the Crescent Group but did not attempt to reengage 
the PLAN units�28
The Chinese moved quickly to retake Vietnamese-occupied islands� They 
wanted to cement their victory at sea; the naval command also feared that the op-
ponent might counterattack with reinforcements� The South Sea Fleet mobilized 
one frigate, five torpedo boats, and eight patrol boats for the follow-on operation� 
The amphibious assault fleet, organized into three transport flotillas, was ordered 
to send ashore three infantry companies (each numbering about one hundred), 
one amphibious reconnaissance team, and the armed militia, totaling five 
hundred troops� The first flotilla consisted of four patrol craft accompanied by 
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fishing boats Nos� 402 and 407, hauling one infantry company� Four patrol craft 
and minesweeper No� 396 formed the second flotilla, with one infantry company 
and one reconnaissance team on board� The single frigate doubled as the third 
flotilla and the command ship, carrying one infantry company�29
The first flotilla assembled before Robert Island on the morning of 20 Janu-
ary� The patrol boats shelled the island to suppress the defenders there� Three 
platoons embarked in rubber rafts and sampans conducted the amphibious as-
sault, seizing the island in about ten minutes� Shortly thereafter, the patrol boats 
and the minesweeper of the second flotilla opened fire on Pattle Island� As PLA 
troops landed, some thirty Vietnamese retreated to the middle of the island, 
where they eventually surrendered� Among those captured were a major in the 
South Vietnamese army and an American liaison officer from the U�S� embassy 
in Saigon� By the time the PLAN turned to Money Island, the Chinese found that 
the RVN commandos had already abandoned their positions�30
When the fighting was over, it was clear who had won� The PLAN had sunk 
one minesweeper, damaged three warships, killed or wounded over a hundred 
Vietnamese officers and sailors, captured forty-eight soldiers, and seized three 
islands, bringing the entire Paracel archipelago under China’s control� The RVN 
Navy put one Chinese minesweeper out of action, shot up three other warships, 
killed eighteen, and wounded sixty-seven others�31
THE BATTLE’S AFTERMATH
Stung by the defeat, Saigon threatened to escalate� The South Vietnamese navy 
reportedly sent two destroyers to reinforce Da Nang and directed six warships 
to head toward the Paracels�32 The RVN high command also alerted all ground, 
naval, and air forces to heighten readiness for war� President Nguyen Van Thieu, 
who arrived in Da Nang to oversee his forces personally, allegedly ordered the 
South Vietnamese air force to bomb Chinese positions on the Paracels—before 
rescinding the decision� At the same time, Saigon requested assistance from the 
U�S� Seventh Fleet, but to no avail�
The Chinese girded for a Vietnamese counterattack� The Military Affairs 
Commission (MAC) instructed the Guangzhou Military Region to supply the 
defenders holding the Paracels� Yulin naval base soon became a logistical hub, 
organizing substantial quantities of ammunition, weaponry, fuel, medicine, food, 
water, and other supplies for delivery� The MAC placed all forces on high alert 
and detached three Type 01 Chengdu-class guided-missile frigates from the East 
Sea Fleet to reinforce their comrades� Equipped with SY-1 subsonic antiship 
cruise missiles, the frigates packed the kind of punch that the South Sea Fleet 
lacked� Mao Zedong personally ordered the three ships to transit the Taiwan 
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Strait—the most direct route to the Paracels—despite concerns that Nationalist 
forces on Taiwan and the offshore islands might ambush the flotilla on its way 
south�33 Mao’s gamble paid off when the three frigates arrived safely after an un-
eventful, though nerve-racking, voyage�34
The South Sea Fleet also called into service Type 033 Romeo-class submarines, 
including 157, 158, and 159, based in Yulin�35 On 20 January, submarine 157 
undertook an unusual refueling mission after an oiler grounded on North Reef� 
After the sub topped off patrol craft near Woody Island, it returned to port�36 Sub-
marine 158 departed Yulin on 22 January to patrol the waters between Da Nang 
and Pattle Island� Attesting to Chinese anxieties about a Vietnamese riposte, its 
mission was to monitor enemy fleet movements and sink—without prior ap-
proval from high command—any RVN warships heading toward the Paracels�37 
Intriguingly, a PLAN sonarman later claimed that he had detected a U�S� nuclear-
powered attack submarine that had been “tracking us for a long time�”38 Subma-
rine 159 subsequently took the place of submarine 158—under stricter rules of 
engagement, as fears of an RVN counterstrike receded�
This show of force, particularly the appearance of the missile-armed frigates, 
tipped the local naval balance of power around the Paracels in China’s favor� 
Saigon soon realized that it was unable to reverse the new realities on the ground 
and eventually backed down�
After the dust had settled, the Chinese leadership began to consider steps for 
consolidating China’s presence on the Paracels� In July 1974, the State Council 
and the MAC jointly issued a formal fortification plan� Beijing put Liu Huaqing, 
then the PLAN’s deputy chief of staff, in charge of garrisoning the Paracels� Liu 
led a ten-member team to Woody Island for an on-site inspection in October 
1974� The following month, Liu briefed the PLAN’s leadership� Liu’s findings 
would become the basis for constructing shore facilities, including an airfield and 
a port, and for administering the island garrison in subsequent years�39
ASSESSMENT OF THE BATTLE
Recent Chinese publications have revealed, in vivid detail, a complex campaign 
that involved various implements of maritime power, ranging from trawlers to 
militia to submarines� Firsthand accounts make clear that it was not an easy win� 
Leaders had to be resourceful, improvising solutions along the way to make up 
for the decrepit material state of the PLAN� Chinese commanders committed 
their fair share of blunders even as they caught some big breaks� Friction be-
deviled the Chinese navy� This more complete picture of the incident provides 
a sounder basis for evaluating the campaign and for assessing the lessons the 
Chinese may have learned from the battle�
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Primacy of Politics. China’s political leadership retained a firm grip on all aspects 
of the campaign�40 Operational imperatives repeatedly gave way to larger strategic 
considerations� On the day the Vietnamese landed on Robert and Money Islands, 
Mao Zedong personally approved the initial decision to respond more forceful-
ly�41 He would maintain a watchful eye throughout the conflict� As the PLAN as-
sembled its forces, the MAC stood up a six-member leading small group, headed 
by Marshal Ye Jianying and Deng Xiaoping to supervise the entire operation�42 
Working out of the Xishan Command Center under the General Staff Depart-
ment, the group assumed direct operational control and reported directly to 
Chairman Mao and the Politburo� Ye and Deng set the parameters of the cam-
paign and asserted their will at key junctures during the battle and its aftermath�
Uncertainties surrounding possible U�S� reactions to escalation in the Paracels 
may in part explain the close political oversight of the operation� On the one 
hand, the 1973 Paris Peace Accords and the subsequent withdrawal of all U�S� 
combat forces in South Vietnam had dramatically reduced America’s stake in the 
fate of its client� The burden had shifted to Saigon to look after its own security� 
War weariness afflicted decision makers in Washington as well� Simultaneously, 
Sino-American ties were still basking in the afterglow of rapprochement in 1972� 
Both sides were eager to court each other’s friendship to counterbalance the 
Soviet threat� China’s tepid response to the U�S� mining of Haiphong following 
Hanoi’s Easter offensive signaled that great-power interests had eclipsed those 
of the regional players� The crisis over the Paracels thus represented a golden 
opportunity to seize the islands while China’s strategic value to the United States 
remained very high�
On the other hand, Saigon was still Washington’s ally� Equally worrying to 
the Chinese, the United States had appeared tacitly to support its client’s posi-
tion throughout the American phase of the Vietnam War; U�S� reconnaissance 
flights over the Paracels in the 1960s had drawn numerous protests from China� 
A violent clash of arms was certain to draw Washington’s unwanted attention� 
Moreover, any U�S� diplomatic or military support to the RVN almost certainly 
would have transformed the strategic landscape and the local balance of power� 
The imperative to keep the United States out, even if direct American involve-
ment was deemed unlikely, probably shaped the conduct of operations�
Recent Chinese accounts suggest that decision makers in Beijing carefully 
weighed the risk of U�S� intervention during the crisis as they contemplated each 
move� According to Admiral Kong Zhaonian, then the deputy commander of the 
Chinese navy, the tactical principle of not firing the first shot in part reflected 
worries about third-party intervention�43 By conceding the first tactical move to 
the RVN Navy—so went the logic—China could cast South Vietnam as the ag-
gressor, thus complicating America’s diplomatic position� The Chinese therefore 
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framed (and still regard) the engagement as a “counterattack in self-defense�” 
Conversely, evidence that China had drawn first blood might have given Wash-
ington a more tangible reason to back Saigon�
Such caution extended to the battle’s immediate aftermath� Buoyed by opera-
tional success, the South Sea Fleet’s commander, Zhang Yuanpei, ordered his war-
ships to give chase and sink the fleeing enemy vessels; but the commander of the 
Guangzhou Military Region, Xu Shiyou, speaking for the MAC, countermanded 
Zhang’s directive�44 Fears of horizontal escalation again stayed the PLAN’s hand�
Concerns about a hostile U�S� response also stimulated debate about evicting 
Vietnamese forces from Robert, Pattle, and Money Islands� Intelligence reports 
that U�S� Navy warships were headed to the Paracels from the Philippines further 
alarmed the leading small group�45 While the PLAN was likely tempted to ride the 
momentum of victory at sea, such a seizure would represent a major escalation� 
Chinese leaders feared that Washington might interpret such a climb up the lad-
der as a threat to the prebattle status quo� Admiral Kong recalled that even though 
plans and forces were in place to conduct the island landings, local commanders 
held back until their political masters made up their minds� Members of the lead-
ing small group apparently agonized over the decision to put troops ashore� In 
the end, Ye Jianying and Deng Xiaoping adjudicated the debate and ordered the 
Guangzhou Military Region to go forward with the amphibious assault�46
The absence of outside intervention—due in no small part to tight political 
control of military operations—was crucial to the strategic success of the naval 
engagement�
David vs. Goliath. The battle exposed China’s military vulnerability to its south� 
Owing to Sino-Soviet and cross-strait tensions, Beijing’s strategic gaze was riveted 
to the north and east� Not surprisingly, the PLAN’s most capable ships belonged 
to the North Sea and East Sea Fleets� The South Sea Fleet’s feeble force structure 
reflected the South China Sea’s backwater status� As the crisis unfolded, the fleet 
had few seagoing forces suitable for operations in the Paracels, a predicament 
certainly made worse by the travails experienced during the Cultural Revolu-
tion� The frigate Nanning, a converted ex–Imperial Japanese Navy warship, was 
well past its service life� As noted, the three Type 065 frigates were not ready for 
sea duty� The PLAN’s fast-attack craft suffered from limited range and question-
able seaworthiness� Only the submarine chasers and minesweepers possessed the 
range to sustain patrols that far south�
Chinese commentators frequently point to the unfavorable tactical situation 
confronting PLAN commanders on the eve of battle�47 The RVN Navy clearly 
outsized and outgunned the PLAN: HQ-4 displaced nearly 1,600 tons at full load 
and was armed with two three-inch guns; HQ-5 and HQ-16 each displaced about 
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1,766 tons and were each equipped with a five-inch gun; HQ-10 displaced 650 
tons and carried a three-inch gun� By contrast, the PLAN’s Kronshtadt-class sub-
marine chaser, Type 010 oceangoing minesweeper, and Hainan-class sub chaser 
displaced 310, 500, and 500 tons, respectively� All were armed with smaller- 
caliber guns than their Vietnamese counterparts� As one study notes, even the 
largest PLAN ship was smaller than the RVN’s smallest vessel�48
Yet China’s navy won� Chinese analysts credit the officers and sailors alike for 
their tactical skill and élan�49 Such intangible qualities, in their eyes, more than 
made up for the PLAN’s lack of heft and firepower� Indeed, the fighting spirit of 
No� 398’s crew, which engaged in the equivalent of hand-to-hand combat against 
HQ-10, remains part of the Chinese navy’s lore� That the PLAN overcame such 
material asymmetries certainly dovetailed with the service’s long-standing small-
ship ethos� From the founding of the People’s Republic, the Chinese navy found 
itself struggling from a position of inferiority against the U�S�-backed Nationalist 
forces� Yet in the 1950s and 1960s the PLAN repeatedly bested its archrival at 
sea, employing speed, daring, and stratagems� To Chinese observers, the battle 
for the Paracels thus represents yet another example of how an enterprising and 
determined weaker side can beat the strong�
However, such a feel-good story is overly simplistic, if not misleading� The 
PLAN’s success resulted as much from Vietnamese incompetence and mistakes 
as it did from Chinese tactical virtuosity�50 For example, some Chinese analysts 
criticize the RVN Navy for dividing the flotilla during the initial approach on the 
morning of 19 January� Had the Vietnamese concentrated their forces and their 
fire—so goes this line of reasoning—they might have picked off PLAN warships 
in sequence�51 At the same time, the decision to charge Chinese positions was im-
prudent� Proximity played to the opponent’s strengths while negating the RVN’s 
advantages in range and firepower� Had the Vietnamese struck the Chinese from 
a greater distance (assuming the crews possessed the necessary gunnery skills), 
they might have avoided the close-in combat that so favored China’s tactical 
preferences� In other words, a more capable and less cooperative opponent might 
have changed the battle’s outcome� A false lesson thus lurks for the Chinese�
Fog, Friction, and Chance. During this battle Carl von Clausewitz would have 
instantly recognized “the countless minor incidents” that “combine to lower the 
general level of performance�”52 The terribly timed mechanical failures of the Type 
065 frigates—the South Sea Fleet’s most suitable combatants for the mission—set 
back the PLAN just as tensions rose in the Paracels� Had the frigates been avail-
able and rushed to the scene, the battle might have tipped even more favorably 
toward China� Alternatively, their presence might have deterred the Vietnamese 
from attacking in the first place�53
NWC_Spring2016Review.indb   54 3/8/16   10:29 AM
59
Naval War College: Spring 2016 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2016
 YO S H I HA R A  5 5
However, the Chinese improvised, and managed—barely—to cobble together 
a flotilla in response to the RVN’s naval presence� Even so, the PLAN was very 
fortunate that the weather cooperated� The operation took place during the 
northeast monsoon season, when surges—involving gusts of forty knots or 
more—can strike without much warning� Had nature turned against the PLA, 
the small combatants would have had trouble handling the rough seas, spelling 
trouble for the entire operation� The PLAN was as lucky as it was good�
Command-and-control problems plagued the Chinese� On the night of 17 
January, reinforcements consisting of torpedo boats were on their way to the Pa-
racels but were recalled because of overlapping chains of command� The PLAN’s 
deputy commander had arranged for the short-legged craft to refuel at Woody 
Island before heading into the combat zone� Unaware of the plan, the Guangzhou 
Military Region’s commander ordered the ships back to port, citing lack of fuel�54 
Had the torpedo boats been present when hostilities broke out, the PLAN might 
have won an even more decisive battle� Alternatively, the Vietnamese might have 
backed down instead of picking a fight�
The late arrival of sub chasers Nos� 281 and 282 was yet another instance of 
poor communications� On the night of 18 January, Wei Mingsen, the flotilla 
commander, had received intelligence that the Vietnamese planned to attack the 
next day� He thus requested that fleet headquarters dispatch Nos� 281 and 282, 
which were awaiting instructions at Woody Island, only three to four hours away� 
Yet it took the two ships more than twelve hours to arrive, well after the heaviest 
fighting had ended� A postbattle investigation revealed that the South Sea Fleet 
headquarters in Zhanjiang failed to follow proper communications protocol, thus 
contributing to the significant delay in relaying the deployment orders�55 Had the 
ships reached the Paracels earlier, the confrontation might have unfolded quite 
differently�
The inability of the PLAN’s land-based airpower, centered on the J-6 fighter, 
to conduct sustained combat air patrols exposed the Chinese flotilla to enemy 
airpower� South Vietnam’s F-5 fighters similarly lacked the range to loiter over 
the Paracels for more than five to fifteen minutes� Some Chinese analysts believe 
that the appearance of the J-6s over the Paracels, even for a short time, boosted 
morale and produced a certain deterrent effect on the adversary�56 But this asser-
tion is difficult to test and verify� The Chinese were simply fortunate that the air 
was uncontested�
Chance favored the Chinese navy again when Mao ordered the East Sea Fleet 
to send reinforcements to the Paracels� Interfleet cooperation was rare, if not un-
heard of, with regional fleet autonomy the norm� It is unclear whether the lack of 
interoperability added to the friction� Intriguingly, Taiwan did not object to the 
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transit through the strait and made no moves to obstruct passage, even though it 
was well positioned to harass the PLAN warships�57 The Chinese leadership, brac-
ing for a possible Nationalist ambush, was puzzled and pleasantly surprised by 
this conspicuous inactivity�58 Taiwan was clearly a complicating factor that could 
have, at the very least, delayed the arrival of the three frigates� Beijing’s ability to 
maneuver forces along the maritime periphery depended on Taipei’s acquies-
cence, if not goodwill� Perhaps leaders on both sides of the strait tacitly agreed 
that South Vietnam’s position in the South China Sea needed to be overturned�
In another example of Clausewitzian fog and friction, a Chinese oiler piloted 
by a crew unfamiliar with local waters ran aground on a reef� The tanker was en 
route to replenish the assortment of fast-attack craft that had assembled to seize 
the Vietnamese-held islands on 20 January� The combatants, capable only of one-
way trips to the combat zone, were desperately short on fuel� Fuel-storage facili-
ties did not exist on Woody Island, so only the grounded oiler could have sup-
plied the fuel in offshore waters� Apparently out of options, the South Sea Fleet 
ordered submarine 157 to step in as a substitute� After filling its ballast tanks with 
fuel, the boat sprinted to the Paracels at full speed on the surface, a particularly 
risky move in a time of hostilities� This hastily improvised and highly unorthodox 
method of delivering fuel worked, to the relief of Chinese naval commanders� 
Even so, this logistical failure left the PLAN’s flotilla dangerously exposed to a 
vigorous Vietnamese counterattack� Had the enemy contested the seas, this glitch 
could well have cascaded into disaster for the Chinese navy�
Paramilitary Instruments of Maritime Power. The civil-military integration of 
China’s maritime power, involving the militia and the fishing trawlers, contrib-
uted directly to operational success� The militia, stationed forward on Woody 
Island, acted on short notice� Akin to a rapid-response force, the militia slipped 
onto the Crescent Group’s southeastern islands under the cover of night, preempt-
ing the Vietnamese� Indeed, the militia threw back RVN commandos attempting 
to seize the islands the next day� The ability to act quickly and effectively denied 
operational objectives to the enemy while likely buying time for regular troops to 
mobilize on the mainland� Finally, the militia took part in the seizure of Robert 
and Pattle Islands that helped to secure China’s control of the entire archipelago�
At sea, trawlers Nos� 402 and 407 acted as first responders� Months before the 
battle, the fishing boats maintained initial presence in the Paracels while assert-
ing claims to the islands by planting flags on them� The trawlers then sent early 
warning to headquarters ashore when RVN warships first arrived in the Paracels� 
The leaders on board also furnished tactical intelligence to the PLAN’s local com-
manders at sea� The ships helped transfer the militia onto Duncan, Drummond, 
and Palm Islands the night before the battle and provided the means to conduct 
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landings on Vietnamese-held islands after the RVN warships fled the area� The 
fishing boats were pivotal in the rescue of crippled minesweeper No� 389�
A closer look at the institutional affiliation of Nos� 402 and 407 helps explain 
their active participation throughout the confrontation� The trawlers belonged to 
the South China Sea Aquatic Produce Company, an entity that had been operat-
ing in the Paracels since 1955�59 The company, in turn, fell under the control of 
the Paracels, Spratlys, and Zhongsha Islands Authority, a county-level adminis-
trative organ of Guangdong’s provincial government� The authority was respon-
sible for exercising sovereignty and jurisdiction over the islands and surrounding 
waters� Established in 1959, it was abolished in 2012 to yield to the establishment 
of Sansha, a prefecture-level city on Woody Island that claimed administrative 
powers over all islands and features in the South China Sea�
The fisheries company and the vessels it operated were also institutionally 
linked to the militia� The militia came under the dual leadership of Hainan’s 
military district and the Chinese Communist Party’s Work Committee of the 
Paracels, Spratlys, and Zhongsha Islands� The aforementioned authority— 
responsible for the fishing company—and the work committee formed a com-
bined agency that administered the South China Sea islands under China’s con-
trol� It is thus not surprising that Nos� 402 and 407 coordinated so closely with 
their militia and PLA counterparts� The PLAN drew strength from interagency 
cooperation�
Wei Mingsen revealed that the fishing company’s deputy director, Zhang 
Binglin, was on board No� 407 to supervise the trawlers personally� In fact, Zhang 
boarded Wei’s ship to share intelligence about the Vietnamese prior to battle 
and organized the 18 January militia landings on the islands� According to Wei, 
Zhang was a demobilized PLA soldier who boasted of “rich combat experience�”60 
Yang Gui, the captain of No� 407 and leader of the militia on board, also conferred 
with Wei in person to confirm the presence of HQ-16�61 Yang has described the 
core of his fishermen as “first-rate militia�”62 Both Wei and Yang recalled that 
militia had ready access to grenades, high-powered rifles, and machine guns 
below decks�
In contrast to a naval presence that could have conveyed belligerence, the 
trawlers gave China a low-profile means to back up its territorial claims� Even 
though the fishing boats engaged in provocative behavior, the ambiguities sur-
rounding their identity and purpose furnished plausible deniability to Chinese 
leaders� The ostensibly civilian character of the trawlers added ammunition to 
Beijing’s diplomatic narrative that Saigon was the aggressor� Indeed, a U�S� intel-
ligence report cited “Saigon’s military response to the move of Chinese fishermen 
into the Crescent group” as the “key step in the escalation�”63 This interpretation 
conformed to the story that Beijing likely wanted to tell�
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HISTORY RHYMING?
Chinese behavior during the 2012 Scarborough Shoal incident exhibits opera-
tional preferences that echo the 1974 Sino-Vietnamese clash in the Paracels� The 
more recent crisis began when a Philippine reconnaissance aircraft detected 
five Chinese fishing trawlers working near the shoal, located some two hundred 
kilometers west of Luzon Island� To investigate the activities taking place inside 
what the Philippines considers its exclusive economic zone, Manila dispatched 
the navy’s flagship, BRP Gregorio del Pilar (a former U�S� Coast Guard cutter)� 
The discovery of coral, clams, and sharks on board the Chinese boats set in mo-
tion an action-reaction cycle� As the Philippine Navy sought to stop the poach-
ers from hauling home the illegal catch, two China Marine Surveillance vessels 
intervened, precluding further Philippine attempts to enforce the law� To ease 
tensions, Manila recalled the frigate and deployed a coast guard vessel in its place� 
Rather than reciprocate the gesture, Beijing turned up the pressure by sending the 
Fisheries Law Enforcement Command’s newest ship, adding heft to the Chinese 
show of resolve�
With at least eight Chinese vessels facing off against a lone Philippine cutter, 
the balance of forces clearly favored Beijing� Moreover, in the event of escalation, 
China’s civilian boats and paramilitary forces could count on the long reach of the 
PLAN’s striking power� While Chinese warships largely stayed out of sight dur-
ing the crisis, their presence just beyond the horizon likely influenced Manila’s 
strategic calculus� Even so, the Philippines refused to back down, leading to a 
months-long stalemate at sea� To bring an end to the standoff and arrest further 
deterioration in bilateral ties, the United States brokered a behind-the-scenes 
deal in which both sides agreed to remove their ships from the area� But shortly 
after the mutual withdrawals, China sent back its maritime law enforcement 
ships and closed off access to the shoal� Since then, Beijing has maintained a 
presence there, retaining de facto control of the feature and surrounding waters�
Just as armed trawlers played an outsize role throughout the Paracels cam-
paign, civilian and paramilitary vessels took part in the Scarborough Shoal in-
cident� Chinese fishing boats triggered both crises by engaging in activities that, 
at least in the eyes of rival claimants, were illicit or provocative� Militia-crewed 
boats in 1974 and paramilitary ships in 2012 acted as China’s first line of defense, 
helping to probe the intentions and capabilities of their opponents while asserting 
Beijing’s claims� The noncombatant vessels enjoyed the protection of the PLAN 
even as they served as the eyes and ears of the Chinese navy� Such mutual sup-
port enabled China to evaluate the tactical circumstances; demonstrate resolve 
without militarizing the confrontation during the initial stages; calibrate the level 
of coercive pressure needed to compel the opponent’s will; and, should deterrence 
fail, apply force�
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The civilian character of the Chinese vessels constrained their rivals’ navies� 
The South Vietnamese and Philippine navies were apparently loath to fire di-
rectly on lightly armed or unarmed civilian vessels, lest they risk major escalation 
or diplomatic fallout� The two services thus found themselves maneuvering and 
posturing in vain to expel the Chinese ships� Even as China’s maritime presence 
imposed a stalemate, Beijing depicted its adversaries’ naval actions as major prov-
ocations, opening the way for a more muscular show of force� Nonmilitary units 
also deprived outside powers, such as the United States, of adequate rationale to 
intervene, yet they were more than enough to signal resolve to the local actors�
In both cases, Beijing waited for the other side to cross a red line before taking 
action that decisively settled the dispute in its favor� China’s maritime services 
sprang into action only after South Vietnam and the Philippines committed 
their navies to confront the Chinese� Whether Beijing consciously maneuvered 
its opponents into making the apparent first move or its rivals stumbled into that 
first move is unclear� This “second-mover advantage” presumably conferred on 
China the moral high ground to achieve more ambitious territorial objectives� As 
Thomas Christensen observes, “It often appears that Beijing is waiting for provo-
cations by others to legitimize Chinese actions that will consolidate control over 
the islands that China has claimed for decades but not administered in the past�”64 
Similarly, Christopher Yung and Patrick McNulty contend that “China may be 
engaging in a ‘status quo plus’ approach to maritime territorial dispute manage-
ment, maintaining the status quo until a rival acts to advance its territorial claims, 
and then responding vigorously to leave its rival in a disadvantaged position�”65
In both confrontations, the Chinese penchant for conceding the first move, 
at least as China perceived it, extended to tactical rules of engagement� In 1974, 
Chinese combatants were under strict orders not to fire the first shot� Demon-
strating impressive discipline under duress, the PLAN unleashed its firepower 
only after the RVN Navy obligingly launched the initial salvo� While the 2012 
standoff avoided a firefight, the burden was on the Philippines to evict the 
nonmilitary Chinese vessels through greater staying power or force� Beijing in 
essence dared Manila to punch first, confident in the knowledge that it would 
overwhelm the outgunned Philippine navy in retaliation� Manila wisely refused 
to take the bait� A similar dynamic is discernible in the ongoing Sino-Japanese 
tussle over the Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands� China Coast Guard vessels regularly 
intrude into or near the islands’ territorial waters, perhaps in hopes of setting off 
an overreaction�
After Beijing forcibly ousted Saigon and nudged out Manila by way of third-
party intervention, it built up overbearing power in the disputed areas that shut 
out the rival claimants� The combined military-civilian flotilla that appeared 
in force near the Paracels not only cemented China’s operational gains but also 
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conferred permanence on the new status quo� Zhang Zhaozhong, a retired admi-
ral and well-known talking head in Chinese media, memorably dubbed Beijing’s 
postcrisis consolidation of its position around Scarborough a “cabbage strategy�” 
The metaphor refers to the concentric layers of security—from the navy standing 
watch at the outermost ring to the maritime law enforcement ships and fishing 
boats patrolling along the inner rings—that surround the shoal� By hardening a 
new reality with physical presence, China sought to telegraph irreversibility to 
outside audiences�
CHALLENGES AHEAD
The United States and its regional partners confront an increasingly competitive 
maritime environment� From a strictly material perspective, the Chinese navy 
today is incomparably more powerful than it was in 1974� A replay of a weak and 
unprepared China facing off against a better-armed local opponent is virtually 
inconceivable�
At the tactical level, the roles have reversed rather dramatically: the PLAN 
outguns many of its Asian neighbors, including Vietnam, by significant margins� 
Indeed, the South Sea Fleet is no longer the neglected, rickety fleet from four 
decades ago� It now commands a large share of the service’s newest surface com-
batants and, significantly, its base in Hainan is home to nuclear attack and nuclear 
ballistic missile submarines�
Woody Island has evolved from a primitive outpost four decades ago to a 
staging area from which fighters and warships can be launched� Farther south, a 
group of newly created artificial islands boasts runways and port facilities that can 
accommodate PLA air and naval forces� Should a network of mutually support-
ing, well-defended bases emerge across the South China Sea, a permanent for-
ward presence would add teeth to China’s coercive leverage in maritime disputes�
Overall, China now possesses the military power to impose costs on the 
United States about which Chinese leaders in 1974 could have only dreamed� 
Modern Chinese destroyers, frigates, fast-attack craft, and submarines bristle 
with long-range antiship cruise missiles that can strike from standoff distances� 
Shore-based aircraft and truck-mounted cruise and ballistic missiles can reach 
deep into the South China Sea, furnishing the kinds of protective cover that naval 
units in 1974 sorely lacked�
Somewhat counterintuitively, a more powerful PLA could render unnecessary 
violent clashes like the Paracels battle� Instead, China may rely even more on 
its maritime law enforcement ships—the signature feature of China’s maritime 
coercion in recent years—to assert its territorial claims while the Chinese navy 
backstops such noncombatant units from just over the horizon� The Scarborough 
Shoal incident and the ongoing face-off over the Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands 
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amply demonstrate this civil-military integration of maritime power� Greater 
conventional military means will thus further empower irregular forces to im-
pose China’s will on rival claimants� And, if all else fails, Beijing can still call on 
its navy to settle a dispute� That China—unlike its weaker rivals—has the option 
of climbing the escalation ladder only amplifies the intimidation factor� Indeed, 
the navy’s lurking presence may induce an opponent to back down in a crisis, as 
it apparently did during the Scarborough confrontation�
Even as the PLAN bulks up on more-capable platforms, China’s maritime 
paramilitary forces are growing and modernizing at a breathtaking pace� Accord-
ing to a 2015 Pentagon report, China is pursuing “the largest MLE [maritime law 
enforcement] modernization effort in Asia” and “China’s MLE fleet � � � is likely to 
increase in size by 25 percent and is larger than that of all of the other claimants 
combined�”66 The Paracels battle illustrates that China’s employment of paramili-
tary units at sea is by no means a new phenomenon� Moreover, the clash reveals a 
well-pedigreed institutional nexus between the military and the maritime militia� 
Decades-long adherence to People’s War under Mao helped hone the kinds of 
doctrine, personnel, command-and-control, and administrative structures well 
suited to combining conventional and irregular means� Such creative uses of ci-
vilian and militia personnel date back centuries; there may be more continuity to 
current Chinese strategy in offshore disputes than is commonly acknowledged�67 
Washington and other, Asian capitals should recognize that the complex inter-
play of Chinese naval and nonmilitary instruments of sea power will likely be a 
permanent fixture in regional maritime disputes�
Hybrid warfare, to use today’s parlance, is neither novel nor unique to China� 
Russia, too, resorted to the use of paramilitary troops to dismember parts of 
Ukraine while avoiding a wider conflict with the West� There is thus an underly-
ing logic of strategy that transcends the peculiarities of China’s way of warfare� 
The apparent efficacy of mixing unorthodox methods with traditional tools of 
war suggests that China may turn to this playbook again in future confrontations 
in the South China Sea� With a more formidable conventional military backing 
up China’s large and growing paramilitary forces, hybrid warfare could become 
an even more attractive and effective option for Beijing in the coming years� The 
United States and other stakeholders in the region must be alert to this prospect�
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 China’s navy is undergoing a leadership transition not seen in a generation� Between late 2014 and the time of this writing (spring 2015), the upper 
echelons of leadership within the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLA Navy, or 
PLAN) began experiencing substantial change in personnel, with eleven of the 
fourteen positions on the navy’s Party Committee Standing Committee (referred 
to below as the PLAN Standing Committee)—the navy’s highest decision- 
making body—turning over (see table 1)�1
Many of these new leaders have been promoted from one of China’s three 
fleets: the North Sea Fleet (NSF), East Sea Fleet (ESF), or South Sea Fleet (SSF)� 
In 2014, for example, Vice Admirals Tian Zhong and Jiang Weilie, former NSF 
and SSF commanders, respectively, both became PLAN deputy commanders, a 
position that carries with it a seat on the PLAN Standing Committee�
Tian and Jiang typify the PLAN’s Rising Cohort� 
Born in the mid-1950s, these two officers came of 
age in a navy that was just beginning to reform� 
Since then, they have gained direct experience 
with the navy’s new missions, including far-seas 
operations� They are increasingly at ease conduct-
ing international naval diplomacy� Vice Admirals 
Tian and Zhong have led PLA delegations abroad, 
Vice Admiral Tian to Russia, North Korea, and 
South Korea and Vice Admiral Jiang to the United 
States�2 In 2014, Vice Admiral Jiang served as the 
PLA’s highest-ranking officer in attendance during 
China’s first-ever participation in the U�S�-led Rim 
The Past, Present, and Future Leaders of China’s Navy
Jeffrey Becker
Jeffrey Becker is an Asia analyst at the Center for 
Naval Analyses (CNA) China Studies Division. He 
is the coauthor of Behind the Periscope: Leadership 
in China’s Navy (CNA, 2013), and From Peasants to 
Protesters: Social Ties, Resources, and Migrant La-
bor Contention in Contemporary China (Lexington 
Books, 2014). His research has appeared in Compar-
ative Political Studies and the Journal of Chinese 
Political Science, as well as edited volumes on Chi-
nese politics. Dr. Becker holds a doctorate in politi-
cal science from the George Washington University, 
a master’s degree in political science from Columbia 
University, and a master’s degree in international 
relations and Asian studies from Colgate University.
Naval War College Review, Spring 2016, Vol. 69, No. 2 
WHO’S AT THE HELM? 
NWC_Spring2016Review.indb   66 3/8/16   10:29 AM
71
Naval War College: Spring 2016 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2016
B E C K E R  6 7
WHO’S AT THE HELM?
of the Pacific naval exercise (RIMPAC 2014)�3 Other officers newly promoted 
to the PLAN Standing Committee have similar experiences and qualities� Vice 
Admiral Qiu Yanpeng, a former ESF deputy commander, is a model officer for 
China’s far-seas expeditionary navy, having led one of the PLAN’s Gulf of Aden 
escort missions, training missions near the disputed Senkaku (Diaoyu) islands, 
and multiple exercises with foreign navies�4
More changes are on the horizon� Before the Third Plenum of the Eighteenth 
Party Congress in October 2012, rumors circulated of PLAN commander 
Name Position
First Year on 
PLAN Standing 
Committee
Former Positions of  
New Members
Adm�  
Wu Shengli
PLAN Commander 2006 
Lt� Gen�  
Miao Hua
PLAN Political Commissar 2014 Political Commissar,  
Lanzhou Military Region
Vice Adm�  
Wang Dengping
PLAN Deputy Political  
Commissar
2014 Director, PLAN Political Department 
Vice Adm�  
Ding Haichun
PLAN Deputy Political  
Commissar
2014 Political Commissar, East Sea Fleet 
Vice Adm�  
Tian Zhong
PLAN Deputy Commander 2014 Commander, North Sea Fleet 
Vice Adm�  
Jiang Weilie
PLAN Deputy Commander 2014 Commander, South Sea Fleet 
Vice Adm�  
Liu Yi
PLAN Deputy Commander 2011–12 
Vice Adm�  
Ding Yi
PLAN Deputy Commander 2014 Deputy Commander, North Sea Fleet 
Vice Adm�  
Du Jingchen
PLAN Deputy Commander 2011 PLAN Chief of Staff 
Vice Adm�  
Wang Hai
PLAN Deputy Commander 2015 North Sea Fleet Chief of Staff 
Vice Adm�  
Qiu Yanpeng
PLAN Chief of Staff 2014 Deputy Commander, East Sea Fleet 
Rear Adm�  
Yang Shiguang
Director, PLAN Political  
Department
2014 Director, Political Department,  
East Sea Fleet
Rear Adm�  
Xu Weibing
Director, PLAN Logistics  
Department
2011 
Rear Adm�  
Wang Jianguo
Director, PLAN Equipment  
Department
2014 Deputy Director, PLAN  
Equipment Department
TABLE 1
CURRENT MEMBERS OF THE PLAN STANDING COMMITTEE
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Admiral Wu Shengli’s retirement�5 Although this did not come to pass, he is al-
ready the oldest member of the Central Military Commission (CMC), the highest 
decision-making body within China’s military�6 As a CMC member, Admiral Wu 
has no known formal retirement date� However, past practice suggests he will 
step down no later than the Nineteenth Party Congress, scheduled for 2017, when 
he would be seventy-two�
These changes raise a number of questions for those interested in China’s naval 
modernization� How do China’s new navy leaders compare with their fellow se-
nior officers, and how will they affect the PLAN’s ongoing modernization efforts? 
The PLA Navy’s transition from a coastal-defense force to a blue-water navy has 
garnered significant attention in both policy and academic circles�7 However, 
an examination of the individuals overseeing the PLAN’s transition largely has 
been missing from this discussion� This article seeks to fill that void through an 
examination of the PLAN’s current leadership transition�
CHINA’S NAVY LEADERSHIP IN TRANSITION
To do so, the article examines three groups of officers� The first is the PLA Navy’s 
Old Guard: leaders who joined the PLA in the late 1960s and came of age largely 
during the Cultural Revolution, one of the most tumultuous and chaotic periods 
in modern Chinese history� These officers, however, are rapidly retiring, and are 
being replaced by the second group examined here, the PLAN’s Rising Cohort� 
This cohort consists of officers who joined the PLA largely in the mid-1970s to 
early 1980s and came of age when the PLA was just beginning to transition from a 
coastal-defense force to a blue-water navy� Naval officers who have recently tran-
sitioned into leadership positions, including those described above, are members 
of this group� Members of the third group constitute the PLAN’s Future Leader-
ship� These officers joined the PLA in the late 1980s and early 1990s and came 
of age during years of rapid economic growth and development� Although they 
have not yet ascended to leadership positions, the PLAN’s next leadership core is 
likely to be selected from this cohort�
This is a watershed moment for China’s navy leadership� The reforms of the 
past two decades have been led by a generation of leaders who, while extraordi-
nary in many ways, had little opportunity to experience the types of operations 
they were tasked with readying the PLAN to undertake� They came of age in 
a PLA that was ideologically oriented, internally focused, and concerned with 
coastal defense� However, they have successfully overseen the development of 
an increasingly professional, modern, and international navy� Their successors, 
members of the Rising Cohort, have played an important and hands-on role in 
the PLAN’s modernization program and led many of China’s early blue-water 
operations, including historic global circumnavigations, training missions into 
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the western Pacific, and early anti-piracy escort operations in the Gulf of Aden� 
Thus, for the first time in modern history, China’s navy will be led by officers for 
whom at-sea and blue-water experience is the norm rather than the exception�
Following on their heels is the PLAN’s Future Leadership, the first cohort of 
officers to join a Chinese navy that had already established a professional military 
education system and begun taking on more-expansive roles and missions before 
they joined� Not only do officers of this cohort have experience with blue-water 
operations, but they have experience operating in concert with foreign navies in 
combined military exercises and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/
DR) missions� Their eventual promotion into leadership positions will likely cre-
ate a second watershed moment for the PLAN, for the service will then be led 
by officers experienced in not only engaging but operating with foreign navies, 
enabling them to incorporate many of the international best practices learned 
from these experiences�
The remainder of this article proceeds as follows� After a brief examination 
of PLAN leadership in historical and organizational perspective, the article 
compares and contrasts the retiring Old Guard with the Rising Cohort, focusing 
primarily on changes within the PLAN Standing Committee� It then provides a 
comparative analysis of all three cohorts� The paper concludes by examining im-
plications of this leadership transition for the PLAN and the PLA more broadly�
PLA NAVY LEADERSHIP IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
PLAN leaders have historically carried little weight in the Chinese military or 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) hierarchy� Early navy leaders were simply 
ground force officers and Party personnel transferred from elsewhere� The 
PLA Navy’s first commander, Xiao Jingguang, spent his early military career in 
Guangdong, Wuhan, and Changsha� After Mao selected him to head the navy, 
there was still significant debate whether the navy would be an independent 
service or housed within the General Staff Department�8 It was not until 1988, 
when career submariner Zhang Lianzhong was promoted to commander, that the 
PLAN was led by a career naval officer�9 The PLAN’s first career-navy political 
commissar did not come until the promotion of Zhou Kunren in 1993� In 2004, 
for the first time in the reform era, the PLA institutionalized the practice of hav-
ing the commanders of each of the three nonground services (the PLAN, the 
PLA Air Force, and the Second Artillery) serve concurrently in the CMC, thus 
increasing the influence of these services in relation to the traditionally dominant 
ground forces�10 Yet only recently were PLAN officers serving in military posi-
tions outside the navy allowed to wear their navy uniforms rather than the olive 
green of the ground forces�11
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From these humble beginnings, PLA Navy leaders appear to have gained con-
siderable influence within the PLA over the past decade (see the figure). Detailed 
information on budgetary spending by service remains unavailable, but it is clear 
the PLA has made naval modernization a high priority, with acquisitions from 
abroad and construction of new ships and weapons platforms.12 To be sure, the 
PLA remains ground force–centric, but navy officers are now found in all levels 
of China’s military and hold positions of great importance within the larger PLA 
hierarchy. 
HOW CHINA’S NAVY LEADERSHIP IS ORGANIZED
PLAN leaders hold important positions within the PLA’s four general depart-
ments: the General Staff Department (GSD), General Political Department 
(GPD), General Logistics Department (GLD), and General Equipment Depart-
ment (GED). These four organizations are tasked with coordinating and oversee-
ing work within their specific purviews throughout the PLA. The GSD is respon-
sible for planning, organizing, and directing military operations, and leads the 
PLA’s modernization program. The GPD manages the political relationship be-
tween the CCP and the PLA, and ensures the Party controls the armed forces. The 
Shenyang MR
Beijing MR
Chengdu MR
General Political
Department
General Sta
Department
Lanzhou MR
Key
PLA Navy Leadership Positions
PLA Navy HQ Second Artillery
North Sea 
Fleet
East Sea 
Fleet
South Sea 
FleetJinan MR
Nanjing MR
Guangzhou MR
PLA Air Force
General 
Logistics 
Department
Seven Military 
Regions
General
 Equipment 
Department
Central Military 
Commission
PLAN LEADERS THROUGHOUT THE PLA
Source: Adapted from Becker, Liebenberg, and Mackenzie, Behind the Periscope, p. 15.
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GLD oversees logistics work� The GED, also referred to as the General Armament 
Department, oversees weapons and equipment development and maintenance� 
This four-department structure is mirrored in China’s navy: the PLAN has a 
headquarters department, which serves a function similar to the GSD’s, as well 
as political, logistics, and equipment departments� Many lower-level departments 
(erjibu, 二级部) found in the PLA’s four general departments are also replicated 
within the PLAN� For example, the GSD Military Affairs Department is respon-
sible PLA-wide for promulgating manuals and developing policies related to PLA 
career tracks; the navy’s Military Affairs Department at PLAN headquarters has 
similar responsibilities within the PLAN�13
Of China’s seven military regions (MRs), PLAN leaders serve in three (the 
Jinan, Nanjing, and Guangzhou MRs), and in China’s three fleets, which are bu-
reaucratically subordinate to the three respective MRs, with the commander of 
the fleet serving as deputy commander within that MR� 
Most navy leaders are found at PLAN headquarters, or within the headquar-
ters of one of the three fleets� However, PLAN personnel are increasingly holding 
positions of importance in central-level organizations and the MRs� Admiral Sun 
Jianguo, for example, is one of five deputy chiefs of the PLA General Staff, and 
chair of the China Institute for International Strategic Studies, a think tank for the 
Second Department of the PLA General Staff Department, the organ responsible 
for human intelligence gathering and analysis�14 Vice Admiral Liu Zhuoming, son 
of the 1980s naval reformer Admiral Liu Huaqing, serves as the deputy director 
of the General Equipment Department’s Science and Technology Commission, 
a body responsible for overseeing high-priority defense science and technology 
aspects of the PLA’s modernization program�15 Rear Admiral Guan Youfei is the 
director of the Ministry of National Defense Foreign Affairs Office, the primary 
organization that manages China’s foreign military relations, while Rear Admiral 
Li Ji serves as one of his deputy directors�16 Other PLAN officers serve as heads 
of navy departments or joint logistics departments within the MRs, maintaining 
force readiness and overseeing naval military training� 
DEFINING PLA NAVY LEADERSHIP 
There exists no universally accepted definition of what constitutes a leadership 
position within the PLA Navy� The few discussions of PLAN leadership that exist 
focus almost exclusively on the PLAN commander, at most extending to a few 
members of the PLAN Standing Committee�17 However, such a limited scope of 
discussion leaves out many officers with influence over day-to-day operations 
and over the PLAN’s long-term strategic direction� With this in mind, this article 
substantially expands the discussion of PLAN leadership to encompass the fol-
lowing positions: 
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• PLAN headquarters
• The PLA Navy commander and political commissar
• PLA Navy deputy commanders and deputy political commissars 
• The PLA Navy chief of staff and deputy chiefs of staff 
• The directors, political commissars, and deputy directors of the navy’s  
political, logistics, and equipment departments 
• The directors of second-level departments
• China’s three fleets
• Fleet commanders and political commissars 
• Fleet deputy commanders
• Fleet chiefs of staff and deputy chiefs of staff 
• Directors of the fleet political, logistics, and equipment departments 
• The four PLA general departments
• Naval officers serving as deputy chiefs of the general staff
• Naval officers serving as assistants to the director of a general department
• Naval officers serving as directors or deputy directors of PLA first-level 
departments
• The military regions
• Naval officers serving as MR deputy chiefs of staff
• Naval officers serving as deputy directors of MR logistics departments
• Naval officers serving as directors of MR navy departments 
Definitions of PLAN “leadership” will remain subject to debate� However, 
the positions listed above all entail extensive responsibilities for portfolios that 
provide their incumbents with immediate PLAN-wide or fleet-wide influence� 
Focusing on these positions, this article relies on a data set of profiles of eighty-
eight different PLAN officers serving in these positions� 
A YOUNGER PLAN LEADERSHIP
Before 2014, one of the most striking qualities of PLA Navy leaders was their 
advanced age� Almost every PLAN Standing Committee member had begun 
his military career in the late 1960s or early 1970s and had come of age during 
the Cultural Revolution (1966–76), when China experienced what amounted to 
a low-intensity civil war�18 In 2013, seven of the thirteen PLAN Standing Com-
mittee members had joined the PLA between 1964 and 1969, while four joined 
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between 1970 and 1972� 
Only Logistics Depart-
ment director Xu Weibing 
was younger,  having 
joined the PLA in 1978�19
PLAN leaders were 
also considerably older 
than their foreign coun-
terparts� For example, in 
2013 the average age for the eleven serving U�S� Navy admirals (O-10) was fifty-
seven, compared with an average age of sixty-four for the three PLA Navy officers 
of comparable rank�20 Admiral Wu Shengli, born in 1945, was eight years older 
than his USN counterpart at the time, Admiral Greenert�21 To put this in perspec-
tive, Admiral Wu’s continued tenure as PLAN commander would be roughly 
equivalent to the U�S� Navy being led by an officer whose formative experiences 
came during the middle period (1965–69) of the Vietnam War�
Recent changes have injected younger blood into the PLAN Standing Com-
mittee� In early 2014, immediately before the most recent round of personnel 
changes, the average age of this body’s members was sixty-two; today it is fifty-
eight�22 Only two actively serving members, Admiral Wu and Vice Admiral Du 
Jingchen, joined the PLA in the 1960s (see table 3)�
Moreover, fewer senior PLAN officers are remaining on active duty past the 
age at which retirement is mandated, which provides opportunities for younger 
officers to move up the ranks� Since the 1990s, the PLA has worked to normal-
ize retirement ages for high-level officers, and roughly two-thirds of the officers 
examined herein joined the PLA between 1970 and 1980�23 This appears to be 
true across the PLA� For example, after examining the careers of 107 PLA com-
manders and deputy commanders serving since 2005 in the army, navy, and air 
force, we found only seven officers within this group who had remained on active 
service past their respective retirement ages�24
CHINA’S EAST COAST: THE CRADLE OF PLA NAVY LEADERSHIP
Studies of civilian and military leadership under previous Chinese leaders Jiang 
Zemin and Hu Jintao have shown an overrepresentation from eastern coastal 
provinces such as Shandong and Jiangsu and an underrepresentation from 
southern coastal provinces�25 This is true for PLAN leaders under Xi Jinping as 
well, as most PLAN leaders come from the eastern third of the country, with a 
significant portion hailing from the same east-coast provinces as under Jiang 
and Hu� We identified the hometowns for forty-nine of the eighty-eight officers 
examined within this data set� All of those officers hail from the eastern third of 
PLA Navy Officers U.S. Navy Officers
Admiral/General 64 Admiral 57
Vice Admiral 61 Vice Admiral 56
Rear Admiral 58 Rear Admiral 55
Senior Captain 52
TABLE 2
AVERAGE AGES OF SELECT PLA NAVY AND U.S. OFFICERS
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the country (see the map)� Moreover, of those forty-nine officers, thirty-nine are 
from coastal provinces such as Shandong (eight) or Jiangsu (eight), with others 
hailing from Zhejiang (five), Liaoning (four), or Beijing (four)� In contrast, we 
could not identify any navy leaders from western provinces such as Qinghai, 
Gansu, Sichuan, or Tibet� 
Some provinces that are home to critical naval installations, such as Guang-
dong, home of the South Sea Fleet, or Shanghai, home to important bases for the 
East Sea Fleet, each have only one leader in this data set, and no representation 
on the PLAN Standing Committee� Eight of the fourteen current PLAN Stand-
ing Committee members hail from Jiangsu (three), Shandong (three), or Hebei 
(two) (see table 3)� 
THREE COHORTS OF NAVY LEADERS
The section below compares and contrasts members of the navy’s past, pres-
ent, and likely future leadership across a wide range of factors, including key 
TABLE 3
HOME PROVINCES AND FIRST YEARS OF SERVICE FOR PLAN STANDING COMMITTEE 
MEMBERS
Name Position Home  Province
First Year  
of Service 
Adm� Wu Shengli PLAN Commander Zhejianga 1964
Lt� Gen� Miao Hua PLAN Political Commissar Fujian 1972
Vice Adm� Wang Dengping PLAN Deputy Political Commissar Anhui 1970
Vice Adm� Ding Haichun PLAN Deputy Political Commissar Hunan 1972
Vice Adm� Tian Zhong PLAN Deputy Commander Hebei 1974
Vice Adm� Jiang Weilie PLAN Deputy Commander Jiangsu 1972
Vice Adm� Liu Yi PLAN Deputy Commander Shandong 1972
Vice Adm� Ding Yi PLAN Deputy Commander Jiangsu 1976
Vice Adm� Du Jingchen PLAN Deputy Commander Shandong 1969
Vice Adm� Wang Hai PLAN Deputy Commander Zhejiang Unknown
Vice Adm� Qiu Yanpeng PLAN Chief of Staff Shandong 1974
Rear Adm� Yang Shiguang Director, PLAN Political Department Unknown Unknown
Rear Adm� Xu Weibing Director, PLAN Logistics Department Jiangsu 1978
Rear Adm� Wang Jianguo Director, PLAN Equipment Department Unknown Unknown
Note:
 a. Admiral Wu grew up in Hangzhou, Zhejiang Province, as his father was mayor of that city in the 1950s. However, Wu’s ancestral home is Wuqiao, 
Hebei Province, which is also the hometown of Admiral Sun Jianguo. My thanks to the anonymous reviewer for highlighting this distinction. 
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historical experiences during the early stages of their careers, access to formal 
technical and professional education, approach to doctrine, experience engag-
ing with foreign military personnel, and combat experience� This comparison is 
summarized in table 4� 
Xinjiang
Tibet
Qinghai
Sichuan
Yunnan
Shaanxi
Shanxi
Hebei
3
Henan
2
Shandong
8
Liaoning
4
Jilin
1
Guangxi
Guangdong
Fujian
3
Jiangxi
1
Hunan
1
Hubei 4
Anhui
1
Jiangsu 8
Zhejiang
5
Beijing
4
Heilongjiang
Inner Mongolia
Shanghai 1
Tianjin 22
Guizhou
1
Gansu
PLA NAVY LEADERS BY PROVINCE
Cohort
Early   
Career 
Period 
Defining  
Historic  
Event 
Professional  
Technical  
Expertise
Doctrine International  Engagement
Combat 
Experience
Old Guard Late 1960s 
Early 
1970s
Cultural 
Revolution 
(1966–76)
Limited or no 
formal training 
until midcareer
Soviet Young 
School; Mao’s 
People’s  
War at Sea
Limited  
engagement at  
senior levels 
Limited
Rising 
Cohort
Mid-1970s 
Early 
1980s
Economic 
and military 
reforms  
(1979–85) 
Rudimentary  
technical  
training 
Offshore 
defense
Growing  
engagement 
opportunities as 
midcareer officers
None
Future 
Leadership
Later 
1980s
Military 
moderniza-
tion  
(1986–92)
Increasingly  
sophisticated 
training as 
junior officers
Offshore 
defense and 
far-seas  
protection
Operational-level 
engagement as  
junior officers
None
TABLE 4
THREE COHORTS OF PLA NAVY OFFICERS
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The Impact of History on China’s Navy Leadership
Shared historical experiences, particularly during individuals’ “formative years” 
(late teens to early twenties), are frequently used to analyze Chinese military and 
political elites�26 Most of the officers examined here joined the military during 
these years, making this approach particularly well suited to the study of China’s 
naval leadership� Differences among the cohorts are also exacerbated by the ex-
treme changes that occurred in China over the past few decades� For example, 
while members of the navy’s Old Guard grew up under Maoist socialism and be-
gan their military careers during the chaos of the Cultural Revolution, members 
of the slightly younger Rising Cohort began their careers during a period of sig-
nificant transition, for both the military and China overall� In contrast, those in 
the PLAN’s Future Leadership are some of the first officers to have never known 
anything but a stable and prosperous China increasingly powerful and confident 
on the world stage�
The Cultural Revolution and China’s Old Guard. Although many have recently 
stepped down, PLAN officers who joined the PLA in the 1960s or early 1970s 
remain in key positions� They include PLAN commander Wu Shengli as well 
as PLAN Standing Committee members deputy commander Vice Admiral Du 
Jingchen and deputy political commissar Vice Admiral Wang Dengping� Officers 
within this cohort came of age during the chaos of the Cultural Revolution, a 
period during which China experienced a breakdown of society and government 
as Mao sought to reestablish authority over the country through continuous and 
often violent revolution� During this time, the lives of millions were affected, in-
cluding many of the PLAN’s Old Guard�
For example, PLAN officers who began their military careers at this time 
worked within an organization focused almost exclusively on domestic political 
issues rather than professional military training and execution� With the break-
down of political authority, PLA troops, including PLAN units, were called on 
to secure important centers of power and maintain law and order� During the 
Wuhan incident in 1967—a pitched battle between rival political factions for 
control of the Hubei provincial capital—Mao dispatched PLAN gunboats from 
the East Sea Fleet to provide support to his factions fighting in the city�27 Other 
units protected critical naval infrastructure on the Zhoushan islands near Shang-
hai, and their personnel provided temporary port labor to ensure the continued 
flow of necessary supplies�28
Opportunities for the PLAN’s Old Guard to receive formal training and pro-
fessional military education (PME) during this time were almost nonexistent� 
By the mid-1960s, most of China’s PME institutions were shut down, and formal 
training and technical knowledge were radically de-emphasized� For example, 
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previous standards that required PLA Navy submarines to be manned with a 70 : 
30 ratio of qualified to unqualified crewmen ran counter to Maoist teachings that 
political will could overcome a lack of specialized expertise, so they were revised 
to allow for as much as 80 percent of a submarine’s crew to be newly assigned, un-
qualified personnel�29 As many as 3,800 officers, including eleven rear admirals, 
were purged during this time�30
Many in the current upper echelon of navy leaders were forced to wait until the 
late 1970s to receive any form of PME� In 1964, just as many of the nation’s educa-
tional institutions were being shuttered, Admiral Wu was enrolled at the PLA Sur-
veying and Mapping College in Xi’an, Shaanxi Province, where he would remain 
until 1968�31 In 1968, Admiral Liu Xiaojiang, who only recently retired as PLAN 
political commissar, worked on a rural commune in Shaanxi as an “educated 
youth�”32 Although he joined the PLA in 1968, Admiral Sun Jianguo, the PLAN’s 
third-highest-ranking naval officer, was unable to attend the Naval Submarine 
Academy until 1978�33 Recently retired deputy commander Vice Admiral Zhang 
Yongyi had to wait years before attending the Shenyang Air Force Academy�34
From Cultural Revolution to Reform and Opening: The PLAN’s Rising Cohort. As 
the older generation of leaders retires, officers who joined the PLA in the middle- 
to-late 1970s or early 1980s are replacing them� Many of the PLAN’s newly pro-
moted Standing Committee members are part of this group, including deputy 
commanders Vice Admiral Tian Zhong and Vice Admiral Ding Yi, and chief of 
staff Vice Admiral Qiu Yanpeng� They join PLAN Logistics Department director 
Xu Weibing as part of China’s Rising Cohort of naval leaders� 
Age differences between the Old Guard and the Rising Cohort are not always 
great� The Rising Cohort’s Vice Admiral Jiang Weilie, for example, who joined 
the PLA in 1972, is not far removed from the Old Guard’s deputy political com-
missar Vice Admiral Wang Dengping or deputy commander Vice Admiral Du 
Jingchen, who joined the PLA in 1970 and 1969, respectively� Members of the 
Rising Cohort were therefore affected by the Cultural Revolution as well� Yet as 
they were just a few years younger, those experiences were often radically differ-
ent� Members of the Rising Cohort likely experienced the worst excesses of the 
Cultural Revolution as civilians, since many of the most violent events took place 
in 1967 and 1968, immediately before they joined the PLA� Absent the PLA’s in-
stitutional protections, they were more likely to have been part of the “sent-down 
youth” movement, which forced roughly 12 million urban youths to work in the 
countryside between 1968 and 1975�35 Current NSF commander Yuan Yubai, an 
older member of this cohort but one who did not join the PLA until 1973, spent 
two years as a member of his county’s “Basic Line Education Work Team,” in 
Gongan County, Hubei Province�36
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While marked by the Cultural Revolution, the PLAN’s Rising Cohort also 
benefited greatly from China’s economic reform and opening period as well as 
the PLA’s early modernization efforts, both of which began in the early 1980s� 
By 1978, Deng Xiaoping had begun dismantling the collective system of rural 
agricultural production and establishing incentives for state-owned industries 
to increase production—steps that would put the Chinese economy on the road 
to three decades of double-digit growth� Around the same time, the PLA had 
reestablished its educational and training institutions, focusing primarily on ro-
tational training and unit readiness� Cultural Revolution policies of preparing for 
total war gave way to training to fight what the PLA refers to as “local wars under 
high-tech conditions�” Most importantly, ideological purity was replaced with 
technical acumen, with a shift in emphasis back from “red” to “expert�”37 Thus the 
Rising Cohort represents the first group of leaders who did not have to transition 
from an ideological to a professional focus midway through their careers� 
A Rising and Confident China: The PLA Navy’s Future Leaders. As the Rising 
Cohort moves up the ranks, this is creating space for a younger group of offi-
cers who came of age in the late 1980s and early 1990s� While they have not 
yet ascended to top leadership positions, in all probability the PLAN’s next true 
“generation” of leaders—in the sense that they will be removed from their prede-
cessors’ experiences during the Cultural Revolution—will come from this cohort� 
Many in this younger cohort are currently serving in naval academic institutions 
or as ship commanding officers (COs) or political commissars� Examples include 
Senior Captain Li Hanjun, who until 2014 was serving as the director of the train-
ing department at PLAN headquarters and is now the director of the military 
training department at the Naval Command Academy�38 This also includes Se-
nior Captain Zhang Zheng, the CO of the PLA Navy’s aircraft carrier, Liaoning; 
Zou Fuquan, the CO of Haikou (CNS 171) during the first Gulf of Aden escort 
operation in 2008; and Senior Captain Zhao Xiaogang, the PLA Navy’s task force 
commander for China’s first-ever participation in RIMPAC�39
Born in the late 1960s and early 1970s, these officers were children or adoles-
cents during the Cultural Revolution, although it still undoubtedly influenced 
their lives� In their adult lives, however, they have experienced a much more 
stable domestic and international environment and an increasingly powerful and 
prosperous China� By the mid-to-late 1980s, when many of these officers were 
still in the early stages of their military careers, China’s relations with the United 
States and the Soviet Union had improved considerably, allowing Deng Xiaoping 
in 1985 to put forth his strategic reassessment of the current international climate 
as one in which China could expect at least two decades of international stabil-
ity�40 These changes to China’s strategic outlook mean that once these officers 
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move into top-level positions, they will be the first PLAN leadership cohort to 
have never served in a navy preparing for total war� 
China’s reassessment of its international environment also allowed the PLA 
to rethink its approach to training, modernization, and national defense� In the 
mid-1990s, Jiang Zemin’s policy of “two transformations” (liangge zhuanbian, 
两个转变) called for the army to shift from preparing to fight local wars under 
normal conditions to fighting local wars in a high-tech environment, and for the 
PLA as a whole to shift toward relying on quality rather than quantity�41 As part of 
this reassessment, the PLA Navy in particular sought to professionalize its officer 
corps and improve training and recruitment, and officers within this younger 
cohort have benefited significantly� For example, since these officers joined the 
PLA in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the PLA has been downsized by roughly 
1�7 million personnel�42 In addition, while much remains unknown about the 
importance of personal connections in the PLA promotion system, this is also the 
first group of navy officers for whom actual retirement at prescribed mandatory 
ages is the standard, making promotion practices more routine� 
The PLA Navy, like the PLA more broadly, has also sought to improve reten-
tion through increased compensation and improved living standards; PLAN 
commander Wu himself has written on this subject�43 The navy’s procurement 
of advanced weaponry in the mid- and late 1990s created even greater emphasis 
on educating and training officers who could operate, support, and maintain 
these new systems�44 Thus, as this cohort of officers was joining up, the PLAN 
was beginning to recruit more college-educated personnel�45 A growing number 
of younger PLAN officers have also studied in top-tier Chinese civilian universi-
ties; they include Senior Captain Zhang Zheng, who graduated from Shanghai 
Jiaotong University in 1990 with a degree in engineering�46 While the PLAN’s 
PME system continues to undergo reforms, the improvements China’s navy has 
already made since these officers joined the PLA means the navy’s Future Leader-
ship includes some of the most highly trained and technically proficient person-
nel in the modern history of the PLAN� 47
China’s Changing Approach to Naval Doctrine 
As the PLAN leadership continues to transition to a new and younger cohort of 
leaders, so has the PLAN’s approach to doctrine changed� Members of the navy’s 
Old Guard were greatly influenced in their early careers by Mao’s views of guer-
rilla warfare, adapted to the navy in the form of “People’s War at Sea,” as well as 
Soviet naval doctrine in the form of the Young School� In contrast, members of 
the PLAN’s Rising Cohort were introduced in the early and middle stages of their 
careers to the concept of offshore or “near seas” defense (jinhai fangyu, 近海防
御), a reorientation of Chinese naval assets seaward, and an extension of China’s 
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area of operations� This gradual extension of the PLAN’s area of operations 
continued with Hu Jintao’s 2004 directive for the PLA to take on “new historic 
missions,” pushing the PLAN farther and farther afield�48 
People’s War at Sea: The Influence of Mao and the Soviet Union. Navy opera-
tions and doctrine in the PLAN’s early years were heavily influenced by two in-
dependent strands of thought: Mao’s views of guerrilla warfare and Russian views 
regarding asymmetric warfare at sea�49 While distinct approaches, both favored 
the use of smaller units operating in dispersed groups to engage in commerce 
raiding and coastal defense, and the PLAN’s approach to warfare reflected this 
influence� For example, Chinese writings on naval operations during the PLAN’s 
early years described the importance of “mak[ing] the best use of the sorghum 
fields at sea—the reefs, islets, cold, fog, and waves—and bring[ing] into full play 
the tactics and strategy of people’s war�”50
The PLAN’s early approach to war fighting can be seen in early coastal opera-
tions against Kuomintang (KMT) forces in the 1950s� In the 1954–55 naval am-
bush operations off the coast of Zhejiang, for example, the PLA Navy conducted 
surprise attacks against KMT frigates and gunships using torpedo boats hidden 
among larger merchant ships moving down the coast� These torpedo boats were 
then dispatched on a rainy night with low visibility, and were able to get within 
four kilometers of their KMT targets before being detected, successfully sinking 
the KMT frigate Taiping and KMT gunship Dongting.51
The PLAN’s limited capacity to remain at sea for prolonged periods surely lim-
ited any opportunities for members of the navy’s Old Guard to acquire blue-water 
experience early in their careers� However, this focus on hit-and-run tactics and 
guerrilla warfare shows that the PLAN’s transition to its current form resulted as 
much from a radical shift in mind-set as from the acquisition of new technology 
and operational capabilities� 
The Rising Cohort and Offshore Defense. Deng Xiaoping’s 1985 reassessment of 
the international strategic environment helped usher in a shift in the PLA Navy’s 
strategy to “offshore defense” (jinhai fangyu, 近海防御), which sought to extend 
China’s strategic maritime periphery farther from its borders� Much ink has al-
ready been spilled in analyzing in nuanced detail this shift in doctrine�52 For those 
in the navy’s Rising Cohort, however, this new doctrine fundamentally changed 
how they would think about war fighting� The PLAN would no longer use hit-
and-run tactics but instead would train and prepare to fight in “more substantial 
and organized formations�”53 
The PLAN’s shift to offshore defense would also expand its area of operations 
farther from China’s coast, creating what may be the most important difference 
between this cohort and its predecessor: namely, that a much larger component 
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of the Rising Cohort has direct experience with blue-water operations�54 Such 
operations have become an increasingly important component of the PLAN’s 
regimen, and active-duty PLAN officers have not been shy in noting the impor-
tance of blue-water operations to the future of the PLAN� For example, speaking 
to the PLA Daily in 2012, current chief of staff  then–rear admiral Qiu Yanpeng 
noted, “With the constant improvement of China’s naval equipment and support 
capability, the waters for maritime training also keep expanding� Open-sea train-
ing has become an effective means and inevitable choice to enhance the combat 
capability of the PLA Navy�”55 China’s 2013 defense white paper notes that the 
PLA Navy is “intensifying blue-water training” and “improving the training 
mode of task force formation in blue water�”56
Prior to personnel changes in 2014, few members of the PLAN leadership had 
any extensive experience with blue-water operations� With the exception of Du 
Jingchen, no Standing Committee member had been involved with the PLAN’s 
Gulf of Aden escort mission, a well-known and long-standing blue-water mis-
sion�57 Now not only is Vice Admiral Du joined by Vice Admiral Qiu Yanpeng as 
another Standing Committee member with such experience (Qiu led the fourth 
escort mission, in 2010), but almost half the members of the Standing Committee 
have similar experiences leading blue-water operations�58 Other members of the 
Rising Cohort with similar blue-water experience have recently been promoted as 
well� Rear Admiral Zhang Wendan, the commander of the fifth Gulf of Aden task 
force, was recently promoted to SSF chief of staff� Rear Admiral Zhou Xuming, 
the leader of the twelfth task force, was promoted to NSF deputy commander�59 
Early blue-water operations likely carried significant weight for the few mem-
bers of the Old Guard who commanded them� For the navy’s Rising Cohort, 
however, the impact on a career of commanding a blue-water operation is not 
automatic� To paraphrase a senior PLA Navy officer:
Taking part in the escort operations is something we increasingly emphasize in 
promotion� But escort participation by itself does not guarantee promotion [emphasis 
added]� It is not the case that if you take part in the escort operations, you will  
be promoted, and if you do not take part, you will not be promoted� If you take  
part in the escort, and you show a good performance, then you may be promoted 
[paraphrase]�60 
Nor does commanding a Gulf of Aden task force specifically appear to lead 
directly to promotion� While Vice Admiral Du was promoted less than a year 
after commanding China’s first escort mission in the Gulf of Aden, no other Gulf 
of Aden task force commander was promoted so quickly� Indeed, of the first 
fourteen officers who led a Gulf of Aden escort mission between 2008 and 2013, 
six remain in the same position at the time of this writing�61
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China’s Expanding Interests Abroad and the Next Generation of PLAN Leaders. 
Since Hu Jintao’s 2004 “New Historic Missions” speech, in which he declared that 
China’s interests abroad were expanding, and that the PLA, particularly the PLA 
Navy, had an important role to play in defending those interests, the PLAN has 
extended its operations farther afield�62 Moreover, this trend appears to show no 
sign of slowing down� For example, the 2013 “Diversified Employment of China’s 
Armed Forces” notes the continuing importance of “comprehensive security” 
(zonghe anquan, 综合安全), including the strengthening of China’s overseas op-
erational capabilities such as search and rescue and emergency evacuation and 
protecting China’s overseas interests, all of which are important missions for 
China’s navy�63 One of the main themes of the 2015 defense white paper “China’s 
Military Strategy” is the need for China to “safeguard its maritime rights and 
interests,” which requires that “the traditional mentality that land outweighs sea 
must be abandoned, and great[er] importance be attached to managing the sea 
and oceans and protecting maritime rights and interests�”64
These two documents continue the shift in the PLA’s focus from the land to the 
sea, and from China’s coastal and littoral regions to far-seas operations� While it is 
too soon to know for certain the impact this trend will have on the PLAN’s Future 
Leadership cohort, two distinct possibilities suggest themselves�
First, the PLA’s continued placement of greater emphasis on China’s maritime 
rights and interests may create opportunities for PLAN personnel to chip away 
slowly at the PLA ground force’s monopoly on positions of power� 
Second, as the PLAN continues to embrace its global role, the navy’s Future 
Leadership may increasingly take on the views and perspectives of officers who 
work in a truly blue-water navy� While this is not to suggest that China’s younger 
leaders will forsake traditional security operations, some PLAN personnel have 
already noted that China’s younger officers are more interested in far-seas opera-
tions outside the first island chain�65 As the PLAN continues this decades-long 
shift from being an inward-looking, coastal-defense force to an outward-looking, 
expeditionary navy, the PLAN’s next generation of leaders will have more experi-
ence at sea than any group of Chinese navy leaders in modern history�
International Engagement with Foreign Navies
Each successive cohort of PLAN leadership has become increasingly comfort-
able and confident operating in an international environment� While members 
of the navy’s Old Guard were almost completely isolated from the international 
maritime community early in their careers, those in the Rising Cohort have had 
opportunities to engage with that community, developing a confidence and so-
phistication honed from experience with naval diplomacy unavailable to most of 
their older counterparts save those of the highest rank� Yet even this confidence 
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and experience are quickly being overshadowed by those in the PLAN’s Future 
Leadership, who engage with foreign navies not only diplomatically but op-
erationally, increasingly working side by side with their foreign counterparts in 
bilateral and multilateral naval exercises as junior officers� 
For China’s Old Guard, international engagement with foreign navies came 
late in their careers� The Cultural Revolution effectively shut down China’s naval 
diplomacy, and with the exception of a handful of senior exchanges with the 
North Korean and Sri Lankan navies, China’s naval diplomacy did not restart 
until the mid-1980s�66 For example, the PLA Navy did not conduct its first port 
visit until 1985, when a three-ship task force visited Pakistan, Bangladesh, and 
Sri Lanka� The Chinese navy only began to conduct combined military exercises 
with foreign navies in earnest in the early 2000s, and the PLAN’s first bilateral 
maritime exercise in the region did not take place until 2007, when members of 
the Old Guard were already well established in their careers�
When the PLAN did begin engaging with foreign militaries, the importance 
of these initial operations meant that they were entrusted to established senior 
officers� For example, PLAN deputy commander Ding Yiping led the PLAN’s first 
global circumnavigation in 2002 as a vice admiral� Vice Admiral Du Jingchen, 
one of the PLAN’s current deputy commanders, led the PLAN’s first Gulf of Aden 
operations as the South Sea Fleet’s chief of staff, but was promoted less than a year 
later to PLAN chief of staff�
The PLAN’s Rising Cohort and Increasing International Engagement. The mem-
bers of the PLAN’s Rising Cohort have had more exposure to naval diplomacy 
engagement at much earlier stages in their careers than their predecessors� As 
the PLAN continues to be China’s primary service for military diplomacy— 
conducting counter-piracy activities in the Gulf of Aden, humanitarian missions 
via the PLAN’s hospital ship Peace Ark, and traditional combat exercises such as 
the annual MARITIME COOPERATION exercise with Russia—the opportunity to 
engage with foreign navy personnel has become increasingly common�67 For ex-
ample, as a senior captain commanding the East Sea Fleet’s 6th Destroyer Flotilla 
in 2007, then–rear admiral Qiu Yanpeng led the PLAN’s contingent in AMAN-07, 
a Pakistan-hosted multilateral exercise with eight other nations, including the 
United States� This marked the first time China participated in a multilateral 
combined naval exercise, the first time a PLAN task force traveled abroad with-
out a supply ship, and the first time the navy used live ammunition overseas�68 
China’s Future Leadership: Working with and alongside Foreign Navies. While the 
PLAN’s Rising Cohort has had substantial international engagement experience 
compared with the Old Guard, much of it has been limited to cursory diplomatic 
events such as meetings during port visits or communications at sea� In contrast, 
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China’s Future Leadership has begun actually operating with rather than simply 
alongside foreign navies� For example, although U�S� Navy and PLAN ships have 
been interacting in the Gulf of Aden for years, in 2013 the two navies conducted 
their first exercise in that region, which included boarding operations, live-fire 
drills, and helicopter landings�69 In September of that year the two navies con-
ducted additional exercises off the coast of Hawaii�70 In the summer of 2014, Chi-
na sent four ships to participate for the first time in RIMPAC, the world’s largest 
multilateral naval exercise� Senior Captain Zhao Xiaogang, the PLA Navy’s task 
force commander at RIMPAC 2014, and the COs of the PLAN’s four ships at the 
exercise each worked closely with ships from the U�S�, French, Singaporean, and 
other navies for weeks, conducting a wide range of drills at sea and interacting 
with them on a daily basis� 
Working so closely with foreign navies at such an early stage in one’s career 
was not a possibility for those in the PLAN’s Rising Cohort, and was unthinkable 
for Admiral Wu and other members of the Old Guard early in their careers� As 
the PLAN continues to work alongside and operate with foreign navies, China’s 
future navy leaders will be provided with a fundamentally deeper knowledge 
and understanding of foreign navies than can be claimed even by members of 
the Rising Cohort� 
Combat Experience
While younger generations of PLA Navy leaders are becoming increasingly well 
educated, trained, and experienced with operations abroad, one characteristic 
that unites all three cohorts is their lack of combat experience� Historically, the 
PLAN’s combat experience has been limited to a few operations, including the 
liberation of offshore islands from the KMT in the 1950s, two small skirmishes 
with KMT forces in 1965, and clashes with the Vietnamese navy in 1974 and 1988 
over the Paracel (Xisha) Islands and Johnson Reef (Chigua Jiao) in the Spratly 
Islands, respectively�71
We have no evidence that any of China’s current leadership has been directly 
involved in combat operations� Even the navy’s Old Guard would have been too 
young to have experienced most of the PLAN’s operations, which took place be-
fore even Admiral Wu, the PLAN’s elder statesman, joined the PLA� Many of the 
Rising Cohort joined the PLAN around the time of the PLAN’s clash with Viet-
nam over the Paracels in 1974� This includes current PLAN Standing Committee 
members Vice Admiral Tian Zhong and Vice Admiral Qiu Yanpeng as well as 
ESF deputy commander Rear Admiral Shen Hao� Again, the short, confined na-
ture of these operations likely precluded any of these officers from participating 
directly, and certainly means they were unable to garner significant combat ex-
perience even if they did participate� However, for those officers joining the PLA 
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at this time, the navy’s success likely served as a positive contrast to the failures 
of the PLA ground forces in the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War�
The available evidence indicates that the closest any of China’s current navy 
leaders came to participating in any of these operations was Admiral Wu’s role 
in the 14 March 1988 Johnson South Reef skirmish (chiguajiao haizhan, 吃瓜礁 
海战)�72 Although not directly involved, Admiral Wu was serving at the time as 
commander of the East Sea Fleet’s 6th Destroyer Flotilla (zhidui, 支队), and had 
authority over the frigate Yingtan (CNS 531), which took part in the conflict�73
THE FUTURE OF PLA NAVY LEADERSHIP
With the PLA Navy undergoing one of the most substantial leadership transitions 
in recent history, this article has sought to compare and contrast the members of 
the PLAN’s Old Guard, who joined the PLA during the Cultural Revolution and 
who are fast retiring, with the Rising Cohort of leaders who are taking their place� 
The article also examines the navy’s Future Leadership, whose eventual ascent will 
mark a second watershed moment in the evolution of China’s navy leadership�
The findings above suggest that a profound shift is already under way in terms 
of the levels of professional education, training, international experience, and di-
rect experience with the navy’s new operations that the PLAN’s emerging leaders 
possess� While the Old Guard was tasked with overseeing a navy that was rapidly 
transforming, the vast majority of them had little if any personal experience with 
the skill sets they sought to develop within that navy� Although under this Old 
Guard the navy began to recruit officer candidates with greater levels of formal 
education and provide them with more-robust training, they themselves had had 
limited opportunities for such training� Although the navy began to conduct ad-
vanced blue-water operations under their tenure, very few of these leaders, who 
joined a coastal-defense force during the Cultural Revolution, had that type of 
experience themselves� 
How unique is China in this regard? Many developing navies must manage a 
certain level of inversion in the technical skills found in their institution’s person-
nel, with younger, lower-ranking members being more technically sophisticated 
than their older, higher-ranking counterparts� Developing navies in South Korea, 
India, Vietnam, and others have faced similar challenges� However, the evidence 
provided above suggests that this difference has been particularly acute for Chi-
na� Very few countries denigrated the possession of technical skill and knowledge 
or treated technical training as inversely related to political loyalty to the extent 
that China did during much of the early military careers of members of the Old 
Guard� Few countries were as closed to the outside world as China during the 
Cultural Revolution� Viewed in this context, the accomplishments of this fast-
retiring cohort of PLAN leaders are all the more remarkable�
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The article’s findings also suggest that each successive cohort of navy leader-
ship is increasingly developing the characteristics and obtaining the maritime 
engagement experiences found in the officer corps of other modern, developed 
navies� The Rising Cohort is more at ease interacting with foreign navies than 
its predecessor, while those in the Future Leadership cohort have operated with 
U�S� Navy ships and studied alongside foreign naval officers in NATO member 
countries�74 These traits will likely facilitate future engagement with naval officers 
from the United States and U�S�-allied countries, with whom they are likely to 
have more and more in common�
Despite these changes, it is important to note some of the similarities that 
remain between the old and the new� Like the Old Guard, the Rising Cohort 
is dominated by officers from China’s developed coastal provinces� Like their 
predecessors, they have a living memory of the Cultural Revolution, one of the 
most dangerous and unstable periods in modern Chinese history� Although it is 
unclear how this experience affected individual officers, they all remember a time 
when China was weak, unstable, and under constant threat of war� 
Finally, it is important to note that, despite the PLAN’s growing professional-
ism, PLA Navy leaders remain firmly embedded within the CCP� While some 
have suggested the possibility that military modernization and PLA profes-
sionalization would lead to a Huntingtonian-style transition from a party to a 
national army, this has not occurred�75 In fact, the party continues to have control 
over PLAN personnel decisions, reflected over the past few years most clearly 
in the CCP’s expansive anticorruption campaign, which has removed a number 
of senior military figures on charges of corruption or lack of party discipline� 
Within the navy, key leaders who have been caught up in the campaign include 
deputy PLAN political commissar Vice Admiral Ma Faxiang and Rear Admiral 
Jiang Zhonghua, the director of the Equipment Department for China’s South Sea 
Fleet�76 Thus, it is important to remember that despite this growing professional-
ism among PLAN personnel, China’s new navy leaders will remain subject to 
strict party control and oversight and will continue to identify first and foremost 
with the party� 
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n the annals of the communist world, the month of October enjoys supreme 
sanctity. The Red October of 1917 ushered in the first socialist government, 
which would eventually become the Soviet Union. In the People’s Republic of 
China (PRC), October is indelibly enshrined as the anniversary month of the 
founding of the communist state, observed with a multiday national celebration.
But each year, amid glorious celebratory glow marking the inauguration of the 
PRC, the memory of a forbidden and inglorious episode surfaces—inevitably, 
albeit surreptitiously and furtively—within China’s educated and political elite. 
The event took place a little over three weeks after Mao Zedong triumphantly 
announced at Tiananmen Square, on 1 October 1949, the establishment of the 
People’s Republic. It is the subject of a substantial and nagging controversy that is 
antithetical to the overall academic and political discouragement of real histori-
cal debate, especially concerning any stain on the exalted victories of the People’s 
Liberation Army (PLA). To most inside China who know and care about the 
episode, it was an ignominious defeat that under-
cuts the familiar and mandatory political culture 
of triumph and glory. 
The episode was the battle of Quemoy, known 
in Taiwan as the battle of Guningtou Beach, which 
raged for three days, 25 to 27 October 1949. The 
outcome was the total annihilation of three PLA 
regiments, totaling over nine thousand soldiers, 
at the hands of a beat-up and retreating National-
ist contingent. But what has made the battle of 
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Quemoy so significant in the military history of the PRC, what has shaped its 
enduring legacy and impact, is not just the lopsided defeat of the PLA troops but 
how it was fought, its inauspicious timing, and the exposure of the PLA’s inability 
to conduct naval and amphibious warfare� 
This paper seeks to analyze the key contentious issues related to the PLA’s 
Quemoy fiasco, mainly from documents and sources published in mainland 
China and recently made available to the public� Though not grand or ambitious 
in scope, the paper endeavors to look at how and why the battle of Quemoy was 
fought and to dispel a few prevailing but mistaken notions based on faulty logic 
and the changing historical narratives emerging from China’s highly mutable 
political climate� Finally, it addresses, first, the pivotal role the battle played in 
setting the pattern of confrontation that has produced a six-decade political and 
military separation between Nationalist Taiwan and Communist China and, sec-
ond, how the battle affected the United States in its Cold War strategy� 
THE BATTLE
Quemoy, variously also called Jinmen, Chin-men, or Kinmen, is a tiny, barren 
archipelago consisting mainly of Greater Quemoy and Lesser Quemoy, total-
ing a mere fifty-nine square miles� In October 1949 there were only about forty 
thousand residents on the islands�1 The most striking feature of Quemoy lies not 
in its size but in its extreme geographical proximity to the PRC mainland—only 
six miles away from the metropolis of Xiamen (Amoy), which was in 1949 the 
second-largest city in Fujian Province and had a population of over two hundred 
thousand� It is important to point out that Xiamen Island (now connected to the 
mainland, on which part of the city stands) is merely one mile from the Chinese 
mainland and would be the primary spot to assemble troops and amphibious 
vessels for any attempt to invade Taiwan� 
But Quemoy controls the sea access in and out of Xiamen and the adjacent 
coastal areas (see the map)� For the Nationalist (Kuomintang, or KMT) govern-
ment, which was in rapid strategic retreat to Taiwan, Quemoy assumed supreme 
strategic importance to its own survival, because it could effectively frustrate the 
PLA’s vowed intention to invade and take Taiwan�2
By the summer of 1949, the Chinese Civil War between the Nationalists and 
the Communists had been raging for over three years and the Nationalists were 
near total defeat all across China� By late July it was beyond any doubt that the 
escape destination for the Nationalist government would be Taiwan� As a result, 
massive transportation of assets and government functions from the mainland 
to Taiwan began in full� Also that month the KMT’s leader, Chiang Kai-shek, 
started to prepare for a pivotal battle to hold Quemoy, which was not even forti-
fied at the time� Although nearby Xiamen Island was much more important in 
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a political and psychological sense, Quemoy would be more crucial militarily, 
because it could control all maritime assets in and access to the area, including 
Xiamen. So from the beginning Chiang Kai-shek was prepared to lose Xiamen 
but determined to keep Quemoy at any cost. He deployed the KMT’s 22nd Army 
to garrison Quemoy, with about twenty thousand troops, in addition to a tank 
battalion with twenty-one American-made M5A1 Stuart tanks, each of which 
had a rapid-fire 47 mm gun. The Stuart tanks would play a pivotal role.
For three days, between 25 and 27 October, a battle for Quemoy raged. Invad-
ing PLA troops were greatly outnumbered, and the fighting was desperate on 
both sides. In the end, however, the PLA suffered a devastating defeat, one that 
shocked its high command. The entire three PLA regiments committed—9,086 
men in all, including 350 local fishermen conscripted as captains of transport 
craft—were annihilated. About five thousand were killed, and the rest were cap-
tured as prisoners of war.3
WAS THE SHORTAGE OF TRANSPORT SHIPS RESPONSIBLE FOR 
THE FIASCO? 
There is no doubt that a severe shortage of troop transports was a key factor in 
deciding the outcome of the battle of Quemoy. But the problem was not just a lack 
of vessels but poor planning and hostility from local residents.
The transport shortage had much to do with faulty planning by the PLA com-
manders. From the beginning, an attack on Xiamen had outweighed all other of-
fensives along the Fujian coast, greatly diminishing any meaningful preparation 
for the planned assault on Quemoy. The mission of taking Xiamen and Quemoy 
Xiamen
Quemoy
PRC
Quemoy
Taiwan
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was handed to the PLA 3rd Field Army’s 10th Army, under the command of a 
battle-hardened general, Ye Fei� He divided his three corps into two task forces� 
The 29th and 31st Corps would take on Xiamen� These corps were more of-
fensively oriented and much better equipped than the smaller and weaker 28th 
Corps, which would take on Quemoy, then considered less important than Xia-
men� The original plan was that the two task forces would launch simultaneous 
assaults on the KMT defenders of both Xiamen and Quemoy� 
But doing so would require the two task forces to commandeer a large num-
ber of fishing vessels from local villages as troop transports� The commanding 
general of the 10th Army, General Ye, believed that many fishing vessels in the 
region were being systematically destroyed by KMT planes to avoid their being 
used by the advancing Communist troops�4 But Ye’s memoir does not provide any 
evidence of such bombing or instances when it occurred� On the contrary, most 
damage to and losses of commandeered fishing vessels were caused by storms 
during a minor island offensive prior to the attacks on Xiamen and Quemoy�5 In 
his memoir Ye Fei contradicts himself, stating that in the island battles immedi-
ately prior to the battle of Quemoy not a single transport ship was lost to enemy 
planes and that this was taken as a welcome sign that the KMT might not use 
planes at Quemoy either�6 
The primary reason for the lack of fishing vessels was that local fishermen 
were generally hostile to the Communist troops in the area� The biggest sector 
of the economy in the region was fishing, and the most important asset for a 
fisherman was his boat� Most fishermen resisted the PLA demand to surrender 
their vessels as troop transports� They hid their vessels or scuttled them to avoid 
their being taken over by the PLA troops�7 General Xiao Feng, the on-scene, 
operational commander in the Quemoy battle, would recall in his own memoir 
that “fishermen in this coastal area either abandoned their fishing vessels and fled 
from us, or took their vessels with them and hid them; others even deliberately 
destroyed their fishing vessels to avoid being commandeered by us� We could not 
find the vessels when we found the fishermen; or we could not find the fishermen 
to operate these vessels when we found the vessels�”8 
Because of the shortage of transport ships, the original plan to attack Xiamen 
and Quemoy simultaneously was abandoned� The new plan was to attack Xia-
men first, concentrating all the ships and boats already commandeered by the 
10th Army, and to postpone the campaign against Quemoy until the Xiamen 
campaign was over and the ships and boats used in it could be released�
The battle for Xiamen started on 15 October and lasted two full days� The 
battle had something expected and something unexpected� The “expected” was 
the outcome, a smashing victory over demoralized defenders, who did not put 
up a real fight� Some twenty-seven thousand KMT soldiers were either killed 
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or captured, the majority of the originally stationed defenders having fled on 
ships to either Taiwan or other outlying islands still under KMT control. The 
unexpected result of the Xiamen campaign was devastating losses of transport 
vessels. After the Xiamen campaign, what remained for the 28th Corps to use in 
its upcoming Quemoy assault was fewer than three hundred small fishing boats, 
none motorized. 
The battle plan for Quemoy was to land twenty thousand PLA troops on the 
island’s beaches. But with fewer than three hundred small boats available, the 
task force would have to be transported in two groups. The first would be three 
PLA regiments, or about 8,700 troops, in addition to the 350 fishermen, most of 
them unwilling to serve the PLA but having no choice. The plan contemplated 
that once the first landing group reached the beachhead, the vessels would return 
to the PLA positions to take the second landing group, which would consist of 
four regiments, another eleven thousand troops. PLA intelligence estimated that 
there were about twenty thousand KMT defenders on Quemoy at the time and 
that the combined invasion force, twenty thousand PLA soldiers, would reach 
parity in strength, one to one. Given the PLA’s superior morale and fighting spirit, 
victory over the defeatist and demoralized KMT defenders on Quemoy would be 
inevitable.9 
But the plan went badly. After the first three regiments were delivered to the 
beachhead—in the middle of the night, apparently undetected by the defenders 
—the tide went out, and all the ships grounded in the shoals, where they were 
mercilessly destroyed by the KMT defenders by shore, sea, and air. Not a single 
ship or boat was able to return to pick up the reinforcing second landing group. 
Although grave miscalculation of ocean tides was later blamed by most partici-
pants and PRC historians as the chief culprit for the transport debacle, it was not 
the most decisive factor in the failure of the transport vessels to return for the 
second group. 
Ignoring advice from local fishermen, the PLA commanders on board the 
vessels had ordered the vessels to approach the shore as closely as possible so that 
the invasion troops would have an easier walk to the beach. The vessels arrived 
at high tide, between 0130 and 0200 (1:30 and 2:00 am), passing over underwa-
ter antiship obstacles and ship-snatching barbed wire. When the tide began to 
recede, some vessels became entangled with the newly exposed obstacles. PLA 
commanders realized the danger and ordered the swift return of the vessels to 
deeper water before the tide got too low. But it was too late; all of them became 
stuck on a long stretch of beach in a scene of total chaos.10 When a land mine near 
the landing beach was accidentally ignited by a KMT patrol, the explosion trig-
gered feverish searchlight sweeps by the coastal defenses, which discovered the 
shambles of landing vessels stuck on and near the beach.11 Gunfire and bombing 
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erupted and lasted for more than two hours� Dawn, when it arrived, allowed 
KMT B-25 bombers and warships to shell the hapless landing forces, destroying 
all of them� Not a single vessel escaped�12 The entire Quemoy battle plan, which 
hinged critically on the ability of the transport vessels to return to pick up eleven 
thousand more PLA troops, had turned into a complete fiasco�
WAS THE PLA’S LACK OF NAVAL POWER AND AIRPOWER  
RESPONSIBLE FOR THE FIASCO?
In his memoir, Ye Fei, the officer in overall charge of the battle of Quemoy, blames 
the PLA’s lack of naval power and airpower during the battle for the defeat� “The 
most important and most salient lesson [for the defeat at Quemoy] was that at 
the time, the Chiang Kai-shek army had a navy and an air force, which remained 
basically intact during the War of National Liberation [the Civil War, 1946–49]; 
while our army did not have a navy and an air force, which forced us to cross the 
sea to fight by way of sailboats, without air cover, without naval support from 
the sea�”13 So states Ye Fei, and his argument seems reasonable on the surface� 
However, a careful scrutiny will reveal that his summary of the reasons for the 
defeat is without merit� 
During the battle of Quemoy, the KMT had at its disposal twenty-five B-25 
light bombers and about fifty FB-26 fighter-bombers�14 The PLA had a squadron 
of P-51 Mustangs, captured from the KMT, but these pursuit planes had been 
used in the ceremonial extravaganza in Beijing marking the founding of the 
People’s Republic of China in early October� They were still in North China�15 
On the naval side, the KMT had a total of nine ships, mostly small patrol vessels 
and light frigates�
During the battle, the PLA command was fully aware of these KMT naval and 
air assets and took measures to deny their usefulness� The most important deci-
sion made by Ye Fei, in this connection, and his subordinate Xiao Feng—and it 
was a correct one—was to conduct the amphibious assault at night, because the 
KMT air force did not have a nighttime capability� Also, with the cover of night 
the PLA troops could avoid being detected by the KMT warships and so launch a 
surprise attack� On both accounts the PLA command was right, and the invasion 
troops did successfully avoid attack by KMT air or naval assets during the entire 
trip to the beaches on the first night of the battle� In addition, the PLA mounted 
a battery of eighty pieces of artillery on nearby Dadeng Island�16 Though not 
overwhelming, these guns could silence the KMT’s small patrol boats during the 
landing phase� 
Ye Fei’s argument is even less plausible if one considers the many amphibious 
battles the PLA launched against even more dominant KMT sea and air superi-
ority, notably at Hainan Island some six months later� In virtually all these other 
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instances, despite overwhelming KMT naval and air superiority, the PLA island 
assaults prevailed� 
What General Ye neglected to point out in his memoir is another key reason 
for the Quemoy defeat—the fatefully delayed departure of the invasion forces� It 
was less than six miles from the PLA embarkation points to the Quemoy beaches� 
Under the weather conditions at the time, a favorably robust northeast breeze, 
it would take less than one hour to reach the destination� The invasion forces 
were accordingly ordered to board the vessels around 1900 (seven o’clock) on the 
evening of 24 October� But indecision on the part of Ye Fei and Xiao Feng and 
command ambiguity between them, in addition to utterly chaotic boarding and 
loading procedures, delayed the departure by several hours, greatly shortening 
the period of darkness, the window during which the KMT air and sea forces 
could not attack� Most of the vessels did not sail until after midnight�17
The armada itself was also disorganized� The three regiments set sail from 
three different spots� Once entering open water, their vessels were to rendezvous 
at a designated area and then proceed together� This order wasted about an hour� 
Worse, because of radio silence to avoid enemy detection, the vessels had no 
communications with each other� As a result, the rendezvous was never really 
completed; the vessels swarmed to Quemoy without any coordination or unified 
command, arriving intermittently between 0130 and 0200, far later than original-
ly planned, with only three or four hours left within which to land their troops� 
Given that delay, even if all three hundred transport vessels had returned to 
the rear echelon and picked up the eleven thousand men of the second group, 
they would most likely have been annihilated� The most important element of a 
victory—that is, inability of the KMT forces to attack by air or sea—would have 
been lost with the advent of daylight on 25 October�
We can then safely conclude that Ye Fei’s theory about the primary reason for 
the Quemoy fiasco is incorrect� 
WAS INTELLIGENCE FAILURE CRUCIAL FOR THE FIASCO?
Before the assault was launched on 24 October, the PLA commanders gathered 
a substantial amount of intelligence on the enemy and the target area� Reports 
poured into the command headquarters of General Ye, the overall commander, 
and of Xiao Feng, the operational commander� These reports were generally clas-
sified as either political or operational intelligence� In both categories the PLA 
commanders fundamentally misjudged the intelligence in front of them and 
made seriously flawed decisions that doomed the entire invasion�
Political intelligence had been the PLA’s forte, as it dealt with timely and ac-
curate assessment of the enemy’s will to fight� Yet both commanders erred gravely 
in the Quemoy assault� Their overall assessments of the Quemoy defenders were 
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more romantic than professional� They believed deeply that the KMT’s 22nd 
Army on Quemoy was morbidly defeatist and incompetent, ready to flee at the 
sight of the PLA invaders� “Landing on the beach of Quemoy is victory itself ” 
was the watchword given to many PLA units in the operation�18 So pervasive was 
the assumption of the enemy’s lack of will to fight that the transports carrying 
the primary assault regiment contained large amounts of cash in several heavy 
chests for the use of celebrating the “liberation of Quemoy” in an extravaganza 
planned for the next day� Several other larger ships were loaded with live pigs 
and with office furniture to be used by the new local government to be run by 
communist cadres�19
To be fair, this was not the problem of only PLA commanders in Fujian 
Province at the time� Rao Shushi, the political commissar of the PLA’s 3rd Field 
Army, which was in charge of the entire East China region, was hopelessly con-
temptuous, on the eve of the battle, of the KMT troops’ will to fight� “Rao Shushi 
developed a ‘mentality of underestimating the enemy,’” later recalled Marshal 
Chen Yi, who commanded the 3rd Field Army� “He believed that once our troops 
landed on the beach, enemies on Quemoy would surrender without fighting� All 
we needed was to send in one or two divisions to attack, the Quemoy problem 
would be solved�”20
But the PLA commanders’ estimate of the enemy’s will to fight was wrong� 
Admittedly, the KMT troops were indeed a ragtag bunch� The 22nd Army, then 
stationed at Quemoy, was under the command of a general named Li Liangrong� 
Li and his troops were not Chiang Kai-shek’s favorites, and they were generally 
underequipped and undertrained� But General Li made these troops into a for-
midable fighting force that displayed tenacity and ruthlessness in the three-day 
battle� 
First of all, Li was given substantial reinforcement at the crucial time� Chiang 
Kai-shek realized Li’s inadequacy in troop strength and redeployed, swiftly and 
sub rosa, one of his best units, the 18th Army, totaling twenty thousand troops, to 
Quemoy� Arriving before and during the battle, these troops greatly boosted the 
morale of General Li’s men� The determination of this ragtag but spirited army, 
however, was already extraordinarily high, in part because of an utter hatred of 
the communists� 
A recent popular writing in mainland China by a high-level PLA general tells 
a revealing story, one that explains the abject hatred of General Li’s men for PLA 
soldiers and the ruthlessness of Quemoy’s defenders� It relates to the battle of Xia-
men, fought several miles away immediately prior to the battle for Quemoy� The 
PLA won that battle, during which many KMT soldiers took off their uniforms 
and hid as civilians in residential neighborhoods� The PLA commander in Xia-
men ordered cars to broadcast via loudspeakers promises of leniency and safe 
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repatriation to Taiwan if they came out and surrendered� Within hours, hundreds 
of KMT officers and soldiers answered the propaganda and emerged from hid-
ing� They were rounded up by PLA troops at the harbor� After dusk, they were 
machine-gunned, execution-style�21 Fear and outrage generated by incidents like 
this permeated the 22nd Army on Quemoy, and General Li adroitly used such 
psychology to instill in his troops despair and ruthlessness—the very essence of 
a formidable enemy�22
If PLA political intelligence was inaccurate, tactical and operational intel-
ligence was not much better� General Ye Fei was never clear about exactly how 
many defenders there were on Quemoy� He believed there were no more than 
twenty thousand; further, he estimated at the time, “Li Liangrong’s 22nd Army 
was nothing but maimed soldiers and defeated generals [残兵败将]�” He was 
completely fooled by a KMT deception plan� Chiang meant to hold on to Que-
moy at any cost, and as noted, he had reinforced it with his crack force, the 18th 
Army, under the able Hu Lian� But even more important, Chiang ordered the 
armada carrying General Hu’s troops to land secretly on the rocky south side of 
Quemoy Island, opposite the anticipated PLA landing strips on the north and 
northwest sides� Unbeknownst to Ye Fei, by 24 October, when the PLA launched 
the assault, half of Hu’s twenty thousand troops were already on the island� The 
other half was struggling to land safely through heavy waves; they succeeded after 
the battle started� 
This intelligence would have been crucial� Had General Ye known of it, he 
would never have ordered the attack� The PLA force would have been greatly 
outnumbered, in a ratio of less than one to two, even if all his planned troops 
had been able to land at once, which would not be the case� In the end, the actual 
PLA/KMT troop ratio during the battle was one to five�23 Faulty intelligence led 
General Ye to believe that he could reach troop parity on Quemoy if he could land 
close to twenty thousand soldiers� Ye’s landing plan was to be utterly invalidated 
and disastrous, but in the meantime he was so confident in this parity that he 
refused to consider any alternatives even when newly acquired evidence pointed 
to the strong possibility that the enemy had already been reinforced by the entire 
twenty-thousand-man 18th Army�
On 14 October, ten days before the order was given to invade Quemoy, Gen-
eral Xiao, the PLA operational commander of the battle of Quemoy, received a 
shocking piece of intelligence� Two KMT officers belonging to Hu Lian’s 18th 
Army, captured in an unrelated skirmish, had revealed that the whole 11th Divi-
sion of that army had landed on Quemoy five days earlier�24 General Xiao im-
mediately reported this crucial piece of intelligence to his superior, General Ye, 
who dismissed it as bunk�25 Frustrated by Ye’s intransigence, Xiao did something 
daring—he managed to report his concern to Ye’s superior, General Su Yu, the 
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deputy commander for operations for the 3rd Field Army� General Su had been 
designated by Mao Zedong as the overall planner for a quick invasion of Taiwan, 
fulfilling Mao’s vow “to carry the Revolution to the ultimate end�” 
Alarmed by the Quemoy situation, Su issued an instruction, now famous in 
the Chinese military, known as the “three conditions for calling off the Quemoy 
campaign�” That is, the attack on Quemoy should be called off if one of the fol-
lowing three conditions existed: first, if the enemy augmented the island defend-
ing force by more than one regiment; second, if there were not enough transports 
to carry six regiments at one time; or third, if there were not at least six thousand 
pro-Communist, politically reliable boat handlers available from the old “Liber-
ated Area” of northern Jiangsu and Shandong, nearly a thousand miles north of 
Fujian�26 
But General Ye did not heed Su’s instructions and bullheadedly went on with 
his attack plan� Nevertheless, Ye sensed General Xiao’s lack of enthusiasm in light 
of the mounting difficulties of attacking Quemoy� On 18 October, six days before 
the battle began, he spent nearly three hours with General Xiao and Xiao’s com-
missar, General Li Mancun, trying to dispel their doubts and eventually ordering 
them to launch the earliest possible attack�27 
But Xiao and Li Mancun were still not persuaded� “I raised the issue to my 
superior of the 10th Army,” Xiao recounted in his memoir, “that � � � we did not 
know how many enemy reinforcements had arrived at Quemoy, which made the 
preparation for the invasion of Quemoy inadequate and it would be difficult to 
launch an early assault on Quemoy�”28 But General Ye and his headquarters staff 
would have none of this� “My superiors at the 10th Army all replied to me by 
saying that the 28th Corps should resolutely implement the 10th Army head-
quarters’ order to seize the battlefield advantage to launch an earliest possible 
invasion to liberate Quemoy,” Xiao Feng would bitterly recall�29 As to what exactly 
the “battlefield advantage” was, General Ye declared with relish, “The enemies 
defending Quemoy have already become frightened by us, like birds scared by 
the mere twang of a bowstring [惊弓之鸟]�” 
On 20 October, four days before the battle began, General Xiao, still spooked 
by uncertainty about enemy troop strength on Quemoy, again requested General 
Ye to postpone the operation�30 Ye was not amused by the new request and denied 
it with alacrity� However, two days later, on 22 October, new intelligence reports 
came to General Xiao that another division of Hu Lian’s 18th Army had just ap-
peared in waters off Quemoy� General Xiao immediately reported to Ye, hoping 
that a delay of action would be approved�31
Incredibly, General Ye interpreted the intelligence the wrong way� He picked 
up the phone and personally told Xiao that the intention of the KMT force near 
Quemoy was not clear and that the PLA attack should be hurried, before General 
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Hu’s troops could land�32 We now know that General Ye was completely out of the 
picture with regard to Hu’s reinforcements� Not only had one of Hu’s divisions 
landed on Quemoy days earlier, but the division reported to be on the sea was 
just waiting for the choppy seas to calm in order to land, which happened within 
hours� 
General Xiao, still unwilling to take the risk of attacking, stated that he could 
not possibly proceed with the operation the next day as ordered and requested 
a one-day delay, until 24 October� Ye Fei finally agreed, and the operation was 
thus set for the 24th� Incredibly, though, in granting the delay, Ye told Xiao that 
“according to various intelligence reports, there had been no reinforcement of 
enemy’s troops in Quemoy, which was only at 12,000 troops strong�”33 In fact, at 
the time, there were more than thirty thousand KMT troops on Quemoy� 
The departure for the invasion was set at night, to avoid naval and air raids� 
Three regiments from General Xiao’s 28th Corps boarded the nearly three hun-
dred small fishing boats being used as transports between 6 and 7 pm, ready to 
set sail to attack Quemoy� Around 8 pm, however, Xiao received a revised intel-
ligence report from 10th Army headquarters in Xiamen that the KMT 18th Army 
had just landed a regiment on the south side of Quemoy� However, 10th Army 
directed that General Ye’s order to attack Quemoy that evening was not to be 
changed—instead, Xiao’s troops were to race to reach Quemoy ahead of the rest 
of Hu Lian’s force� 
But General Xiao, shocked by the new report, immediately ordered all three 
of his regiments, on board and ready to set sail, to stand fast� He placed an urgent 
call to the 10th Army headquarters in Xiamen and requested that the entire at-
tack plan be called off until more intelligence on enemy’s troop strength could be 
ascertained and more transports could be commandeered� But General Ye was 
nowhere to be found� Answering General Xiao’s urgent call was Liu Peishan, Ye’s 
deputy commissar and political director, who rejected Xiao’s request� General 
Xiao later recalled, “I clearly stated to Liu on the phone that we [should] halt 
the attack plan, wait for clarification on the true situations of the enemy, obtain 
more transport ships before we take action� Hearing that, Director Liu only said, 
‘Proceed according to the original plan, the decision shall not be changed�’ Then 
he hung up the phone�”34 
Around midnight, the invading armada set sail for Quemoy� It arrived an hour 
and a half later, and the epic battle began� 
WAS COMMAND CHAOS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE FIASCO?
In the aftermath of the disastrous defeat, Xiao Feng went to his superior, Ye Fei, 
and asked to be punished for the defeat� Ye replied that it was he himself who 
should be punished for the infamy at Quemoy� General Ye promptly drafted a 
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lengthy cable to his superior, General Su Yu at the 3rd Field Army, asking for 
punishment� Su, however, rejected Ye’s request and instead cabled Mao Zedong 
directly asking that he, Su, be punished, for his failure to ensure victory� Mao, the 
supreme leader of the Communist forces in China, rejected General Su’s request, 
saying essentially that nobody should be punished� “The loss at Quemoy is not a 
matter of punishment,” Mao declared� “Instead, it’s a matter of learning a lesson 
from it�”35
All this is telling, because it reflects the kind of command chaos that existed 
before and during the battle of Quemoy� No one was responsible for command 
integrity or organizational coordination� 
The 10th Army commander, General Ye Fei, had been born in the Philippines 
of Chinese parents from the Fujian area� Ye, who had joined the communists 
seventeen years earlier as a young man of no social or political distinction, had 
returned to his hometown as a glorious conqueror and wartime leader of over 
120,000 troops�36 When Ye captured the picturesque metropolis of Xiamen, he 
promptly moved his headquarters to the city, immersing himself in urban life 
and acting more like a mayor than a military commander with battles still raging 
in his area�37 In fact, the moment Ye moved into Xiamen he sent for his mother, 
who had been living in rural Fujian, moving her into his headquarters to share 
the euphoria and glory�38
For the remaining, and militarily more daunting, task of taking Quemoy, Gen-
eral Ye designated the weakest of his three corps, the 28th Corps� However, in late 
August 1949 the 28th Corps’s longtime commander, General Zhu Shaoqing, had 
suffered a stomach illness and was now in Shanghai, newly captured from the 
KMT, for medical treatment� The political commissar of the 28th Corps, General 
Chen Meizao, was in a hospital in Fuzhou, the capital of Fujian Province, enjoy-
ing the ease of urban life� In addition, the 28th Corps’s longtime chief of staff, Wu 
Shu, had been reassigned without replacement� General Ye then appointed Zhu 
Shaoqing’s deputy commander, a staff general named Xiao Feng, to command the 
28th Corps, without a deputy commander or a chief of staff�39
The first invasion group was to consist of three regiments� However, as Gen-
eral Ye ordered, only two would come from the 28th Corps; the third would come 
from another corps, the 29th, also under Ye’s command� This was done mainly so 
that the 29th Corps could share the anticipated glory of victory at Quemoy� But 
mixing troops from competing units confused the organic command structure of 
the 28th Corps�40 Also, there was some rivalry between the 28th Corps and 29th 
Corps, and there had been ill feeling in the competition to commandeer local 
fishing vessels�41
General Ye realized the potential for rivalry among the three hurriedly mixed 
regiments, but his response, rather inexplicably, was that there should be no 
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overall commander for the entire invasion force. The three regimental com-
manders were to act with equal command authority, with individual battle plans; 
Xiao Feng was to stay in the rear echelon listening to their radio reports once 
the battle started.42 To achieve the element of surprise, however, as we have seen, 
radio silence was ordered while the armada of wooden sailing vessels was on its 
way. So there was absolutely no communication among vessels during the entire 
landing process, which further aggravated the command problem.
In the event, the most deadly weapons used by the KMT defenders against 
the invading PLA troops and vessels were the twenty-one M5A1 Stuart tanks. 
The PLA command had known about the tanks beforehand and had prepared 
antitank rockets to deal with them. But the antitank rockets came in three parts, 
which needed to be assembled before launch. General Xiao ordered the parts car-
ried by separate ships. When the force attempted to land and came under fierce 
and devastating tank fire, none of the antitank rockets could be assembled.43
WAS THE BATTLE OF QUEMOY A “TURNING POINT” IN HISTORY?
Mao Zedong admitted that the battle of Quemoy was the biggest loss to the PLA 
during the Chinese Civil War.44 Three regiments of PLA troops were completely 
wiped out by the KMT, in utter contrast to the military zeitgeist of the time, when 
the Nationalist army as a whole was in an avalanche of retreat and defeat. In the 
annals of the Nationalists’ military history, the triumph at Quemoy, known in 
Taiwan as the battle of Guningtou Beach, marked a turning point, the final halt-
ing of the momentum of the PLA assault against Taiwan. It was the battle that 
saved the Republic of China; it was Chiang Kai-shek’s battle of Midway, turning 
the tide of history and sealing for the future the general pattern of the Cold War 
confrontation in Asia. 
The KMT claim is not entirely without merit. The battle of Quemoy did in-
deed end the PLA’s amphibious attempts to capture the offshore islands. But far 
more importantly, Quemoy has since become a focal point and symbol of the epic 
struggle between communist and noncommunist forces in Asia. Metaphorically 
and realistically, the battle made the tiny island of Quemoy, just a few miles from 
Communist China, Asia’s West Berlin, triggering decades of military confronta-
tions in and around it. In 1954 and 1958 the PLA launched major artillery bom-
bardments almost bringing on a nuclear Armageddon by involving the United 
States and possibly the Soviet Union. Intermittent artillery bombardment on 
Quemoy, with real shells or pamphlets, would last for many years. They would not 
stop until 1 January 1979, when the United States abandoned its diplomatic recog-
nition of Taipei and switched to Beijing as the legitimate government of “China.”
However, the PLA historian Xu Yan disputes the idea that the battle of Que-
moy was really a turning point of anything:45 “The defeat at Quemoy at the hands 
6797_Yu.indd   103 3/11/16   9:04 AM
108
Naval War College Review, Vol. 69 [2016], No. 2, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol69/iss2/1
 1 0 4  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
of the KMT forces was only a small episode at the last stage of the PLA’s strategic 
pursuit against the collapsing KMT regime[;] � � � it did not affect the strategic 
outcome of the war a bit” (p� 93)� It is hard to disagree with Mr� Xu Yan� However, 
it should also be noted that the battle of Quemoy had an unintended strategic 
consequence that few could have realized at the time� That is, the utter shambles 
at Quemoy may have saved the PLA from an even bigger catastrophe known as 
the battle of Taiwan, which had been actively contemplated by the PLA high com-
mand, from Mao Zedong on down� 
After the fiasco, Mao ordered the 3rd Field Army to prepare for an even 
larger invasion of Taiwan� The task fell on the shoulders of General Su Yu, the 
deputy commander for operations of the 3rd Field Army and the realist who had 
cautioned about the three conditions that should have invalidated any attack 
on Quemoy� Three weeks later, General Su, now the chairman of the Liberating 
Taiwan Working Committee, proceeded with specific planning for an invasion of 
Taiwan� On 20 November 1949 he laid out his plan to senior PLA commanders�46 
The Quemoy lessons loomed large in Su Yu’s plan� By mid-December he had 
become the leading voice of reason and calm, realistically assessing the difficul-
ties of an amphibious invasion of Taiwan� He reported to Mao Zedong several 
times his concerns and cautions� That might not have gained him favor from the 
triumphalist chairman, then getting ready to travel to Moscow to meet Joseph 
Stalin and take charge of “making revolutions” in Asia while the Soviet Union 
occupied itself with Western and Eastern Europe� Nevertheless, on 17 December 
Su Yu officially postponed the date for invading Taiwan�47
General Ye Fei may have left the best summary of this point� “In the early 
1950s, when our navy and air force were still inferior to the enemy, if we pro-
ceeded with wooden sailboats to liberate Taiwan by crossing the Taiwan Strait, 
we would have had an even bigger fiasco than the battle of Quemoy� After the 
defeat at Quemoy, we learned our lesson; our head became more clear and lucid� 
Perhaps the real significance of learning from the lessons and experience of our 
Quemoy operation lies exactly here�”48 
Yet the real significance of the battle of Quemoy goes beyond even this� The 
battle may be most important not in itself but in spite of itself� Its importance has 
something to do with what else was going on in the much larger international 
arena�
At the time, the Harry Truman administration in the United States had all but 
given up supporting the Chiang Kai-shek government� Two months before the 
battle of Quemoy, the White House approved a China white paper that largely 
blamed Chiang Kai-shek and his government for the loss of China to the Com-
munists� Washington expected the defeat of the KMT army to be thorough and 
inevitable, including the loss of the island of Taiwan, although it had been heavily 
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built up by Chiang for the impending transfer of his government� The National-
ist general Sun Liren, the garrison commander of Taiwan and a favorite of the 
U�S� administration, reported to Washington by a separate channel in September 
1949, a few weeks before Quemoy, that the PLA was capable of assembling an 
invading armada of a thousand vessels carrying two hundred thousand troops 
who would take over Taiwan within twenty-four hours�49 The newly established 
Central Intelligence Agency too was thoroughly convinced that the PLA would 
take over Taiwan militarily by the end of 1950�50
But the battle of Quemoy changed all that� One week after the Nationalist 
victory at Quemoy and most likely in response to it, the Truman administration 
initiated contact with Chiang for the first time since 1948� The American consul 
general in Taipei officially informed Chiang on 3 November that the U�S� govern-
ment would support his efforts toward reform and democracy in Taiwan�51 This 
was an enormous morale boost for Chiang and his defeated government� He 
now for the first time had Washington’s support for using Taiwan as a base from 
which he might stage a comeback to the mainland� It also marked the beginning 
of official American recognition of the Republic of China in Taiwan, which lasted 
until the 1970s� 
Further, after the battle of Quemoy the U�S� Joint Chiefs of Staff adjusted, 
albeit with a certain subtlety, its military posture toward Chiang in Taiwan� The 
Joint Chiefs now suggested to the White House that limited military assistance 
be provided to the KMT troops in Taiwan, though it ruled out direct military 
involvement in Taiwan�52 The momentum of readjustment by the United States 
in favor of the KMT government in Taiwan created by the battle of Quemoy, 
however nuanced and limited, would be given robust boosts by two other major 
international events: the outbreak of the Korean War less than eight months later 
and the loss of the U�S� monopoly on atomic bombs at the same time� 
In this sense, the battle of Quemoy was not only a turning point for the Civil 
War that still remains unresolved across the Taiwan Strait but also the beginning 
of a chain of events that shaped the Cold War throughout Asia and the Pacific 
region for decades to come� 
N O T E S
The author’s research and writing for this 
article were made possible by a McMullen 
Seapower Fellowship through the U�S� Naval 
Academy Foundation�
This article will appear as chapter 19 of New 
Interpretations in Naval History: Selected 
Papers from the Eighteenth McMullen Naval 
History Symposium Held at the U.S. Naval 
Academy, 19–20 September 2013, edited by 
Lori Lyn Bogle and James C� Rentfrow, forth-
coming from the Naval War College Press as 
Historical Monograph 25� 
NWC_Spring2016Review.indb   105 3/8/16   10:29 AM
110
Naval War College Review, Vol. 69 [2016], No. 2, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol69/iss2/1
 1 0 6  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
 1. Xu Yan, The Battle of Quemoy [徐焰, 金门之
战, 中国广播电视出版社, 北京] (1992), pp. 
47–48.
 2. Ibid., p. 48.
 3. Dangdai zhongguo de junshi gongzuo [当代
中国的军事工作, 中国社会科学院出版社] 
(1989), p. 237; Xiao Feng, “My Recollection 
of the Battle of Quemoy,” in Recollections of 
the Amphibious Battle of Quemoy, ed. Xiao 
Feng et al. [回顾金门之战, 载于萧锋, 李曼
村等, 回顾金门登陆战,人民出版社] (1994), 
p. 40; Xu, Battle of Quemoy, p. 82; Liu Yazhou, 
Examination of the Campaign of Quemoy  
[金门战役检讨, 载于中国报道周刊] (20 
April 2004), p. 12. There is little disagreement 
among mainland historians on the numbers 
of PLA soldiers who were killed. On the  
prisoner-of-war (POW) number, Xu Yan 
believes it should be around three thousand, 
while Liu Yazhou’s number is four thousand. 
It is likely that Xu confuses the actual num-
ber, which should be around four thousand, 
with the number of PLA POWs returned to 
mainland China between 1950 and 1956, 
which was around three thousand; see Liu, 
Examination of the Campaign of Quemoy, 
p. 12. The returned PLA POWs all became 
“nonpersons” in China and would suffer 
harsh treatments ranging from dishonorable 
discharge to prison terms—even outright 
execution—for being “traitors.” See Liu, Ex-
amination of the Campaign of Quemoy, p. 12, 
and Feizi Longxiang, “The Fate of Returned 
POWs Captured from the Battle of Quemoy” 
[飞子龙翔: 金門之戰回归戰俘的命运], 
Feizi Longxiang’s Blog, zxy0808.bokee.com/.
 4. Ye Fei, Ye Fei Memoir [叶飞回忆录, 解放军
出版社] (1988), p. 601.
 5. Ibid., pp. 598–601.
 6. Ibid., p. 599.
 7. Xiao, “My Recollection of the Battle of Que-
moy,” p. 23.
 8. Ibid.
 9. Xu, Battle of Quemoy, pp. 44–47.
 10. Ibid., p. 66.
 11. Ibid., p. 64.
 12. Ye, Ye Fei Memoir, p. 604; Xiao, “My Recollec-
tion of the Battle of Quemoy, p. 33; Xu, Battle 
of Quemoy, p. 66. 
 13. Ye, Ye Fei Memoir, p. 606. 
 14. Xu, Battle of Quemoy, p. 61.
 15. Ibid., p. 45.
 16. Ibid., p. 61.
 17. Ibid., p. 64.
 18. Liu, Examination of the Campaign of Quemoy, 
p. 3.
 19. Ibid.
 20. Ibid.
 21. Ibid., p. 6.
 22. Ibid.
 23. Xu, Battle of Quemoy, pp. 61–62.
 24. Xiao, “My Recollection of the Battle of  
Quemoy,” p. 23.
 25. Ibid.
 26. Su Yu was ensnared in a major political purge 
in 1958 and as the PLA’s Chief of Staff was a 
main target of a relentless “antidogmatism in 
military affairs” campaign engineered by his 
immediate superior, Marshal Peng Dehuai, 
Mao’s defense minister for much of the 1950s. 
A year later, in July 1959, Peng was purged in 
turn by Mao for opposing the chairman’s di-
sastrous “Great Leap Forward” movement. In 
the 1980s, after Mao’s death, Peng was politi-
cally rehabilitated. But one cannot rehabilitate 
a victim of a rehabilitated PLA marshal; also, 
the chief henchman who carried out Peng’s 
“Struggling against Su Yu” campaign in 1958 
was Deng Xiaoping, who essentially ruled 
China from 1978 until his death in 1997. As 
a result, positive spin in recent decades on 
Su Yu’s salient caution about the Quemoy 
battle, in the form of the “three conditions for 
calling off the Quemoy campaign,” generates 
intense, politically motivated internal debate 
among factions of the PLA. For such positive 
spin on Su Yu, see Xiao Feng, “Unforgettable 
Instructions,” in The General of Our Genera-
tion: Remembering Comrade Su Yu [萧锋,难
忘的教诲,载于“一代名将: 回忆粟裕同志,” 
上海人民出版社] (1986), p. 299; Xu, Battle of 
Quemoy, pp. 89–90; and Liu, Examination of 
the Campaign of Quemoy, p. 4. For a negative 
view see Hong Xiaoxia, “Doubting and Inves-
tigating ‘The Three Conditions for Calling 
off the Quemoy Campaign’—and Assessing 
the Value of Memoirs as Historical Evidence,” 
Journal of Modern History Studies 3 (2002)  
[洪小夏《金门战斗“三不打”的质疑与考
证—兼论回忆录的史料价值及其考辨》,
6797_Yu.indd   106 3/11/16   9:04 AM
111
Naval War College: Spring 2016 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2016
 Y U  1 0 7
《近代史研究》, 2002年第3期], and Wang 
  Hongguang, “An Inquiry into the ‘Three 
Conditions for Calling off the Quemoy Cam-
paign,’” Journal of Military History (November 
2012) [王洪光,对金门战役“三不打”的考 
证《军事历史》2012/11]. 
 27. Ye, Ye Fei Memoir, pp. 600–601; Xiao, “My 
Recollection of the Battle of Quemoy,” p. 24.
 28. Xiao, “My Recollection of the Battle of Que-
moy,” p. 24.
 29. Ibid.
 30. Ibid., p. 25.
 31. Ibid.
 32. Ibid.
 33. Ibid., p. 26.
 34. Ibid., pp. 28–29.
 35. Xu, Battle of Quemoy, p. 91; Ye, Ye Fei Memoir, 
p. 606.
 36. Liu, Examination of the Campaign of Quemoy, 
pp. 2–3.
 37. Xu, Battle of Quemoy, pp. 597–98.
 38. Liu, Examination of the Campaign of Quemoy, 
pp. 2–3.
 39. Xiao, “My Recollection of the Battle of Que-
moy,” p. 16.
 40. Liu, Examination of the Campaign of Quemoy, 
pp. 3–4.
 41. Ye, Ye Fei Memoir, p. 600.
 42. Xiao Feng was originally designated the 
overall commander and told to accompany 
the invasion troops, but hours before the 
departure of the armada General Ye’s head-
quarters ordered him to stay behind; Xiao, 
“My Recollection of the Battle of Quemoy,” 
p. 29. Xiao also recalls in his memoir that he 
designated a division commander, Zhong 
Xianwen, to be the overall commander of 
the three regiments and asked him to go to 
Quemoy with the first invasion group. But, 
according to Xiao, Zhong’s flagship was 
commandeered by one of the three regiment 
commanders as a troop transport (p. 33). 
This is quite implausible, because a regiment 
commander could not possibly comman-
deer a division commander’s flagship. If this 
did indeed happen, it further testifies to the 
miserable command chaos suffered by the 
28th Corps in the hands of an incompetent, 
understaffed, and weak corps commander. 
 43. Liu, Examination of the Campaign of Quemoy, 
p. 8.
 44. Mao Zedong to key PLA field army com-
manders, 29 October 1949, in Xiao, “My 
Recollection of the Battle of Quemoy,” p. 42.
 45. Xu, Battle of Quemoy, pp. 92–93.
 46. The Chronicle of Su Yu’s Life [粟裕年谱]  
(Jiangsu Party History Work Office, Contem-
porary China, 2006), pp. 487–89.
 47. Ibid.
 48. Ye, Ye Fei Memoir, p. 608.
 49. Jay Taylor, The Generalissimo’s Son: Chiang 
Ching-kuo and the Revolutions in China and 
Taiwan, Chinese ed. (Beijing: Huawen, 2010), 
p. 156.
 50. Ibid., p. 160.
 51. Ibid., p. 157.
 52. Ibid., pp. 159–60.
6797_Yu.indd   107 3/11/16   9:05 AM
112
Naval War College Review, Vol. 69 [2016], No. 2, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol69/iss2/1
 The political thought of Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan was a response to two particular waves of American progressivism. Social Darwinism, the first 
wave, in its most secular, conservative, and unadulterated form, claimed that the 
human race is constantly progressing, that the survival of the fittest is embedded 
in the historical unfolding of history, and that morality is conditioned by the 
contingencies of one’s historical epoch. Social Darwinism led to an emphasis on 
human selfishness, competition, and the following of one’s interest.1 The second 
wave, influenced by a variety of factors including Kantian ethics, European social 
policies, and the American Social Gospel, focused on the more positive aspects 
of progressivism. The state, according to this worldview, existed to better the 
world and to promote moral responsibility in both the domestic and interna-
tional spheres.2 Herbert Croly, one of the most influential progressive thinkers, 
believed that “the promise of American life” could be achieved through various 
internal social, political, moral, economic, and constitutional reforms that would 
both redress a perceived loss of individual liberty and further the common good.3 
Mahan combined both of these strands of American progressivism to provide 
his country a new and reinvigorated foreign policy. Nations, Mahan argued, had 
to be self-interested. The United States needed 
to protect itself from the possibility of European 
encroachment against the Monroe Doctrine. Un-
like many of his contemporary social Darwinists, 
however, Mahan balanced his emphasis on interest 
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with a genuine concern for moral responsibility� The United States had a duty 
not only to ensure its national interest but also to improve and better the world� 
American armament, for example, not only protected the United States from 
foreign encroachment but protected the sovereignty of South America from 
European imperialism—an objective distinct from national interest� American 
armament, therefore, promoted a moral tenet: the right of South American na-
tions to self-determination� 
Mahan was not a comprehensive thinker� By profession he was a historian 
and essayist� His comments and ideas about progressivism are sporadic, pep-
pered throughout writings concerning particular moments of history or specific 
policy issues� Mahan never created any overarching theory about the interplay 
of national interest and moral responsibility� The absence of any grand theory is 
intentional: Mahan, like his most important intellectual source, baron de Jomini, 
made universal claims only through the study of particular situations� Examining 
multiple historical and contemporary events, Mahan emphasized the supremacy 
of national interest in American foreign policy, but he balanced this position with 
a genuine concern for moral responsibility� Although America had to follow its 
own interests, Mahan argued, he never advocated any action or social policy that 
he believed to be evil�
Progressive expansionist tendencies did not begin with Mahan, but he was 
one of the best exponents of this outward movement in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries�4 The uniqueness of Mahan’s thought stemmed from 
his integration of thorough strategic and military knowledge, shrewd political 
analysis, and the academic vigor of two burgeoning fields of his time, economics 
and history� Mahan’s career as an intellectual began with his study of sea power, 
The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783 (1890), which was based on 
the lectures he delivered as President of the newly founded Naval War College� 
Although Influence of Sea Power is largely a technical and terse account of sea 
power, its most celebrated parts—the introduction and first chapter—provide an 
outline of his political philosophy� Nations, he argues there, are concerned pri-
marily with their own survival� They follow their own interests, creating a com-
petitive international environment based predominantly on force and strategic 
calculation� They employ various forms of coercion, including outright war, to 
pursue their interests� The study of history, Mahan holds, demonstrates that the 
development of sea power is one of the most influential elements in the forming 
of a great nation�5 
Mahan’s concept of sea power was broader than the mere military possession 
of a navy� Rather, for him “sea power” was an economic term, one that explained 
how a nation became dominant at sea, in three steps: the production of goods, 
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the building of a navy to protect and transport these goods, and the creation of 
colonies, which provided the raw materials necessary to produce more goods 
while simultaneously creating other markets for trade.6 Sea power, then, was fun-
damentally tied to expanding economic markets. For nations such as the United 
States to grow in influence, they had to expand economically as well as militarily. 
The political implications of Mahan’s thought—the centrality of national inter-
est in international affairs, the reality of competition, the imperative to maintain 
a strong home market and economy, the importance of strategic military and 
naval force, the necessity of constant economic and military expansion, and the 
benefits of colonialism—were not lost on Mahan’s contemporaries. Influence 
of Sea Power upon History, as well as its acclaimed sequel, The Influence of Sea 
Power upon the French Revolution and Empire, 1793–1812 (1892), produced a sig-
nificant splash on both sides of the Atlantic. Many Europeans were enamored of 
Influence of Sea Power upon History because they thought it defended their own 
nations’ policies on armament and imperialism. It was translated into several 
languages and placed in all the naval ships and schools of Germany and Japan.7 
Kaiser Wilhelm owned two copies of the book, one in English and the other in 
German, and claimed that he was “trying to learn it by heart.”8 In Great Britain, 
Mahan received an audience with Queen Victoria and honorary doctorates from 
Oxford and Cambridge.9 The nation that most effectively employed Mahan’s 
ideas, however, was Japan. Several Japanese theorists, such as Akiyama Saneyuki 
and Sato Tetsutaro, read Mahan religiously. Many of Mahan’s books were trans-
lated into Japanese.10 In America the book’s reception was a bit less sensational, 
except in the Republican Party. The William McKinley administration picked 
Mahan, by then retired, to serve on a board formed to advise on naval strategy 
during the Spanish-American War and, then in peace, as a delegate to the first 
Hague conference, where he was noted as the only representative to vote against 
the ban on asphyxiating gas in war.11
Owing to Mahan’s forty-year naval career, the subject matter of his histories, 
his philosophical emphasis on the competition of nations, and his staunch op-
position to arbitration, his name has become synonymous with the promotion of 
war, force, and imperialism. This unfavorable association began with several of 
his contemporaries. The noted British pacifist Norman Angell considered Ma-
han’s political thought “a doctrine of savagery.”12 Charles Beard, in a sensational 
piece, characterized Mahan as a “bookish” manufacturer of American imperial-
ism and one of “the four . . . most powerful agitators that ever affected any na-
tion.”13 A generation later, Richard Hofstadter dismissed Mahan, claiming that 
“[Mahan] believed that every nation like every schoolboy was bound to come to 
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blows with its fellows�”14 By midcentury, many historians had labeled Mahan a 
social Darwinist�15 
These interpretations not only are uncharitable but purvey a certain caricature 
of Mahan’s political thought� It is true that Mahan was not afraid to use force to 
protect American interests� In his books, essays, and articles, he supported the 
annexation of Hawaii, the creation of the canal across the Central American 
isthmus, the Open Door policy in China, the Spanish-American War, the taking 
of Cuba, the colonization of the Philippines, and increases in naval armament� 
Above all, Mahan urged his countrymen to uphold the Monroe Doctrine� Mahan 
defended these positions primarily as imperatives of national interest� On several 
key issues, however, Mahan entwined his position with a moral responsibility 
that he perceived Western nations to have with respect to non-Western nations� 
That emphasis on moral responsibility, which many of Mahan’s critics either flatly 
ignore or dismiss as ethnocentric cultural and religious imperialism, is pivotal to 
an understanding of the depth and balance of Mahan’s political thought� Mahan 
is neither Hofstadter’s rambunctious schoolboy nor Beard’s trigger-happy im-
perialist� He did not desire war for its own sake� In fact, he thought that various 
elements of his political thought, such as economic reciprocity, military and naval 
armament, and the European balance of powers, would help reduce the likeli-
hood of war�16 
At first glance, it may seem that national interest and moral responsibility are 
incompatible, in that the former deals with the appetites while the latter focuses 
on morality� Mahan attempted to wed these two concepts by claiming that the 
ultimate arbiter of both national interest and moral responsibility is the nation 
itself� Nations, he argued, are sovereign and independent� As there is no universal 
and impartial arbiter of justice, every nation has the right to form its own subjec-
tive understanding of moral responsibility� Only the individual nation is able to 
decide whether its policy is based on national interest, moral responsibility, or a 
combination of both� Even when a nation realizes that it has made an error in pol-
icy judgment, it is better that it err than allow another nation or arbiter to decide 
what is moral or in the interest of that nation� Ultimately, the radical subjectivity 
and nationalism of Mahan’s thought make his distinction between national inter-
est and moral responsibility less apparent and self-evident than Mahan seems to 
have intended� In principle, however, there remains a substantive difference be-
tween interest and responsibility: in the latter, perceived charity and beneficence 
are offered to non-Americans� Mahan, though, did not provide an example in 
which national interest is absent from acts of moral responsibility� Recognition 
of the interaction in his political thought between national interest and moral 
responsibility is important in any evaluation of his public-policy positions� 
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THE NATURE OF NATIONS: COMPETITION AND THE PURSUIT OF 
NATIONAL INTEREST
There is little evidence that Mahan was exposed to the classics of Western politi-
cal thought� In the over two thousand personal letters that have been collected 
and published by his most recent biographer, Mahan did not comment on Nic-
colò Machiavelli, Hugo Grotius, Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau, Immanuel Kant, Georg Hegel, or Karl Marx�17 These thinkers were 
absent also from his published work, although he did quote Montesquieu on 
the importance of commercial monopolies�18 Rather, Mahan’s thought was in-
fluenced primarily by the military strategist baron de Jomini, by various works 
of nineteenth-century high Anglican theology recommended by his uncle Milo 
Mahan, and by a vast array of political and military historians, ranging from 
Thucydides and Plutarch to Leopold von Ranke and François Guizot�19 It was his 
study of history that specifically led him to develop his sea-power thesis� Mahan 
recounts in his autobiography how, while reading an account of the Carthaginian 
Hannibal’s failed Second Punic War campaign in Theodor Mommsen’s History of 
Rome, he came to understand the historical importance of the navy: “It suddenly 
struck me � � � how different things might have been could Hannibal have invaded 
by the sea, as the Romans often had Africa, instead of the long land route�”20 From 
this insight, Mahan argued that the study of history demonstrated that Hannibal’s 
undoing—failure to deploy naval power equal to that of the enemy—was not an 
isolated event but a fault that had plagued many campaigns� In the preface of 
Influence of Sea Power upon History he compares the failure of Hannibal (and the 
concomitant success in that war of the Roman general Scipio) with the failure in 
the nineteenth century of Napoleon and the success of the Duke of Wellington� 
Although these cases were over two thousand years apart, they manifested a uni-
versal principle: in both, “mastery of the sea rested with the victor�”21
Mahan’s sea-power thesis and his political philosophy were based on a his-
toriographical approach called “subordination�” The composition of history, 
Mahan asserted in his 1902 presidential address to the American Historical As-
sociation, begins with a “multiplicity of details often contradictory” that “do not 
readily lend themselves to a unity of treatment�”22 Like that of an artist, the task 
of the historian is to find unity within the multiplicity of human affairs� Banal 
curiosities need to be discarded and the important facts of history “subordi-
nated” to “a central idea�”23 The central ideas of history, like the tension between 
freedom and slavery, are motivated primarily by conflict� In Mahan’s histories, 
the tension among nations in international affairs and the appropriate means 
through which to handle conflict and war in particular situations receive the 
most attention� 
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Many of Mahan’s ideas about war, particularly about strategy and tactics, are 
influenced strongly by Jomini’s Art of War� Jomini was not a political philoso-
pher� Though Jomini recognized the importance of politics, especially the roles 
of diplomacy and statesmanship in war, many moral ambiguities arise from his 
work� Jomini, like Mahan, was not an adherent of the traditional just-war theory� 
He recognized that nations go to war for a variety of reasons, some of them 
more defensible than others� He openly admits, in the first chapter of his work, 
that many wars arise from “so many doubtful and contested rights�”24 Whereas 
just-war theory holds that war can be waged only for a just reason, Jomini does 
not make the pursuit of justice a necessary prerequisite of warfare� Wars that 
according to just-war theory must not be waged can still be fought according to 
Jomini’s work, with its moral ambiguities� In the interplay of national interest and 
moral responsibility, it is clear that national interest dominates Jomini’s thoughts; 
Mahan, nevertheless, owing to the limitations of Jomini’s work, often focuses on 
the role of conflict in human affairs� 
The prevalence of conflict in both human and international affairs guided 
Mahan’s emphasis on the impulses, sentiments, and feelings of nations and their 
citizens�25 Although these elements of human behavior are volatile, Mahan pos-
ited a fairly static view of human nature: “It must be remembered that, among 
all changes, the nature of man remains the same�”26 He provided neither a stage 
of human history in which the flaws of human nature are overcome nor the pos-
sibility that human nature itself can change� Since he believed that human nature 
was constant, Mahan was able to make a universal claim about humanity: “All 
men seek gain and, more or less, love money; but the way in which gain is sought 
will have a marked effect upon the commercial fortunes and the history of the 
people inhabiting a country�”27 Humankind is, was, and always will be moved by 
a universal principle: the pursuit of interest� The nation does not differ from the 
individual in its pursuit of interest� Rather, the pursuit of interests is amplified in 
the nation, especially in the realm of international relations�
Successful nations, Mahan posited, adhere to what he called the “national will,” 
or “popular will�” The national will is different from that of the government� It is 
best defined as the opinion of the majority of the citizenry�28 Nations are simply 
agents of the people� “Governments,” Mahan claimed, “are trustees, not prin-
cipals; and as such must put first the lawful interests of their wards, their own 
people�”29 The policies of a strong government will need to be congruent with the 
national interest, because the most successful policies of a nation are grounded in 
“the sentiment of the people�”30 Thus, statesmen who wish to push certain policies 
that are currently against the wishes of the people must somehow convince the 
people to convert to their positions�31 While Mahan himself was an intellectual 
and not a statesman, he took his own advice� In order that America might expand 
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its commercial interests and become a sea power, Mahan attempted to convert 
the American people through his own writings to support his main political 
project—the expansion of America’s sea power� 
The opening line of Influence of Sea Power upon History boldly states, “The 
history of Sea Power is largely, though by no means solely, a narrative of contests 
between nations, of mutual rivalries, of violence frequently culminating in war�”32 
Embedded in this thesis is Mahan’s view that conflict is a natural part of human 
nature� Human nature, moved by various feelings and impulses, is volatile and 
avaricious� History, he argues, has shown that the course of human affairs is a 
narrative of competition� Whether at peace or at war, nations act out of both 
impulse and calculation of profit� Tension arises naturally among neighboring 
nations, because they often have the same pursuits� “Clashing interests” lead to 
“angry feelings” over various economic concerns, and then to attempts by na-
tions “to exclude others, either by legislative methods of monopoly or prohibi-
tory regulations, or, when these failed, by direct violence�”33 Successful nations 
have to find ways to procure their interests while simultaneously protecting 
themselves against their competitors� War is just one possible solution to such 
predicaments, but Mahan defended adamantly a nation’s right to wage it: nations 
have a “right to insure by just means whatsoever contributes to natural progress, 
and correlatively to combat injurious action taken by an outside agency, if the 
latter overpass its own lawful sphere�”34 The basis for international relations is 
national interest� The impulses, sentiments, and feelings of a nation dictate its 
relationship with other nations� Peace, nevertheless, can be found, if there exists 
mutual profit in attaining it� Nations invade other nations (or indigenous groups) 
only if there is something to gain from the conquest or occupation� Sometimes 
interests encourage nations to invade; in other cases, interests encourage nations 
to negotiate treaties�35 
The pursuit of interest stems from self-preservation, which Mahan defined 
quite broadly� “The first law of states, as of man,” Mahan wrote, “is self-preservation 
—a term which cannot be narrowed to the bare tenure of a stationary round of 
existence�”36 Self-preservation is not simply a reaction against an external threat 
but something more comprehensive: it is the right to defend the nation’s inter-
ests, whether in direct response to provocation or not�37 Self-preservation is not 
merely instinctual but also strategic and calculative� The use of reason, not just 
instinct and the passions, is necessary to preserve the nation� A nation ought to 
realize that it may not possess tomorrow what it does at the current moment� 
Preparedness for defense is legitimate, because it is prudent for a nation to take 
precautions against future disasters� When not at war, the most appropriate act of 
self-preservation is economic expansion� A healthy nation needs to engage eco-
nomically with other nations and to compete with its neighbors� Mahan’s study 
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of history even suggests that competition often has positive, constructive, and 
moral qualities� The prosperity of the Western world derives “from the fact that 
our present world of civilization consists of strong opposing nationalities, and is 
not one huge, consolidated imperium � � � [where] the individual declension [i�e�, 
decline] of the Roman citizen had destroyed the material from which the more 
healthful organism of earlier days could have been reconstituted�”38 The defeat of 
Carthage, for example, provided Rome with no antagonism; instead of flourish-
ing, Roman mores faltered�39 Mahan defended competition by imagining what 
the world would look like if there were no competition� Behind his argument is 
the belief that creativity and innovation need some sort of impetus; complacency 
breeds stagnation� Likewise, from a moral perspective, the absence of perceived 
evil or actual struggle fosters decadence� It is vigorous, antagonistic competition 
—the need to overcome something or someone—that molds great men and 
nations� Without Napoleon, there would have been no Nelson� Competition 
provides the necessity that forges the tools and means by which progress is made� 
The closest synonym to “progress,” in Mahan’s understanding, is “growth�” 
Nevertheless, Mahanian progress is a vague concept, best defined as the “onward 
movement of the world [that] has to be accepted as a fact, to be advantageously 
dealt with by guidance, not by mere opposition, still less by unprofitable bewail-
ing of things undesirably past�”40 Progress is a fact not because nature itself inher-
ently progresses but because a particular nation is bound to take advantage of 
another’s weaknesses� Progress, in other words, occurs through human activity 
and effort� Unlike Herbert Spencer, in whose thinking progress happens natu-
rally, through evolution, from homogeneity to heterogeneity, Mahan argues that 
progress is achieved laboriously, from human toil and experience�41 It is possible, 
for instance, for progress to slow down and even, theoretically, to falter entirely� 
Progress is “dependent upon each man’s thorough, consummate knowledge of 
his own business, supplemented by an adequate understanding of the occupa-
tions and need of his neighbors�”42 Progress is the result of human reason, not 
the movements of the natural order� Mahan admits that the “raw materials” of 
progress often come from geographical and physical conditions, but, just as a 
nation must touch a sea if it is to develop a navy, the success of a nation often 
depends on its geographical, cultural, and racial characteristics�43 In the modern 
age, Mahan argued of his time, progress advances by looking outward and is 
achieved through interaction with the outside world� The aforementioned three 
determinants of sea power—production, shipping, and colonies—involve con-
stant motion and growth� This growth intensifies when other, opposing nations 
are also expanding, thereby creating competition� 
Mahan’s focus on development and competition affected the way in which he 
understood the nature of human rights� Mahan defined natural rights as those 
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“that result from the simple fact of being born�”44 Natural rights differed, for him, 
from political or legal rights in that the latter “depend upon other fitnesses than 
that of merely being a man�”45 Using this distinction, Mahan defended the impe-
rialism, colonialism, and expansion of Europe over the less developed parts of the 
world on the ground that the indigenous peoples of those regions did not have 
natural rights to the lands they occupied, whatever legal or political rights they 
might have enjoyed� No nation, he argued, has a natural right to its land� Territory 
is held by fitness� Mankind at large has a natural right to the unused goods of idle 
lands; hence, Mahan asserted, the raw materials of Africa, Asia, and the Middle 
East belonged to those who could develop them� The strongest, most progressive 
nation is the most likely to use and to develop a region’s natural goods most ef-
ficiently; the strong, then, should rule over those resources�46 
As the historian Walter LaFeber has noted, Mahan defined “colonialism” dif-
ferently from the seventeenth-century mercantilists� Sometimes Mahan’s use of 
the term centered on created settlements, such as in Hawaii, but most of the time 
he associated it with purely strategic points of trade and military forts�47 For ex-
ample, Gibraltar, an English possession, was considered by Mahan to be a colony 
although it was primarily a strategic naval fort� Colonialism, then, fundamentally 
involved two things for Mahan� First, it brought wealth for the nation� Second, it 
provided a base for further expansion and acted as a check against hostile move-
ments of foreign nations� Mahan used the example of India, the possession of 
which had given England both wealth and a strong military position in the Indian 
Ocean� Protecting India required England to have a strong navy and, to create a 
highway to India, colonial and strategic possessions in the Mediterranean� It was 
for this reason that England possessed both Gibraltar and the Suez Canal�48 The 
constant development of the navy, ever larger in response to England’s own needs 
(and to the challenges posed by its neighbors and competitors) was necessary for 
the successful administration of colonial India� 
Mahan constantly stressed the importance of naval armament because a 
navy represented not only power to protect but power to rule� Navies, Mahan 
remarked, “can be felt where national armies cannot go�”49 More sophisticated 
than ever before, navies provided defense, communication, transportation, and 
the protection of trade� Most important of all, navies gave their nations a chance 
to secure peace� For this reason, Mahan applauded the military buildup of the 
Western powers, convinced that it was diminishing the likelihood of inter-
European combat� With their gaze on colonialism and imperialism, the Western 
nations were able to participate in healthy competition without destroying each 
other� Armament—not the pacifism of men like Norman Angell—created true 
humanitarianism�50 Mahan wrote, “The most beneficial use of a military force is 
not to wage war, however successfully, but to prevent war, with all its suffering, 
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expense, and complications of embarrassments�”51 Mahan’s balance of powers, 
however, did not adequately deter violence in non-Western states� 
MORAL RESPONSIBILITY, CONSCIENCE, AND THE LIMITS OF 
LAW
Throughout his writings, Mahan argued consistently that there is a strong cor-
relation between national policy and public opinion� As a nation follows a certain 
interest because its citizens demand it, so will a nation carry out a certain policy if 
the people think it has a responsibility to do so� Moral responsibility stems from 
a conviction that a certain position is morally right� It moves the nation to tran-
scend politics based solely on calculation and instinct, to rise to questions of right 
and wrong� Mahan stated that “to regard the world as governed by self-interest 
only is to live in a non-existent world,” adding that the causes of war were now 
based on convictions of good and evil, though interests certainly remained�52 At 
first glance, this statement seems to contradict the centrality of national interest 
in international affairs as outlined in Influence of Sea Power upon History� Mahan 
resolved this ambiguity by explaining that an issue of national interest, especially 
one concerning tension with other nations, “gradually assumes the aspect of a 
right and a wrong�”53 There are two important points to be made here� First, ques-
tions of right and wrong are based on the feelings of the citizenry and are decided 
by a majoritarian consensus; right and wrong, therefore, are not necessarily ab-
solutes� Second, questions of right and wrong are sometimes not independent of 
national interest� Hence, part of the tension between national interest and moral 
responsibility is resolved by the fact that both derive from the sentiments of the 
people�
Mahan’s moral subjectivity and the importance he gives to public opinion are 
products of his Protestantism� Mahan believed in the supremacy of the individual 
conscience in questions of what is right and wrong� He argued further that the 
individual has not only the right to hold a belief but also a moral duty to act on 
that belief� Mahan begins his spiritual autobiography, The Harvest Within, by em-
phasizing the relationship between the roles of exteriority and spiritual interior-
ity� In particular, he emphasizes the role of intentionality: “the moral and spiritual 
value of acts depends upon the motive�”54 This point is central to Mahan’s political 
writings� If individuals or nations are to make a moral decision, they must do so 
freely and without coercion� Morality cannot be forced by an alien, exterior force; 
rather, an act is moral only when it is deliberated and acted on freely and without 
compulsion�
Although Mahan did not articulate the distinction, he used the term “moral 
responsibility” in two different ways: the moral responsibility a nation has to 
itself, on one hand, and on the other, the moral responsibility a nation has to the 
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human race� First and foremost is the duty the nation has to itself, to maintain 
its own conscience� On these moral matters, which are especially prominent in 
international affairs, the nation needs to stand by its own understandings, its 
own reasoning capacities, not allowing other nations to interfere with its policies 
and beliefs� The nation’s exercise of reason forms the basis of Mahan’s condem-
nation of international arbitration and, more generally, his reservations about 
international law� Second, the nation has a moral responsibility to contribute to 
the progress of humankind� Western nations, like America, ought to act out of 
beneficence toward weaker nations, peoples, and indigenous groups that “re-
quire” exposure to Western culture and Christianity� The single greatest example 
of this perceived feeling of responsibility was the divine and covenantal charge 
that many Americans, including Mahan, believed they had assumed in acquiring 
the Philippines� 
To actualize moral responsibility, force often is needed� Force in and of itself is 
neither innately evil nor incompatible with Christianity� “Force,” Mahan argued, 
“must be used for the benefit of the community, of the commonwealth of the 
world�”55 Since there is no ultimate earthly arbiter or judge to determine the right-
ness of an action, it is the right of the nation itself to decide what it ought to do� 
Like individuals, nations have consciences, and although the conscience of any 
given nation can—and may—be misguided, the nation still has a right and duty 
to follow it� Mahan wrote, almost as a theologian might, that “even if mistaken, 
the moral wrong of acting against conviction works a deeper injury � � � than can 
the merely material disasters that may follow upon obedience�”56 Consequently, 
it is better to commit a wrong act with a good intention than to do a good act for 
a wrong reason� This supremacy of conscience for Mahan undoubtedly derives 
from his Protestantism, but whereas Christianity assigns conscience to the indi-
vidual, Mahan allocates it to the nation� Conscience, according to Mahan, is a gift 
from God and cannot be violated� If a nation defiles its conscience, it abandons 
its supreme reasoning tool�57 This reasoning, however, has a tremendous social 
and political implication: such emphasis on conscience leads to subjectivity� 
The parallel and connection between Mahan’s conception of conscience and his 
conception of national interest are unmistakable� They both rest on the presup-
position that a competing nation has no right to enforce its morality over another 
nation except by means of force� Since different national consciences inevitably 
disagree on important issues, disputes among nations are natural in and integral 
to international affairs—hence, the need to arm, in case of war� 
Since Mahan held that national conscience needs to be in accordance with the 
judgment of an individual nation, his political thought was naturally suspicious 
of international law and was opposed adamantly to arbitration� International law, 
according to Mahan, did not guarantee moral decisions: “Law, itself, which its 
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extreme advocates desire to see installed in place of war, is, in last analysis, simply 
force regulated—a most desirable end—but inadequate for the very reason that 
it is only a manifestation of a power which is manifold in its exhibition�”58 If law 
is only regulated force, it has no inherent moral value� Law, in general, is simply 
conventional because the majority of its premises are utilitarian and arbitrary� 
Though law may advance justice occasionally, it is not certain to pronounce the 
correct verdict� Since international law cannot be changed easily, it is an unreli-
able arbiter in particular scenarios� Furthermore, Mahan claimed, “the positive-
ness inherent in the very idea of law, its lack of elasticity, renders it too frequently 
inadequate to the settlement of certain classes of disputes, because in them an 
accepted law exists, decision in accordance with which would simply perpetuate 
injustice or sustain intolerable conditions�”59 Positive international law, in other 
words, is an inelastic universal principle unsuited for specific events� Conse-
quently, adherence to international law creates dysfunctional scenarios in which 
a nation is hindered from doing what it thinks is moral� 
Mahan was especially critical of arbitration, which many of his contemporary 
American and European intellectuals desired to be required by international 
law� His case against arbitration was twofold� First, Mahan argued from the 
perspective of conscience� Conscience, not positive law, is the supreme medium 
through which God communicates� Arbitration, then, is an act “of submitting to 
an impartial third party a question, not of interests, nor of facts, but of right and 
wrong, and therefore of conscience�”60 Bluntly put, arbitration is the forfeiture of 
conscience: “Fidelity to conscience,” Mahan wrote, “implies not only obedience 
to its dictates, but earnest heart-searching, the use of every means, to ascertain 
its true command�”61 Conscience, therefore, sometimes prohibits following a law� 
Mahan, drawing on then-senator William Seward’s famous denouncement in 
1850 of the Fugitive Slave Act, stated that there is a higher law than the Constitu-
tion, one that must be interpreted individually� By extension, the Fugitive Slave 
Act represented, for both Seward at the time and Mahan later, a grave offense to 
the higher law and consequently was not to be followed�62 If a citizen has a consci-
entious right to defy a positive domestic law, then surely a nation has the right to 
defy a positive international law� Mahan used this line of reasoning to attack arbi-
tration� If an international arbiter or legislative body decreed an unfair verdict or 
issued an unjust decree, a nation ought to have a right to disobey that law simply 
on the grounds that acceptance would violate its conscience� This decision to 
reject the arbiter’s judgment was unlikely to go unpunished by the international 
community, leading quite easily to war—unnecessarily, in Mahan’s view� 
Second, Mahan criticized arbitration from the perspective of sovereignty� Even 
if a nation benefits from arbitration in the short term, it risks threats to its nation-
al sovereignty� Mahan wrote that “law, strictly so called, presupposes a lawmaker; 
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and for international law the lawmaker has not yet come into existence�”63 Mahan 
feared that some sort of international body would have to be developed to give 
arbitration teeth, causing American citizens to be subject in certain cases to for-
eign rule� Justice would not be guaranteed from this foreign rule; in fact, Mahan 
doubted altogether the feasibility of justice in such a case, because all nations 
have their own interests� In the modern world—interconnected even in Mahan’s 
time—all nations have interests that could prejudice specific decisions� Arbitra-
tion, consequently, was hopelessly idealistic and naive; it does not erase the eter-
nal realities, constants arising from nature itself: competition, national interest 
and self-interest, force, and greed� Proponents of arbitration, he argued, did not 
recognize its potential for tyranny� To express the futility of arbitration, Mahan 
compared it to the perceived tyranny of the medieval papacy over kingdoms—
a sharp jab from a devout high Anglican�64 As in the Middle Ages, he claimed, 
arbitration would be decided by an arbitrary power motivated by its own biases 
and interests and overriding the consciences of nations� 
After dismissing arbitration as an unreasonable assault against national sov-
ereignty and the denial of national conscience, Mahan proceeded to argue that 
it would hinder America’s ability to make sound moral decisions� He used the 
example of the Spanish-American War� Had a third party arbitrated between 
Spain and the United States, he was sure, American intervention in Cuba would 
have been condemned, because an arbitrator would likely have applied exist-
ing positive law�65 Positive law, however, would have been unable to address 
the many wrongs and injustices committed in Cuba by Spain, which according 
to Mahan was an oppressive, feudal, and cruel power� Mahan held sincerely 
that there was nothing unjust about America’s decision to intervene in Cuba— 
freeing Cuba from Spanish tyranny was a legitimate end� To deny America 
such an opportunity to follow its conscience and to liberate Cuba was to deny 
America’s conscience and sovereignty� Moreover, it was more than likely that 
international reprisals against American involvement in the Spanish-American 
War would have stemmed from selfishness and various European interests, not 
from moral concern for the oppressed� 
THE APPLICATION OF MAHAN’S IDEAS TO THE AMERICAN  
REPUBLIC 
Mahan’s grappling with the problems of international affairs and geopolitics 
pushed him to reject the policy of American isolationism in a world of rapidly 
advancing imperialism� Mahan was an imperialist, but he was an American im-
perialist� He was well aware of the limits of his nation’s armed forces and of how 
little interest his commercial-minded countrymen had in warfare� Mahan’s policy 
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positions reflected the tension between following public opinion and promoting 
causes contrary to public opinion� Consistent with his philosophy, Mahan did not 
call for any imperial project comparable to those of Britain or France, not only 
because such a project would be beyond America’s capabilities but also because 
it would not be in accordance with public opinion� 
Having taken the pulse of the Republic, Mahan supported the principle of 
reciprocity advanced by Secretary of State (1881 and 1889–92) James G� Blaine� 
Mahan defined reciprocity as the abandonment of “exclusive interest, which is 
the citadel of protection, to embrace that of mutual benefit, the cornerstone upon 
which the advocates of freedom of trade rest their argument�”66 At first glance, 
the principle seems to be in sharp contrast with Mahan’s emphasis on competi-
tive national interest� Yet reciprocity is pursued not for its own sake but out of 
national interest� It opens up markets, especially non-Western markets, and al-
lows competition among nations to flourish without risk of bloodshed� Moreover, 
reciprocity permits a Western nation, such as the United States, to spread its core 
values with other, less developed nations� Of America’s increased engagement 
with foreign nations Mahan wrote that “what the nation has gained in expression 
is a regenerating idea, an uplifting of the heart, a seed of future beneficent activ-
ity, a going out of self into the world to communicate the gift it has so bountifully 
received�”67 It was this understanding of reciprocity that later formed the basis of 
his support for the Open Door policy, by which America benefited from trade 
with China (national interest) while also fulfilling its duty to humankind by 
promoting Western civilization and propagating Christianity (moral responsibil-
ity)� Reciprocity, in this light, is charity with interest� It does not imply equality 
between the interacting nations or peoples, but it does provide—when the United 
States is involved—material and spiritual benefit by virtue of economic access to 
American goods and cultural access to Christianity� 
As his adherence to the principle of reciprocity demonstrates, Mahan was 
concerned with economic, cultural, and political influence but not necessarily 
dominion� Mahan took different stances on how to promote American influence� 
Owing to his emphasis on particularity, Mahan’s policy positions are not formu-
laic and rigid; his reasons for particular stances on given issues varied according 
to the nuances of specific policy positions� On issues like the canal across the 
Central American isthmus, influence in the Caribbean, the annexation of Hawaii, 
and control over the Persian Gulf, Mahan’s concerns were based primarily on na-
tional interest� However, on two very important matters—the Monroe Doctrine 
and the Spanish-American War—his policies were based on both national inter-
est and moral responsibility� These two examples highlight how Mahan’s stances 
integrated the two concepts� 
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The Monroe Doctrine
Mahan stressed, from the publication of Influence of Sea Power upon History until 
his death, the crucial importance of the Monroe Doctrine� He stated bluntly that 
the Monroe Doctrine was a “product of interest�”68 Mahan valued particularly the 
practicality of the Monroe Doctrine, arguing that it was the product of prudent 
reflection on American security� Before its promulgation by President James 
Monroe, the early Republic had suffered various assaults on both land and sea 
by the European colonial powers� Mahan wrote, “Not reason only, but feeling, 
based on experience of actual inconvenience, suffering, and loss—loss of life, 
and loss of wealth, political anxiety, and commercial disturbance—conspired to 
intensify opposition to any avoidable renewal of similar conditions�”69 Although 
its bedrock claim—that no European power was free to recolonize lost colonies 
or gain new ones—had remained consistent in the nineteenth century, Mahan 
argued, the doctrine had to be expanded and developed to address America’s 
contemporary interests; it had been founded in part on the basis of interest, and 
the interests of nations change�70 Mahan asserted forcefully, especially in his writ-
ings on the construction of the isthmian canal, the importance of continuing to 
assert the Monroe Doctrine in support of contemporary concerns� He warned 
repeatedly that with the completion of the canal, Europe would be tempted to 
attain new territories in the Americas that could threaten American superior-
ity in the Caribbean as well as control over the canal� It was, therefore, in the 
American interest to have a navy strong enough to deter European colonization 
in the region�71 
If national interest formed the (elastic) foundation of the Monroe Doctrine, it 
was force that upheld its implementation� The Monroe Doctrine, in other words, 
was only as strong as the American navy made it�72 In Mahan’s thought, however, 
force was not applied simply in the pursuit of interest but also in the promotion 
of moral responsibility� First, Mahan argued that the Monroe Doctrine was a dec-
laration of America’s moral conscience� America, therefore, reserved the right to 
intervene in Latin and South America if its conscience compelled it to intervene� 
Mahan received worldwide attention on this issue while serving as an American 
delegate at the first Hague conference� There, consistent with his political phi-
losophy, Mahan made a provocative stand against article 27 of the conference’s 
declaration, which stated, “The Signatory Powers consider it their duty, in case a 
serious dispute threatens to break out between two or more of them, to remind 
these powers that the permanent Court of Arbitration is open to them�”73 Mahan 
perceived in this proposed language a clear violation of national conscience, in 
that it called for third-party intervention in American affairs within South Amer-
ica, perhaps even paving the way for destruction of the Monroe Doctrine itself� 
Mahan, with the support of the majority of the American delegation, requested 
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and received an addendum explicitly stating that article 27 was not applicable to 
the Monroe Doctrine�74 Not a single nation at the conference dared to object to 
the request�75
Second, the Monroe Doctrine was based on moral responsibility in that it as-
sisted the nations of South America in maintaining their own self-determination� 
America, Mahan wrote, has “a common sympathy with peoples struggling for 
relief from a very real oppression�”76 In opposition to those European nations 
who desired to take back parts of South America, the U�S� position was “sustained 
by policy and by a conviction of rightfulness�”77 Legitimate concern for Central 
and South America, Mahan insisted, did enter into America’s calculation in 
upholding the Monroe Doctrine� Mahan’s view protected the self-determinism 
of the various countries of South and Central America; with the notable excep-
tion of the lands annexed as a result of the Spanish-American War, it did not 
call for American colonialism there� He did not claim that America had “quasi 
suzerainty” over South America, as England did over its colonies�78 By treating 
South American nations as sovereign nations, Mahan claimed, the United States 
occupied higher moral ground than its European competitors, who would have 
disregarded South and Central American self-determinism altogether� 
The Spanish-American War and the Acquisition of the Philippines 
Mahan’s position on the Spanish-American War highlighted how a nation can 
be motivated simultaneously by both national interest and moral responsibility� 
Mahan claimed that Cuba’s “deliverance from oppression [had been] the object 
of the war�”79 America had had a moral goal in the war� While it may have had 
certain interests in the possession of Cuba—an island only ninety miles away 
from American coastline—its actions had been based also on nobler sentiments� 
In short, the United States had seen a nation suffering under an unjust authority 
and, finding this tyranny repulsive, had followed its conscience and uplifted its 
neighbor from the “generally iniquitous character” of Spain�80 
The war having culminated in the liberation of Cuba and the Philippines, Ma-
han believed that America was embarking on a new chapter in its history, one of 
colonialism� Mahan reflected on the moral responsibility America had to its new 
dependencies� Colonialism, Mahan wrote, is “novel to us; we may make blunders; 
but, guided by [the example of British] experience, we should reach the goal more 
quickly�”81 Mahan did not shy away from the fact that the United States had been 
formed as a result, in effect, of British colonialism� Moreover, he did not believe 
that America’s experience with British colonialism provided a sufficient reason to 
oppose colonialism� Rather, it had the potential to be a great colonial power itself 
precisely because it had been ruled by a colonial power, making it more sensitive 
to possible abuses� Mahan warned that if America “sees in its new responsibilities, 
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first of all, markets and profits, with incidental resultant benefit to the natives, it 
will go wrong� Through such mistakes Great Britain � � � lost the United States�”82 
Genuine care and consideration needed to be shown to the people of its new 
dependencies� Mahan stressed that it would be bad policy to create unnecessary 
tension with its colonies, especially the Philippines� 
This newfound moral responsibility with respect to the Philippines certainly 
was not without consideration of interest, for it was in the nation’s interest to have 
a stable and productive colony� Mahan went so far as to declare that the two con-
cepts do not need to be separate: the “interest of the nation is one with its benefi-
cence�”83 From the standpoint of interest, there are two clear reasons why he sup-
ported the acquisition of the Philippines� The first was that it was compatible with 
the foundational propositions of his naval philosophy� Colonialism was a natural 
corollary of production and naval power� Possession of the Philippines, Mahan 
hoped, would stimulate the American navy to develop and expand� The second 
reason was geopolitical� Mahan believed that “enlightened self-interest demands 
us to recognize not merely, and in general, the imminence of the great question 
of the farther East, which is rising so rapidly before us, but also specifically, the 
importance to us of a strong and beneficent occupation of adjacent territory�”84 
Mahan both feared and respected the Far East, especially Japan� Hence, America’s 
occupation of the Philippines would have a twofold effect� It would force the East 
to recognize America as a formidable power; an Eastern power expanding its 
territory would have to do so in light of America’s presence in the Philippines� 
Moreover, the Philippines gave America better access to the Far Eastern markets�
REFLECTIONS ON MAHAN’S POLITICAL THOUGHT 
With the advent of the United Nations and increased internationalism, Mahan’s 
political thought seems to have been rejected by contemporary U�S� policy mak-
ing� Yet in fact Mahan’s influence may be today more pertinent than it may ap-
pear at a glance� By 1893, when Frederick Jackson Turner declared the end of the 
American frontier, Mahan had already (in 1890) identified the new American 
frontier: the sea�85 The history of the twentieth century, with its world wars, and 
of the early twenty-first, with its globalization, shows that Mahan was correct� 
The sea is a perpetual frontier—there are always new markets and new modes 
of expansion� For the most part, Mahan favored peace and negotiation (though 
as the Philippines experience showed he was open to coercion and force)� This 
point, however, needs to be tempered with the realization that had Mahan been 
a British or German subject he most certainly would have given quite different 
advice to his countrymen� Ultimately, the decision between acting from national 
interest and acting from moral responsibility rested on the nuances of the par-
ticular moment� 
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Mahan’s political thought was based on a combination of national interest 
and moral responsibility� Although the former is concerned with calculation and 
appetites, whereas the latter derives from principles of morality, Mahan was able 
to reconcile the two concepts by arguing that both derive ultimately from the na-
tional will� Their actualization rests equally on the ability of the nation to make its 
own decisions� Mahan held consistently that since there can be no earthly arbiter, 
decisions about whether an action is just, moral, necessary, or useful must be left 
solely to the individual nations making them� 
However, a significant international problem emerges: if individual nations 
are viewed as the only just arbiters, decisions from national interest might be 
called—quite inappropriately—judgments of conscience� That is, there arises 
the danger of national interest subsuming conscience� Under the banner of 
conscience or moral responsibility, nations might declare war or commit acts of 
aggression when, in truth, it is only their interests that are being served� Mahan 
does not resolve this tension; his thought is based on the conviction that moral 
truths of right and wrong can be determined only on the basis of the feelings of 
individual nations� Mahan falls short of moral relativism, though, because he ac-
knowledges openly that nations may err� But nations have the right to err; other 
competing nations hoping to interfere cannot speak infallibly or unbiasedly, are 
motivated by their own selfish interests, and would object if other nations inter-
fered in their own business� By stressing the importance of determination by the 
individual nation whether its own actions are moral, Mahan was attempting to 
avoid the international tyranny of nations disguising their own interests as mat-
ters of conscience and responsibility� Mahan’s concern for the potential dangers of 
arbitration is genuine and shows, contra the judgments of Hofstadter and Beard, 
that Mahan was neither a trigger-happy imperialist nor a rambunctious school-
boy but a sober-minded observer of world affairs� 
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BOOK REVIEWS
STRATEGY AS A BATTLEGROUND
The Direction of War: Contemporary Strategy in Historical Perspective, by Hew Strachan� Cambridge: 
Cambridge Univ� Press, 2013� 322 pages� $66�70 (paperback $26�99; Kindle $17�20)� 
About halfway through his account of 
the direction of war, the distinguished 
Oxford military historian Hew Strachan 
makes a seemingly minor point about 
Bernard Brodie, one of the pioneers of 
limited-war theory during the Cold War� 
“Brodie had studied Socratic philosophy 
and had been trained as a historian� 
These were in some sense the traditional 
disciplines of strategic thought,” but in 
the early nuclear age they “were now 
in retreat” (p� 187)� Some might doubt 
that a Socratic approach combined with 
historical inquiry is a foundation of 
strategic thought, or at least of Brodie’s, 
but in truth Strachan thereby described 
his own approach to strategic theory 
and practice as well as anyone possi-
bly could� Strachan, however, is not in 
retreat� He has taken the initiative and 
is very much on the offensive—against 
just about everyone’s sacred cow�
Following Clausewitz directly and per-
haps Socrates’s greatest student, Plato, 
indirectly, Strachan has a dialectical ap-
proach to thinking about strategy, which 
is fundamentally a conversation, the sort 
any war college could only welcome� 
It occurs at many levels, and often the 
interlocutors speak at cross-purposes� 
Most fundamentally it is a conversation 
between theory and practice, one insist-
ing on clarity and therefore abstraction, 
the other on concrete experience�
As the conversation develops, Strachan 
brings in new interlocutors� Virtually all 
the great and many minor strategic theo-
rists and practitioners of the modern era 
have something to say in this dialogue: 
Clausewitz, of course, but also Jomini, 
Mahan, Corbett, Douhet, Billy Mitchell, 
Brodi, Herman Kahn, Mao Zedong; 
Generals Powell, Clark, Petraeus, and 
McChrystal; Admirals Morgan and Mul-
len; and many, many others� While they 
converse with each other, all also are 
engaged in a conversation with practice, 
i�e�, what works and what does not�
That conversation is rooted in a 
deeper one about the relation of the 
past (continuity and change) to the 
present and the foreseeable future 
(contingency), meaning Strachan har-
nesses his vast understanding of the 
past to help us think about the future 
direction of strategy and war� His 
dialogue is always about at least these 
three big questions: What is strategy? 
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Who should direct it? And where and 
how should it be made (p� 215)?
Those looking for a clear answer to the 
first question are likely to be disappoint-
ed� Strachan observes that Clausewitz’s 
“On War contains many references to 
the need for principles and system, but 
never delivers them in a way designed to 
be learnt by the parrots of military cram-
mers and spoon-fed examinees” (p� 203)� 
Neither does Strachan� Like Socrates, he 
is an interrogator� He asks what other 
people, such as the British prime min-
ister and the American president and 
their military and other subordinates, 
mean by policy, grand strategy, military 
strategy, and operations. Like Socrates 
again, he is pretty sure either they do 
not know or their views are one-sided, 
if not misguided, and at best limited 
in utility to a particular moment in 
time� He frustrates his readers as much 
as Socrates does in Plato’s dialogues 
because he never quite defines strategy 
himself� It exists somewhere between 
war’s political purpose and operations 
that purport to achieve it (p� 220)�
As a middle ground between political 
purpose and military action, strategy 
also becomes a battleground between 
those who make policy and those who 
design and execute operations to achieve 
it� Strachan’s focus is often on the disap-
pearance of strategy in this conflict� 
Sometimes it is subsumed by policy, 
which is what he insists happened dur-
ing the Cold War, when the purpose of 
strategy was to ensure that major-power, 
i�e�, nuclear, war did not occur, so the 
use of violence to achieve political 
objectives among major powers against 
each other became unthinkable� This 
also happened after the Cold War, when 
strategy as a means to achieve political 
purposes was nearly extinct (with many, 
in Europe especially, welcoming its 
demise), and operations came to occupy 
the middle ground� This was especially 
true in the United States, though in such 
a narrow way that Strachan ascribes 
fleeting successes in Afghanistan and 
Iraq after 9/11 and 2003 to the triumph, 
i�e�, failure, of merely operational think-
ing� So, in many ways his book becomes 
a discussion of civil-military relations, 
with a powerful critique of the pioneer 
of the field, Samuel Huntington�
Like Socrates, Strachan is willing to 
question taboos� He argues that, in 
both England and the United States, the 
danger of a military leader on a white 
horse coming to power at the expense of 
freedom was vastly exaggerated� Liberal 
principles had taken such deep root in 
the people that a military coup d’état 
was simply inconceivable� What private 
in the U�S� or British military would 
obey an order from a general to arrest 
the president or prime minister? So 
Huntington’s principle of strict separa-
tion between the roles of statesmen and 
generals was not merely unnecessary 
but in many ways counterproductive� 
“The principal purpose of effective civil-
military relations is national security: its 
output is strategy� Democracies tend to 
forget that” (p� 76)� Following Clause-
witz, whom he uses to criticize rather 
than support Huntington, Strachan in-
sists that war is interactive, the realm of 
chance, friction, contingency, and unex-
pected actions from the adversary� And 
war has its own grammar, often leading 
to escalation� War, in other words, has its 
own nature, which politics defies at its 
own risk� A good Clausewitzian might, 
indeed must, try to impose the political 
logic of war on all this, but once the dogs 
of war are unleashed, they tend to make 
havoc—that is, they follow their own 
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direction� As often as not, then, policy 
and strategy are directed by war; they do 
not direct it� Responding to that reality 
requires a dialogue between soldiers and 
politicians—not the subordination of 
one element to the other, but rather their 
“harmonization” (p� 78)� For any kind 
of rationality to be imposed, politics 
must therefore listen to strategy, which 
must listen to war, both in its enduring 
nature and in its changing character� 
All this suggests a far more prominent 
role in the conversation for generals 
and admirals than current norms, often 
violated in practice, tend to permit�
As a student of the American founders 
and the American political tradition, 
this reviewer is not sure Strachan is right 
to challenge the Anglo-American taboos 
as much as he does� As a professor of 
strategy, however, I am certain Strachan  
has captured something vital for un-
derstanding the direction of any war� 
It arises from Clausewitz’s discussion 
of war as more than a true chameleon 
changing its colors from war to war� War 
does have a nature� It is embodied espe-
cially in Clausewitz’s trinity: the relation 
among reason, passion, and creativity 
that exists in any war� But that relation 
changes from war to war� Sometimes one 
element is more important than another, 
which gives an entirely different direc-
tion to a conflict than the one preceding 
or succeeding it� Sometimes the ele-
ments quarrel among themselves� Each 
attempts to give direction to war, and 
the changing historical direction of war 
is very much the result of the conversa-
tion among the parts and the interaction 
of their whole with others� No wonder, 
then, that Strachan does not give us the 
clear and final answers we crave� War 
will not allow them; neither will he� We 
therefore will have to figure the answers 
out for ourselves� A fine way to start is 
by reading this subtle and erudite book�
KARL WALLING
Authority, Ascendancy, and Supremacy: China, 
Russia, and the United States’ Pursuit of Relevancy 
and Power, by Gregory O� Hall� New York: Rout-
ledge, 2015� 188 pages� $145 (paperback $42�95)�
Gregory O� Hall, a professor of politi-
cal science at Morehouse College, has 
taken an acknowledged fact of con-
temporary international relations—the 
dominance of the United States, Russia, 
and China within the international 
system—and developed a compelling 
academic model supporting this�
Hall argues that the Tripolar Conflict, 
Cooperation, and Competition (TC3) 
Framework model reflects the real-
ity of the international system since 
at least the early 2000s� From Central 
Asia to the Middle East and Northeast 
Asia, Hall demonstrates that the United 
States, China, and Russia are locked in 
a complex web of interrelationships that 
increasingly determines the outcome 
of pressing regional, and even global, 
issues� As the traditional economic and 
military advantages of the United States 
decline relative to those of some rising 
powers, the international system will be 
even more defined by the interactions 
of these three dominant global powers�
Hall cogently traces the gradual transi-
tion of the global system following the 
“unipolar” moment that emerged after 
the collapse of the Soviet Union in the 
early 1990s� While the United States 
remains first among equals in numerous 
metrics of national power, the compara-
tive diminution of its own influence 
and the rise of other power centers 
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have led to an international environ-
ment in which regional problems must 
be resolved in conjunction with the 
other critical global actors—namely, 
Russia and China. Hall contrasts previ-
ous examples of American unilateral 
action—from military intervention in 
the Balkans in the late 1990s to the 2003 
invasion of Iraq—with more recent 
examples of U.S. foreign policy be-
ing constrained by Russian or Chinese 
concerns. Whether it is Russian sup-
port for the al-Assad regime in Syria, 
China’s sustainment of the Kim dynasty 
in North Korea, or both Moscow and 
Beijing’s attempts to constrain pos-
sible U.S. military action against Iran’s 
nuclear program, Hall marshals the full 
panoply of regional issues to demon-
strate the relevance of his framework.
For the national security community, 
Hall’s work represents an important 
translation of international relations 
theory to the realm of practical policy 
making. His “strategic triangle” between 
the United States, Russia, and China is 
an accepted fact of international politics 
with which leaders around the world 
have grappled for at least the last decade. 
On almost any security issue of note, 
whether traditional or nontraditional, 
the acquiescence of at least two of the 
three major powers is essential for any 
action. Whether it is Russia and China 
constraining U.S. options in Middle 
East hot spots such as Syria or Iran, or 
the United States and China increasing 
their influence in traditionally Russian-
dominated Central Asia, the triangular 
relationship plays out on nearly every 
conceivable regional security question. 
While the popular literature continues 
to debate a “post-American world” 
and other slogans, a “strategic triangle” 
has long been the reality for Russian, 
Chinese, and U.S. decision makers.
While Hall is particularly adept at 
translating the academic literature into 
a compelling narrative that fits the 
global political reality, he is less sure 
footed in properly contextualizing the 
limits of American power. Although it is 
clear that global power is more diffuse 
than in the years directly following the 
Soviet Union’s collapse, and American 
power is certainly more constrained on 
a variety of regional issues, Washington 
still maintains an unparalleled ability to 
act militarily when and where it chooses 
even in the face of strong objections 
from Moscow and Beijing. The 2011 
intervention in Libya demonstrates that, 
while Russian and Chinese concerns 
were certainly considered in ways 
unheard of during the 1990s and early 
2000s, Washington still ultimately exer-
cises a tremendous degree of discretion 
in the use of force and remains able to 
apply its overwhelming military advan-
tage in a variety of contingencies despite 
deep misgivings in Moscow and Beijing. 
As Professor Hall rightly notes, the 
continued economic and military 
advances of less developed nations such 
as Turkey, Brazil, Iran, and South Africa 
will inject new forces and issues into the 
international agenda. Nontraditional 
security issues such as water scarcity 
and environmental degradation, while 
certainly not replacing the traditional 
primacy of inter-state competition 
and conflict, will likely act as a supple-
ment to those dynamics. As the global 
system seeks to adjust to these actors 
and issues, the predominance of the 
United States, China, and Russia in the 
international system and the reality of 
cooperation and competition between 
these powers will continue to define the 
twenty-first-century international order.
ALEXANDER B. GRAY
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The Battle of Lake Champlain: A “Brilliant and 
Extraordinary Victory,” by John H� Schroeder� 
Norman: Univ� of Oklahoma Press, 2015� 184 
pages� $26�95�
War in the Chesapeake: The British Campaigns to 
Control the Bay, 1813–14, by Charles Neimeyer�
Annapolis, Md�: Naval Institute Press, 2015� 256 
pages� $44�95�
In 1814, the United States faced a crisis 
of a magnitude not experienced since 
the Revolution and not to be exceeded 
until the Civil War� Congress declared 
war against the British Empire in 1812 
to stop the impressment of sailors on 
American ships, to maintain the rights 
of neutral trade, and to stop perceived 
British support for Native Ameri-
cans then violently opposing western 
settlement� Congress and the Madison 
administration expected a quick victory 
by ending British control over Canada� 
After all, Britain was locked in existen-
tial struggle with Napoleonic France 
and could send little assistance to its 
forces in North America� However, the 
British in Canada managed to turn back 
multiple American invasions� Even the 
stunning naval victory on Lake Erie in 
1813 resulted only in local superiority� 
The key cities of Montreal and Quebec 
remained firmly in British hands�
With the abdication of Napoleon in 
1814, Britain deployed large land and 
naval forces to North America� Britain’s 
goals were to retaliate for American 
depredations in Canada, permanently 
eliminate American military power on 
the Great Lakes and Lake Champlain, 
establish a neutral Indian territory 
north of the Ohio River, and seize New 
Orleans� The American treasury was 
almost empty, the Atlantic coast was 
under close blockade, American naval 
power on the Atlantic was all but neu-
tralized, and politically the nation was 
bitterly divided over continuing the war�
Two new books reexamine this pe-
riod of national crisis� First, John H� 
Schroeder retells the dramatic story of 
turning back a powerful British inva-
sion intended to clear Lake Champlain 
of an American military presence� Lake 
Champlain makes up a large segment of 
the traditional invasion corridor linking 
Montreal to New York City� In Septem-
ber 1814, ten thousand British soldiers, 
many of them veterans of Wellington’s 
victories in Spain, marched into New 
York State heading toward the American 
base at Plattsburgh� A strong Royal Navy 
squadron accompanied this formidable 
army� Defending Plattsburgh were a 
few thousand regulars and militiamen 
under Brigadier General Alexander 
Macomb� Master Commandant Thomas 
Macdonough commanded the naval 
squadron on the lake� Macomb and 
Macdonough were determined to defend 
Plattsburgh, and they prepared an 
integrated defense� Macomb stationed 
most of his soldiers in three earthen 
fortifications across the narrow penin-
sula formed by the Saranac River and 
Plattsburgh Bay� Macdonough deployed 
his four major war vessels anchored in 
line across the bay� This arrangement 
exploited American advantages—yet 
there would be no escape for either force 
if the British attacks were successful�
Sir George Prevost, governor general 
of British North America, directed a 
less-well-coordinated offensive� He 
urged Captain George Downie to attack 
Macdonough’s squadron� However, 
Prevost delayed the accompanying 
land assault to await the results of the 
fight on the water� Downie intended 
to lead a column of warships to pierce 
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the American line, but the wind and 
currents in the bay refused to cooperate� 
Instead, the four British warships came 
into close range of their opposites and 
anchored to begin a cannonade� Barely 
fifteen minutes into the fight, an Ameri-
can ball slammed into a British gun, 
dismounting it—and crushing Downie� 
The next ranking officer on the flag-
ship could not locate the signal book to 
inform Captain Daniel Pring that Pring 
was now in command� As a result, each 
British skipper fought his own battle�
Schroeder recounts the well-known 
story of Macdonough’s use of anchors 
and cables to rotate his big vessels 
to bring the maximum number of 
guns into action� Eventually, superior 
American gunnery prevailed, and one 
British vessel after another struck its 
colors� When Prevost learned that the 
Americans had shattered his naval force, 
he called off the land attack and led his 
frustrated troops back to Montreal� 
While Schroeder adds little that is new 
to the oft-told battle narrative of this 
improbable victory, his notable contri-
bution is the detailed analysis of how 
British defeat on this inland body of 
water affected the peace negotiations� 
The British ministry offered com-
mand in North America to the Duke 
of Wellington� The Iron Duke care-
fully spelled out the requirements for 
military success� In his analysis, Britain 
could not win a decisive victory until it 
controlled the water� Only this would 
yield the operational and tactical mobil-
ity to take advantage of the troop surge� 
Failing to control key lakes and rivers, 
Wellington opined, the government 
would be best served by ending the 
war as rapidly as possible� The min-
istry received the news of the failures 
at Plattsburgh and Baltimore in rapid 
succession and sent new instructions 
to its negotiators in Ghent� Britain 
dropped its objectionable demands, and 
a treaty was signed on Christmas Eve�
The defense of Baltimore is the final 
chapter in Charles Neimeyer’s excellent 
narrative of the campaign in Chesapeake 
Bay� As early as the spring of 1813, a 
formidable Royal Navy force under Sir 
George Cockburn entered the bay with 
the purpose of shutting down American 
commerce and persuading Madison 
to withdraw regulars from the fight in 
Canada to defend the cities, villages, and 
plantations along the hundreds of miles 
of coast and along rivers that empty into 
the bay� The Royal Navy raided with im-
punity� Captains ordered crews to torch 
villages, seize food and tobacco, and 
evacuate thousands of escaped slaves, 
sending them to freedom in British colo-
nies� Yet Madison refused to redeploy his 
regulars from the northern campaigns, 
even after the burning of Washington�
Neimeyer relates this tale lucidly, 
weaving events and policy change with 
insightful analysis� The Americans 
responded to British raids with Com-
modore Joshua Barney’s famed flotilla 
of gunboats� While Barney was ulti-
mately forced to destroy his squadron 
to avoid capture, he and his flotillamen 
and accompanying Marines were the 
only bright spot in what was otherwise 
a debacle at Bladensburg, Maryland� 
Neither author tells a new story, yet 
both Schroeder and Neimeyer provide 
a fresh look fortified with penetrating 
analysis� Their works are well-balanced, 
speaking perceptively to national policy, 
strategy, diplomacy, and joint operations 
from both sides� These are scholarly 
works written for a popular reader-
ship and are at the top of their genre�
RICHARD V� BARBUTO
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The Ashgate Research Companion to Military 
Ethics, ed� James Turner Johnson and Eric D� Pat-
terson� Farnham, Surrey, U�K�, and Burlington, 
Vt�: Ashgate, 2015� 464 pages� $149�95�
The editors and twenty-nine other con-
tributors have produced an impressive 
collection of essays on military ethics, 
not “ethics and the military�” Thus, one 
will find nothing about false report-
ing, fraternization, abusive command 
climates, limitations on gifts, gays in the 
military, women in combat, contrac-
tor oversight, civil-military relations, 
hazing, rape, drug or alcohol abuse, 
suicide by service members, marital 
violence, postretirement employment 
restrictions, interservice rivalries, or 
headquarters politics (careerism)� 
The first of four parts addresses why a 
nation morally may use force� Pacifism 
of any variety is not considered; the 
Christian-based ideas of just war serve 
as the fundamental approach� Chapter 
1 explains jus ad bellum (the state’s right 
to go to war) as seen by the approach’s 
classic founders from antiquity through 
Aquinas (Gregory M� Reichberg)� 
Chapter 2 looks at very recent bases for 
the use of force (jus ad vim), including 
the “responsibility to protect” weaken-
ing the Westphalian idea of sovereign 
inviolability (Daniel R� Brunstetter)� 
Chapters 3 and 4 examine current 
international law (Davis Brown) and the 
military’s role in decisions to use force 
(Martin L� Cook)� The part’s final four 
chapters focus on “special problems” in 
resorting to force: preemption (Mary 
Manjikian), asymmetric warfare and 
terrorism (Keith Pavlischek), interven-
tion in “failed states” and genocides 
(Luke Glanville), and weapons of 
mass destruction (Darrell Cole)� 
Half the book’s pages are devoted to part 
2’s “Right Conduct in the Use of Military 
Force” (jus in bello). Chapters 9–12 
discuss the ground of limitations on 
violence: from the just war tradition (J�  
Daryl Charles), from a Kantian per-
spective (Brian Orend), from several 
contemporary doctrines of human rights 
(Robert E� Williams, Jr�), and from 
international humanitarian law (How-
ard M� Hensel)� Chapters 13 (Amos N� 
Guiora) and 14 (Pauletta Otis) address 
terrorism; chapters 15–18 explore the 
problems arising from targeting dual-use 
facilities (Paul Robinson), employing 
autonomous unmanned aerial vehicles 
(UAVs) (James L� Cook), pursuing 
“targeted killing” of specific individuals 
(Laurie R� Blank), and conducting cyber 
warfare (George R� Lucas, Jr�)� Chapters 
19–21 explain recent academic debates 
about the moral equality of combatants 
(Henrik Syse), how to classify and treat 
prisoners and detainees (John Sawicki), 
and what—if anything—remains forbid-
den even to those with just cause whose 
enemies are fighting without restraint 
(David Whetham)� Chapter 22 studies 
military ethics in peacekeeping opera-
tions (Bard Maeland); chapter 23 re-
views the immense problems associated 
with justifying and enforcing noncomba-
tant immunity (James Turner Johnson); 
and chapter 24 discusses the enigmatic 
topic of “proportionality” in contem-
porary armed conflict (Paul Gilbert)� 
Part 3 offers reflections on the recently 
developed topic of postconflict justice, 
jus post bellum� Chapters 25–28 con-
sider who must take control at war’s 
end (Eric D� Patterson), how to fight 
with a future peace in mind (Timothy 
J� Demy), war crimes trials (Carla L� 
Reyes), and eventual reconciliation as 
an ethical military goal (Nigel Biggar)�
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Part 4 is a valuable addendum giving 
academic, primarily historical, reviews 
of military ethics in the Islamic (John 
Kelsay), Chinese (Ping-cheung Lo), 
and Indian (Torkel Brekke) traditions� 
The editors provide summary introduc-
tions to all four parts, and they asked 
the authors to begin each chapter with 
an abstract and to close with a conclu-
sion section preceding a list of refer-
ences� All three features are helpful� 
Aptly titled a “research companion,” this 
is a cutting-edge effort by many leading 
students of military ethics� I learned ma-
jor things from every author; and while I 
especially admire certain chapters, other 
experts are likely to applaud different 
contributions most, depending on their 
own backgrounds� However, all the 
chapters are aimed at advanced scholars 
or the highest level of decision makers� 
Finally, two critical remarks underscore 
scholarly responsibilities� The word 
guerrilla is spelled with a single r more 
than a score of times—even quoted 
materials repeatedly are mangled—in 
an otherwise laudable chapter by the 
volume’s expert on unconventional 
warfare� Second, an author asserts that 
the Gulf of Tonkin incident was merely a 
matter of erroneous U�S� Navy report-
ing� While the Navy now judges that the 
night “battle” of 4 August 1964 never 
took place, no one doubts that the 2 
August day engagement of USS Maddox 
(DD 731) and three North Vietnamese 
P-4 torpedo boats happened� (There 
were eyewitnesses and photographs; 
a Vietnamese 12�7 mm machine-gun 
round lodged in Maddox’s superstruc-
ture; and in 1984 General Vo Nguyen 
Giap told former Secretary of Defense 
Robert McNamara the attack was delib-
erate�) The lesson for all of us is that, in 
professional ethics, theories are interest-
ing but facts matter, usually decisively�
THOMAS GRASSEY
Waging War, Planning Peace: U.S. Noncombat 
Operations and Major Wars, by Aaron Rapport� 
Ithaca, N�Y�, and London: Cornell Univ� Press, 
2015� 266 pages� $79�95�
Innovative, provocative, and compelling, 
Aaron Rapport’s Waging War, Planning 
Peace offers a distinct perspective on 
U�S� failures in postwar stability and 
reconstruction operations since 1941� 
The disconnect between waging war 
and planning peace is the subject of this 
intriguing study that applies theories of 
national security policy to four his-
torical case studies� A lecturer at the 
Department of Politics and International 
Studies at the University of Cambridge, 
Rapport examines how the ambitious 
state-building aims of U�S� presidents 
and senior advisers were consistently 
undermined by meager planning� 
Rapport invokes “construal level theory” 
to explain postconflict reconstruction 
failures following World War II and 
Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, arguing that 
the Roosevelt and Bush administrations 
projected confidence and visionary ob-
jectives for peace after the war without 
providing the necessary organizational 
support� In turn, failures following the 
Korean and Vietnam Wars are attributed 
to administrations that did not articulate 
end-state agendas and instead concen-
trated on immediate operational and 
military gains� The flaw common to the 
actors in all four historical studies is that 
kinetic aspects of the war were priori-
tized at the expense of postwar planning� 
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The construal level theory consists of 
several key components� The more dis-
tant our goals, the greater we construe 
the long time horizon abstractly� The 
more immediate our goals, the greater 
we construe the short-term horizon in 
detail� Consequently, the desirability 
of distant goals can overshadow their 
feasibility� National leaders who for-
mulate lofty goals for the distant future 
support transformative objectives, while 
those who focus on the particulars of 
combat operations tend to be preoc-
cupied with a maintenance outlook 
that is far more cautious about future 
estimations� Proponents of desirability 
and transformative strategies for peace 
display deductive reasoning based on 
preexisting concepts, whereas advocates 
of feasibility and maintenance ap-
proaches demonstrate inductive thinking 
sensitive to context-specific informa-
tion� Undergirding these processes in 
strategic assessments, the construal 
level theory presupposes the dynamic 
of communication fluency� In other 
words, civilian and military leaders’ 
predispositions toward either desir-
ability or feasibility will determine the 
flow of information and whether the 
incoming data are accepted or rejected�
Rapport suggests that the semantics of 
“postwar” be reformulated� The seman-
tics of “post” makes reconstruction en-
deavors more of an afterthought, and the 
“post” verbiage buys into a sequential 
scheme of arranging operations instead 
of a fluid model of cooperative interac-
tion� From this descriptive analysis, he 
offers a prescriptive remedy to the prob-
lem: instead of sequencing or paralleling 
phases of the total operation, he suggests 
overlapping the coordination of waging 
war and planning peace so as to harmo-
nize stabilization considerations with 
kinetic aims� To that end, greater joint 
agency collaboration between military 
and civilian leaders—both desirability  
visionaries and feasibility organizers— 
must take place for abstract ends 
and concrete means to synergize in 
the range of military operations� By 
bringing the why of desirability and 
the how of feasibility together through 
interagency cooperation, U�S� presi-
dents and their senior advisers will be 
better equipped to win the peace, and 
not simply the war, through a con-
tinuum of joint operational planning�
Overall, Rapport’s use of construal 
level theory for understanding the gap 
between jus in bello and jus post bellum 
is persuasive� Readers must decide 
whether this particular theory assumes 
too great a role in explaining the lack 
of correlation between war fighting 
and state building and, in the process, 
minimizes the cultural, political, and 
economic factors that frame the context 
and motivate the power brokers of a 
given historical period� For scholars and 
students, policy makers, and warfight-
ers, Rapport’s interdisciplinary work 
in history, international policy, and 
psychology is a fascinating study worth 
the time and money to read and heed� 
EDWARD ERWIN
Outsourcing Security: Private Military Contrac-
tors and U.S. Foreign Policy, by Bruce E� Stanley� 
Lincoln, Neb�: Potomac Books, 2015� 238 pages� 
$25 (paperback)�
Bruce Stanley, a retired Army officer and 
professor at the United States Army’s 
School of Advanced Military Studies, has 
written a detailed and well-documented 
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volume on the recent use of private 
military contractors by the United States 
Department of Defense and their utility� 
He has done this by taking a scholarly, 
microeconomic approach to assessing 
how and under what conditions the 
military has most recently employed 
private military contractors within the 
context of overall U�S� foreign policy�
While Stanley begins with a clear, easily 
understandable introductory discus-
sion of what private military contractors 
are, how they differ from mercenaries, 
and why they are valuable to the U�S� 
military today, he later delves into the 
microeconomic model’s concept of sup-
ply and demand as it relates to private 
military contractors within theaters of 
operation� He provides all the economic, 
mathematical, and statistical modeling 
and analysis that a postgraduate student 
might desire� However, readers who 
have a “diminishing marginal utility” 
for the nuances of academic economics 
may safely bypass the in-depth math-
ematical discussions and proceed to his 
qualitative discussion of this subject�
Stanley’s book looks at four recent U�S� 
military engagements, each of which 
saw the use of private military con-
tractors: DESERT SHIELD and DESERT 
STORM (1990–91), Bosnia (1995), U�S� 
operations in Afghanistan (2001 to very 
nearly the present), and U�S� operations 
throughout the Iraq war (2003–12)� 
He examines the similarities between 
these engagements, the existing de-
mand for the contractors’ services, and 
how the various contracted provid-
ers were able to supply those services 
for the Department of Defense�
Stanley maintains a balance in his exam-
ination of the use of contractors in the 
performance of our military’s mission� 
He does not delve into the oft-heard 
complaints from many in uniform that 
contractors are solely in the business 
to make money� Frankly, all business 
entrepreneurs are in business to make 
a profit; it is a crucial part of the very 
fabric of America� Profit is the entrepre-
neur’s reward for assuming risk within 
the marketplace� Indeed, the protection 
of capitalism is among the fundamental 
reasons our armed forces exist� This sug-
gests a tolerant view of those engaged in 
business in general; and private military 
contractors in particular share substan-
tial risk to life and limb to support our 
armed forces� Since the end of the Cold 
War, the Department of Defense has 
successively and significantly reduced 
the numbers of active-duty personnel� 
While the numbers of soldiers, sailors, 
airmen, and Marines have fallen, the 
mission requirements of our armed 
services have not diminished� As a 
result, in an effort to use our uniformed 
service members in the business of 
actual combat tasks, the Department 
of Defense and its subordinate military 
departments and combatant commands 
have resorted to using contractors to 
provide the many logistical and other 
supporting service tasks necessary to 
support their combat operations�
Stanley’s study includes the sobering 
numbers of civilian military contractors 
wounded and killed in these various the-
aters� Over certain periods, the casualty 
numbers experienced by some private 
military contractors closely mirrored 
those experienced by soldiers� His book 
provides a deeper understanding of the 
very real risks these companies and their 
employees have faced in the support 
of our deployed service members�
The United States has successfully 
conducted recent and current military 
operations to support our foreign policy� 
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Readers should note that doing so 
requires us to maintain both a sufficient 
number of uniformed armed forces 
personnel and a treasury sufficient to 
fund both military operations involving 
soldiers conducting extended combat 
operations anywhere in the world and 
the significant expense of hiring private 
military contractors to perform the sup-
port services necessary to enable them� 
This economic model, while currently 
feasible and tenable for the United States 
as a wealthy nation, may not work for 
another nation with more-constrained 
resources� In the future, while the 
“demand” may be there and the “sup-
ply” of contractors may still exist, if 
a nation does not have the financial 
resources to pay for those contracted 
services, this model might not work�
Outsourcing Security is a valuable 
read for military and civilian de-
fense professionals� Stanley applies 
a thoughtful analysis to what many 
may have thought they understood, 
and his work brings both depth 
and academic merit to the topic�
NEAL H� BRALLEY
Success and Failure in Limited War: Information 
& Strategy in the Korean, Vietnam, Persian Gulf 
& Iraq Wars, by Spencer D� Bakich� Chicago: 
Univ� of Chicago Press, 2014� 344 pages� $35 
(paperback)�
This groundbreaking treatise by Dr� 
Spencer Bakich, visiting lecturer in 
political science at the University 
of Richmond, endeavors to explain 
America’s mixed success with limited 
war since 1950 by way of a new theo-
retical approach to analyzing policy-
strategy formulation and execution at 
the highest levels of government� For the 
purposes of his theory, Bakich char-
acterizes limited wars as those fought 
at a high level of intensity for limited 
aims but whose outcomes “are of a 
considerable consequence for the states 
involved and for the broader interna-
tional system�” Furthermore, restraint 
is necessary to avoid escalation—a 
tendency of limited wars� Not surpris-
ingly, Bakich focuses his analysis on 
four preeminent case studies from the 
“American century”: the Korean War; 
the Vietnam War; the Persian Gulf War 
(Operation DESERT STORM); and the 
Iraq war (Operation IRAQI FREEDOM)�
The book’s first two chapters are largely 
theoretical� Bakich points out how estab-
lished approaches such as “rationalistic 
strategic choice theory” and the “foreign 
policy decision making (FPDM) school” 
cannot fully explain how information 
influences strategy, or its outcome, 
in war� He argues that organizational 
theory does not capture the true nature 
of relationships between strategic 
leaders and national security organiza-
tions� As Bakich writes, “A gap remains 
in our understanding of the sources 
of strategic success in [limited] war�”
To bridge this gap, Bakich confidently 
posits his “information institutions” 
approach� Simply put, it is the pattern 
of information flow between those at 
the apex of power and their national 
security organizations that predisposes 
states to success or failure in limited war� 
The information institutions approach 
suggests that top decision makers served 
by an information-rich and densely 
networked national security appara-
tus should have a better grasp of the 
strategic environment and experience 
greater military-diplomatic coordination 
in planning and execution, significantly 
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enhancing the effectiveness of their 
limited-war strategies� Bakich carefully 
explains the methodology used to test 
his theory and introduces two direct 
competitors: organizational culture 
theory and democratic civil-military re-
lations theory� Key propositions on stra-
tegic performance are also tabulated to 
test each of the three theories against the 
empirical data (the four case studies)�
In the next four chapters, Bakich 
convincingly demonstrates how only 
the information institutions approach 
correctly predicts (or explains) both 
the military and diplomatic strategic 
outcomes in all four limited-war cases, 
with the competing theories falling short 
in one way or another� For example, 
in the Persian Gulf War, defeating 
the Iraqi army without fracturing the 
international coalition defined strate-
gic success for the United States� The 
information institutions approach alone 
correctly anticipates military and diplo-
matic success in the Persian Gulf War� 
Organizational culture theory expects 
both military and diplomatic failure 
(given the extant organizational culture 
characterized by a military-dominant 
conception of war and a Jominian norm 
of civil-military relations), whereas 
democratic civil-military relations 
theory forecasts military success but 
diplomatic failure (given divergent 
military and diplomatic strategic prefer-
ences)� The book’s final chapter nicely 
encapsulates the results of the aforemen-
tioned analyses and their significance 
for theory and policy� One finishes the 
book persuaded that the information 
institutions approach offers a more 
satisfactory explanation for America’s 
mixed military and diplomatic results 
in limited war than do the alternatives�
Interestingly, Bakich’s emphasis on insti-
tutional as opposed to organizational re-
lationships in ascertaining the pertinent 
information flows reveals the often- 
disproportionate influence of key 
individuals in the decision-making 
process� In the Korean War, MacArthur’s 
near stranglehold on strategic intel-
ligence available to top policy makers 
was abetted by John Allison (in charge 
of the Department of State’s Office 
of Northeast Asian Affairs) arguing 
for American intervention north of 
the thirty-eighth parallel, against the 
advice of State’s own Policy Planning 
Staff—with disastrous results� In the 
Persian Gulf War, President George H� 
W� Bush’s personal, “hands-on” ap-
proach to information gathering, down 
to the analyst and desk-officer level, 
was tempered by National Security 
Adviser Brent Scowcroft’s and his deputy 
Robert Gates’s deft management of the 
interagency process� These and other 
anecdotes will keep the reader engaged 
and enthusiastic about the book�
With over eight hundred endnotes 
gleaned from more than four hundred 
authoritative sources, this is first and 
foremost a scholarly work� Those in 
the international relations community 
seeking to understand the puzzle of 
America’s recent strategic performance 
in limited wars will find this information 
institutions approach a worthy adjunct 
to the more established theories� Those 
who read purely for pleasure will enjoy 
the four case studies, each offering a 
unique take on the various policies and 
strategies crafted and the decisions made 
at the highest levels of government� In 
short, the book has much to offer, to 
the serious reader and dilettante alike�
DERRILL T� GOLDIZEN
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Fu-go: The Curious History of Japan’s Balloon 
Bomb Attack on America, by Ross Coen� Lincoln: 
Univ� of Nebraska Press, 2014� 296 pages� $28�95�
The world recently commemorated the 
seventieth anniversary of the surren-
der of Japanese forces at the end of the 
Second World War� Even seven decades 
later, however, little-known stories of 
various military operations are being 
published that provide insight into ways 
the Pacific War was fought using re-
markable technology and ingenuity� This 
is very much the case with Ross Coen’s 
fascinating book, which provides a 
detailed discussion of the use of the first 
unmanned intercontinental weapon: 
the fu-go balloon� These attacks were, at 
the time, the longest-range attacks ever 
conducted in the history of warfare�
In his carefully researched and richly 
documented book, Coen weaves the 
story of an improbable project that 
succeeded in launching upward of nine 
thousand gas-filled balloons from the 
Japanese home island of Honshu to 
attack the North American coast in 
late 1944 and early 1945� At least six 
hundred of these balloons are known 
to have actually made it to the United 
States and Canada, carrying antiperson-
nel and incendiary bombs� The inten-
tions were to kill individuals; set forest 
fires in the heavily timbered Pacific 
Northwest; and demonstrate that Japan 
could attack the American mainland, 
thus creating panic and anxiety�
Once this bizarre form of attack was 
recognized by U�S� military forces, 
strict censorship was exercised on press 
and other media outlets, which were 
forbidden to publish any information 
about the silent attacks against which 
there was little defense� This lack of 
public awareness led directly to the only 
combat deaths to occur in the continen-
tal United States during the entire war� 
On 5 May 1945, a group of hikers came 
across a crashed fu-go balloon near Bly, 
Oregon, and in the process of trying 
to determine what the device was they 
caused it to explode, killing twenty-six-
year-old Elsie Mitchell and five children�
The fu-go balloons were cleverly de-
signed to make the transpacific crossing 
by using an automatic altitude-control 
device to drop sandbag ballast at inter-
vals as the hydrogen-filled balloons rose 
and settled owing to the solar heating of 
the gas envelope� The balloons flew as 
high as thirty thousand feet to capture 
the prevailing easterly jet stream, carry-
ing them across the Pacific in as little as 
three days� A fu-go measured approxi-
mately thirty-three feet in diameter, was 
constructed from laminated washi 
paper, and was supported by nineteen 
thousand cubic feet of hydrogen�
The censorship that resulted in the 
Oregon deaths also had a more posi-
tive effect by denying the Japanese any 
knowledge about whether the balloons 
were successfully crossing the ocean� 
Facing increasingly destructive raids on 
the home islands that made the manu-
facturing and launching of the balloons 
more difficult, and with no indication 
that the attacks were succeeding, the 
program was abandoned in April 1945� 
(The last balloon recovered in North 
America during the war was found near 
Indian Springs, Nevada, which is near 
current-day Creech Air Force Base, the 
home of the Predator/Reaper drone 
program�) Balloon remnants have been 
found as far east as Michigan, and as 
recently as October 2014, when a bal-
loon was detonated by Canadian bomb-
disposal personnel in British Columbia�
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Today’s headlines are filled with discus-
sions questioning the ethics of launching 
unmanned weapons (drones) against 
targets when nearby innocent civilians 
might be killed or injured by an attack. 
It is interesting to reflect on the ethical 
ramifications of launching thousands 
of unmanned weapons (the fu-go bal-
loons) against an entire continent, with 
no ability to predict within thousands 
of miles where the weapons would 
strike or who would be injured or killed. 
Such attacks today would certainly 
violate the law of armed conflict, but 
they must be judged within the con-
text of warfare in the last century.
I strongly recommend this book to 
those with an interest in the tech-
nology of warfare, and to those 
who may have heard of the balloon 
bomb attacks and thought them 
to be almost-mythical events.
JOHN E. JACKSON
Reconstructing a Shattered Egyptian Army: War 
Minister Gen. Mohamed Fawzi’s Memoirs, 1967–
1971, ed. Youssef H. Aboul-Enein. Annapolis, 
Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2014. 320 pages. 
$10.94.
Few states in modern times have seen 
their military beaten as badly as Egypt 
did in 1967—and have that military 
survive. Even fewer, perhaps no oth-
ers, have then deliberately rebuilt that 
defeated force to a point at which a 
mere five years later it could again offer 
battle and, arguably, produce victory. 
How the Egyptians accomplished this 
has been something of an incomplete 
and little-known story up to now. This is 
mainly due to a lack of translated articles 
and writings penned by senior Egyptian 
leaders. Youssef H. Aboul-Enein has, 
with this volume, begun to fill in some 
of the major gaps in the account.
Aboul-Enein’s book is actually a col-
lection of articles initially published 
in Infantry magazine. Each of the 
original accounts was written by General 
Mohamed Fawzi, the man handpicked 
by Nasser to build the defeated and 
demoralized Egyptian forces into a 
professional, combined-arms military 
that could retake and hold occupied 
Egyptian territory. Fawzi served as war 
minister for both Nasser and Sadat and 
was the master architect of the stunning-
ly successful creation of professionalism 
in the Egyptian armed forces. His voice, 
despite whatever biases and personal 
axes to grind he may bring to the table, 
deserves to be heard, and Aboul-Enein’s 
translation gives Fawzi that opportunity.
Fawzi’s challenge was massive. The pre-
Fawzi army was much more involved 
with state security than with power 
projection or war fighting. As the 1967 
war had revealed, the Egyptian armed 
forces, even with Soviet equipment, 
were woefully inferior technologically 
to Israeli forces. The Egyptian army was 
riddled with low morale and displayed 
an apparently well-deserved inferior-
ity complex. Its soldiery was, for the 
most part, uneducated and poorly 
trained. The Egyptian high command 
was overcentralized, overpoliticized, 
and, as events had proved, unable to 
exercise anything like the command and 
control required in modern combat. 
The end of the war both left Israel with 
strategic depth and turned the Suez 
Canal into a natural defensive barrier 
that was further fortified with a series 
of formidable defensive positions.
Fawzi admits to having certain un-
usual advantages in accomplishing his 
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mission� Nasser was willing to give his 
new war minister as close to a blank 
check as could be imagined� Nothing 
was more important than securing a 
victory and expunging the shame of 
1967� Furthermore, the Soviet Union 
became a guaranteed supplier of 
military hardware, not only making 
up the quantitative Egyptian losses but 
substantially improving equipment 
quality as well� Fawzi makes the point 
that the Soviets were less motivated by 
a common ideology in this effort than 
by the need to prove that their equip-
ment was at least on a par with that of 
the United States, and to maintain their 
geopolitical position in the region� Fawzi 
also confirms that the Soviet presence 
on the ground was extensive, that Soviet 
forces not only advised but performed 
certain military duties as well�
Fawzi brought new capabilities to Egypt 
and improved others� Surface-launched 
ship-to-ship missiles, modern surface-
to-air missile batteries, new armor 
and aircraft all entered the Egyptian 
inventory� Fawzi understood, how-
ever, that new hardware would not be 
enough� Military-school attendance was 
increased, and the military’s intellec-
tual capabilities expanded� But beyond 
that, he explains, the three-year “war 
of attrition” that Egypt waged against 
Israel (1967–70) was a deliberate effort 
to blood the Egyptian army, test new 
tactics, and deploy new forces� Over this 
period, Fawzi argues, the Israeli forces 
came to embrace a defensive mind-set, 
while the Egyptian army became 
imbued with the spirit of the offensive� 
Although most books claim Israel won 
the war of attrition, Fawzi claims this 
was not the case� According to Fawzi, 
not only did Israeli jets increasingly 
avoid Egyptian airspace, but Egyptian 
soldiers underwent quantum improve-
ments as well—and these improvements 
were the real war aims of this period� 
It is also clear that whatever strategic 
deterrent the Israeli leaders thought they 
might have against the Egyptians did 
not work when it came to preventing at 
least a limited war� As the Egyptian army 
began to believe in itself, Fawzi and his 
officers crafted plans for what would 
become one of the most successful set-
piece battles of the twentieth century: 
the 1973 crossing of the Suez Canal 
and the breaching of the Bar-Lev line�
Reproducing the Infantry articles, com-
plete with their original and somewhat 
repetitive forewords, gives the book 
something of a choppy feel� It is also 
clear that this work is a synopsis of 
Fawzi’s memoirs, not a complete transla-
tion� Some readers will be left with a 
desire to know more� Not surprisingly, 
the focus of the book tends to be at 
the strategic level� Readers who want 
more tactical details will have to find 
them elsewhere� Unfortunately for our 
understanding of Egyptian perspectives 
of how the war was waged, Fawzi was re-
lieved of his duties two years before the 
war began and was arrested for conspir-
ing to overthrow Sadat, so this critical 
element is sadly lacking� However, these 
shortcomings pale when compared 
with the value inherent in this work�
RICHARD J� NORTON
Tarnished: Toxic Leadership in the U.S. Military, 
by George E� Reed� Lincoln, Neb�: Potomac 
Books, 2015� 216 pages� $26�50�
Although the term “toxic leadership” has 
recently come into vogue, the U�S� mili-
tary is no stranger to the phenomenon� 
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Any current or former member of 
the armed forces can usually provide 
a firsthand account of a leader he or 
she believes was toxic� So even when a 
very healthy dose of skepticism regard-
ing anecdotal reporting is applied, it is 
surprising that senior military leaders 
have not paid more specific atten-
tion to evaluating to what degree toxic 
leadership has affected their services’ 
personnel and their performance, and 
to determining what to do about it�
George Reed, who carries very respect-
able credentials as both a former Army 
officer with twenty-seven years of 
experience and a civilian scholar, has at 
least begun to examine toxic leadership 
in the U�S� military seriously� For those 
interested in understanding this type 
of leadership, Tarnished is an excel-
lent starting point� However, as Reed 
is laudably quick to point out, more 
work—much more work—is required�
The study of leadership is as fraught as 
it is vital� There is not even a univer-
sally accepted definition of the term� 
The field abounds with conflicting 
theories, mountains of individual case 
studies, and an ever-increasing num-
ber of blandly self-assured “how-to” 
books of questionable utility� Tar-
nished is a welcome change of pace�
Reed begins by defining toxic leader-
ship as “demotivational behavior that 
negatively impacts unit morale and 
climate�” Reed then explores how toxic 
leaders behave and why; in many cases, 
their seniors in the chain of command 
may fail to recognize these behaviors 
and even reward these leaders� This, not 
surprisingly, is in marked contrast to the 
perspectives of toxic leaders’ subordi-
nates and the deep and lasting nega-
tive impact that results from working 
for such a leader� Loss of productivity, 
decreased communication of neces-
sary information to senior leaders, and 
rampant dissatisfaction with not only 
the leader but the service are just some 
of the consequences Reed documents� 
But as serious and at times tragic as 
these results can be, they pale in com-
parison to the loss of combat effective-
ness such units could experience and 
the potential cumulative impact of toxic 
leadership on the profession of arms�
Reed makes a convincing case that a 
toxic leader’s behavior likely stems from 
feelings of inferiority, which, when 
combined with narcissism, creates a 
potentially disastrous mix� The manner 
in which toxic leadership often involves 
ethical breaches is also examined� 
Among the useful ideas presented in 
Tarnished is that toxic leadership is best 
viewed along a spectrum� At one end are 
found true psychopaths, whose numbers 
in the military are likely to be few� At 
the other end of the scale are individu-
als with behaviors that may actually 
be correctable, or at least mitigated�
Part of this book’s allure is Reed’s 
healthy understanding of reality� He 
notes that losing control in the mo-
ment or having a bad day does not 
make a leader toxic� Tarnished does 
offer suggestions for those sentenced to 
work with toxic leaders, but Reed has 
the candor to admit that these sugges-
tions may not work� This is a refreshing 
change from books that suggest that 
“speaking truth to power” will result in 
a happy ending, or those that, having 
identified a problem, offer no solution�
This is not to suggest that Tarnished is 
without flaws� In discussing specific 
cases, there is a tendency to identify 
toxic leaders as “a Navy captain,” or “a 
visiting field officer�” If these cases are 
in the public domain, then providing 
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actual identities would be better� 
Although it is ostensibly devoted to 
military leadership, civilian cases do at 
times move into the narrative� There is 
also a surprising lack of historical cases� 
Were Admiral King, General Patton, 
and General LeMay toxic leaders?
Does the answer matter? One of the 
more difficult questions involving 
toxic leaders is, Do results ever trump 
their behavior? Tarnished claims, quite 
reasonably, that how leadership is 
delivered can be as important as what 
it delivers, or even more important� But 
is that always true? Another question 
that will leave most readers wanting 
more is whether, and to what degree, 
the culture of the U�S� military and the 
nature of the profession of arms rewards 
(some would say demands) attributes 
from leaders that, if not toxic, may seem 
very similar� However, when all is said 
and done, Tarnished is a most welcome 
addition to the discipline of leader-
ship� It belongs in the handful of books 
that should be on the shelves of both 
scholars and practitioners of leadership�
RICHARD J� NORTON
The China Dream: Great Power Thinking & Stra-
tegic Posture in the Post-American Era, by Liu 
Mingfu� New York: CN Times, 2015� 288 pages� 
$24�99�
This 2015 publication of the Eng-
lish translation of The China Dream, 
originally published in Chinese in 2010, 
merits reading by a wider Western 
audience wishing to understand a clear 
exposition of a conservative, hawkish 
view of China’s approach to international 
relations� The author, Liu Mingfu, is a 
retired People’s Liberation Army colonel� 
The book does not necessarily represent 
the mainstream view of the Chinese 
general public or the official Chinese 
government position, but it does ring 
more true to the spirit of Chinese 
president Xi Jinping’s current thinking 
than it did to former Chinese president 
Hu Jintao’s approach when the book was 
released in Chinese over five years ago� 
The fact that the foreword for the book 
was written by Liu Yazhou, a princeling 
political commissar of the National De-
fense University, gives the work gravity 
within the Chinese defense community�
Henry Kissinger spent four paragraphs 
in On China (2011) summarizing Liu’s 
views regarding China’s grand goal 
to become number one in the world, 
thereby restoring its historic glory� 
According to Liu, this is to be done 
through cultivating “martial spirit,” not 
through “peaceful rise�” The inherent 
conflict in U�S�-Chinese relations is 
portrayed as a “marathon contest” or 
“duel of the century,” as if world politics 
is a sporting event between a champion 
and a major contender for the global 
championship� Kissinger follows his 
discussion of the Liu triumphalist view 
of the national destiny debate with a 
much longer analysis of State Councilor 
Dai Bingguo’s more moderate reaffir-
mation of the peaceful rise strategy�
Liu begins the first chapter by paying 
homage, Chinese fashion, to his ances-
tors, laying out his interpretation of the 
visions of Sun Yat-sen, Mao Zedong, and 
Deng Xiaoping for turning China into 
the world’s leading nation� Getting to 
the crux of his argument in the second 
chapter, “The Fight for the Century,” 
Liu clearly blocks out the results of five 
centuries of global political competition� 
Citing George Modelski’s hegemonic sta-
bility theory that there is an approximate 
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one-hundred-year life cycle for global 
hegemons, Liu names the champi-
ons: Portugal in the sixteenth century, 
Holland in the seventeenth century, 
Britain in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, and America in the twentieth 
century� Maybe China had a fleeting 
world championship title in the fifteenth 
century—not through colonial conquest, 
but through tributary recognition of the 
center of world power� Liu’s argument is 
that China is back—to claim the cham-
pion’s title in the twenty-first century�
The rest of the book elaborates how 
China can become the world champion 
by drawing on lessons from former 
and current champions, especially the 
United States� For instance, Liu notes 
that American strategy included an 
internal strengthening phase of isola-
tionism under President Washington, a 
century of regional consolidation under 
the Monroe Doctrine, and world power 
generation under FDR’s globalism� He 
also likes America’s “cheap rise”: in 
other words, coming late to both world 
wars, but concluding those wars with 
the victor’s share of the spoils� Compar-
ing China to America, Liu notes that 
China underwent domestic consolida-
tion under Mao and Deng, and has 
its eye on being king of Asia, with the 
ultimate goal of being king of the world�
The first champion’s goal, toward 
achievement of which China is well on 
the way, is to become the wealthiest  
nation—because all world champions 
have been the wealthiest nation� All 
world champions have also been the 
strongest military power—hence the 
focus on martial spirit� In terms of strat-
egy, Liu prefers Sun Tzu to Clausewitz, 
pointing out that China will seek to win 
without fighting� In what may seem like 
a non sequitur to Americans and many 
others, Liu continually repeats the theme 
that “the first nonhegemonic champion 
nation in history will appear, and that 
nation is China�” However, he also refers 
on multiple occasions to China as king, 
and the difference between kingly think-
ing and hegemonic thinking is ironically 
opaque� Liu refers to the United States 
as “one country, two systems,” mean-
ing democracy at home and hegemony 
abroad� Since Liu prefers to see China 
exercise democracy abroad and hege-
mony at home, we could also refer to 
China as “one country, two systems,” but 
with practices inverted from those of the 
United States of his characterization�
For those who like the sporting anal-
ogy, the book is an entertaining read 
and an enticement to place one’s bets 
on the grand sporting event of world 
politics� On a more sober note, Liu’s 
world view rings more true to current 
Chinese policies than to those of five 
years ago� President Xi Jinping gave his 
“China Dream” speech in November 
2012, apparently somewhat influenced 
by Liu Mingfu’s book of the same title 
published two years earlier� Thus, the re-
cent translation is food for thought that 
should be chewed on by a wider Western 
audience now that it is available�
GRANT RHODE
Logistics in the Falklands War, by Kenneth L� 
Privratsky� Barnsley, U�K�: Pen & Sword, 2015� 
248 pages� $34�95�
Major General Kenneth Privratsky, 
USA (Ret�), highlights the importance 
of the integration of combat operations 
and logistics in this book about the 
Falklands War of 1982� Logistics in the 
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Falklands War is the result of years of 
research, begun when Privratsky was 
at the Army’s Command and General 
Staff College in the mid-1980s and 
continued while a fellow at Stanford’s 
Hoover Institution� Most of all, the 
author wants the reader to “appreci-
ate the extent of the efforts behind the 
victory” rather than simply present 
a logistical view of lessons learned�
The book begins by examining British 
and Argentine claims on the Falkland 
Islands before walking through the 
sequence of Argentina’s invasion threat 
and subsequent invasion; Britain’s mobi-
lization and deployment; combat opera-
tions; and the aftermath of the conflict� 
He highlights the key role of industry 
during the rapid mobilization� Com-
mercial ships were quickly modified for 
the war� For example, the cruise ship 
Uganda was converted to a hospital ship 
in only sixty-five hours once it reached 
the shipyard� This included modifying 
its interior spaces for a clinic, surgical 
facilities, and labs; installing a helicop-
ter deck; adding equipment to produce 
fresh water; and applying Red Cross 
markings� In total, fifty-four ships were 
taken up from trade, outnumbering the 
number of warships involved� Privratsky 
aptly describes the outload as rushed 
and gives readers a sense of being on 
the docks during the unchoreographed 
flurry of activity� Many converted com-
mercial ships were designed only for 
pier-side off-loading; however, once in 
theater, supplies and equipment had 
to be transferred to vessels capable of 
shallow-water operations� Off-loading 
difficulties and concerns over Argentine 
air strikes sent Queen Elizabeth 2 home 
with “seventy percent of 5 Brigade’s 81 
mm mortar and 105 mm gun am-
munition � � � buried in lower decks�”
Privratsky argues convincingly that 
logistics was the center of gravity of the 
campaign� The movement of ammuni-
tion, supplies, and equipment—whether 
by shallow water–capable ships, helicop-
ters, or backpacks—dictated the pace of 
the ground war� The author’s thorough 
research, including interviews, leads 
to a comprehensive description of the 
combat operations and movement of 
supplies and equipment from the am-
phibious landing zone on the west shore 
of East Falkland on D-Day, 21 May 1982, 
to the surrender on 14 June 1982, at Port 
Stanley, the capital on the east shore of 
East Falkland� The British, with their 
firm resolve and their jointly trained and 
professional military forces, tirelessly got 
the right supplies to the right place� His 
vivid description of the harsh conditions 
on the Falkland Islands reinforces the 
importance of the integration of combat 
operations and logistics� Nevertheless, 
although that integration was successful, 
“[b]y the time the Argentines surren-
dered in Stanley, some [British] artillery 
batteries were on their last rounds�”
In many ways, Britain embarked on a 
“come as you are, bring what you can” 
affair to reclaim the Falkland Islands 
from Argentina� The remote islands’ 
formidable terrain and inhospitable 
climate—along with the hostile Argen-
tine military forces—exacerbated the 
difficulty of moving supplies and equip-
ment, which directly impeded combat 
operations� As Privratsky writes, “Wars 
sometimes occur at times and in places 
least expected�” And a lack of bullets, 
beans, and fuel can cause unplanned 
pauses to a campaign plan or, worse 
yet, leave troops alone and exposed�
Privratsky firmly believes that effective 
combat operations are enabled by inte-
grating combat and logistics units and 
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conducting realistic training� Privratsky’s 
insights could also apply to humanitar-
ian affairs operations, especially if a 
natural disaster has destroyed piers or 
off-loading equipment, or occurred in a 
remote location without prepositioned 
stores� Military operational planners and 
military history enthusiasts should add 
this book to their professional library�
CYNTHIA K� SEXTON
The East Asian War, 1592–1598: International Re-
lations, Violence, and Memory, ed� James B� Lewis� 
London: Routledge, 2015� 418 pages� $178�
The Japanese invasion of Korea, known 
in the West as the Imjin War, has been 
largely overlooked by Western schol-
ars� While Stephen Hawley’s The Imjin 
War and Kenneth Swopes’s A Dragon’s 
Head and a Serpent’s Tail are excel-
lent works, those wishing for a more 
thorough treatment of some of the 
issues leading to the war and a more 
succinct history of the war itself have 
had to rely on Korean- or Japanese-
language sources� However, James B� 
Lewis’s The East Asian War, 1592–1598: 
International Relations, Violence, and 
Memory now fills the void, offering a 
variety of perspectives on this seminal 
conflict among Korea, China, and Japan�
Lewis has assembled an impressive list 
of international scholars representing 
a variety of academic specialties� This 
book is far more than a simple military 
or political history of one of Asia’s largest 
conflicts prior to the twentieth century� 
It is divided into three parts, the first an 
examination of the international and 
domestic background to the conflict� 
Japanese and Korean scholars assess 
the issues that led to a deterioration 
of relations between Korea and Ja-
pan� Economic issues, including trade 
disputes, predominate in this section, 
and set the stage for a review of the war 
itself, which is the subject of the next 
part of the book, simply entitled “War�”
The nine chapters that compose the sec-
tion on the Imjin War present the reader 
with a wealth of information previously 
unavailable to an English-language 
audience� These chapters rely almost 
exclusively on either primary-source 
material in Japanese and Korean or sec-
ondary sources from scholars in Korea, 
Japan, and China who have provided 
their own accounts and interpretations 
of this conflict� Each of the belligerents 
gets a thorough review, covering politi-
cal, military, cultural, and social forces 
that shaped the six-year-long tragedy 
that has come to be known as the Imjin 
War� From a military perspective, read-
ers will find plenty of groundbreaking 
information on the naval aspects of this 
war, which featured the largest maritime 
expedition in history up to that time� 
The valiant resistance put up by the 
Korean navy against the invading Japa-
nese is worth a separate book in itself�
The third and final part of this book 
should not be overlooked� Examin-
ing the “impact and memory” of the 
Imjin War, these five final chapters 
provide the reader with a review of 
the ways in which this conflict helped 
shape attitudes among China, Korea, 
and Japan over the ensuing centu-
ries� Whether through literature, art, 
or fashion, this conflict left a lasting 
impact that Western audiences would 
have had a difficult time discerning 
prior to the publication of this book�
There is a comprehensive glossary and 
index at the end of the book; however, 
the term “glossary” is a bit misleading, 
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as this section is a traditional index, 
albeit an inclusive and very useful one� 
The references are all listed at the end 
of each chapter, and readers will be 
impressed with the breadth of sources 
used to put this book together� In light 
of the many challenges facing East Asia 
in the twenty-first century, Lewis’s book 
should be read by anyone interested in 
some of the antecedents to the political 
and cultural tensions that exist in that 
volatile part of the world� Both general 
readers and scholars alike will find 
something of interest in this impres-
sive work� It is highly recommended�
JEFFREY SHAW
The U.S. Naval Institute on Naval Cooperation, ed� 
Sam J� Tangredi� Annapolis, Md�: Naval Institute 
Press, 2015� 224 pages� $21�95 (paperback)�
Naval Cooperation is an anthology of 
essays on the employment of maritime 
forces in security cooperation and part-
nership missions, taken from the U�S� 
Naval Institute’s periodical Proceedings� 
The Naval Institute Wheel Book series 
represents an analogy to the practice of a 
naval officer keeping a pocket-size note-
book, or “wheel book,” that served as a 
ready reference of accrued and evolv-
ing knowledge and experience� This 
book places maritime force partnership 
and cooperation in a strategic context 
by evaluating the relationships among 
maritime partnership, operations, 
and strategy� This approach facilitates 
examination of the relationships among 
strategy, strategic objectives, and global 
maritime partnership, moving the reader 
to consider not only the relationship of 
partnership to strategy but the intended 
outcome of partnership activities�
One of the interesting elements of this 
collection is the variety of experiences 
and perspectives its authors represent: 
U�S� and international chiefs of ser-
vice; flag officers who commanded 
fleets; maritime theorists; and senior 
and junior naval officers from U�S� 
and international navies� The articles 
reflect these contributors’ personal 
experiences in cooperation operations 
ranging from counter-piracy patrols 
off the coast of Africa to disaster-relief 
missions in Asia, multilateral exercises 
such as Rim of the Pacific exercises (i�e�, 
RIMPAC), and military-to-military 
maritime training events� Each article 
receives an editor’s introduction to both 
its topic and author� These introductions 
are especially helpful in contextual-
izing the different periods in which the 
articles were written and the relevant 
cooperation and participation issues�
Geoffrey Till’s 2005 piece “Navies and 
the New World Order” is notable for its 
assessment of trends within the contem-
porary security environment affecting 
the international maritime system� Till 
argues that the sea is transforming from 
a domain of peer-to-peer naval competi-
tion to one that requires collective action 
in defense of the established norms 
and rules of the international maritime 
system� This will require partnership 
and cooperation among navies to guar-
antee maritime security in support of 
the global economy, while protecting an 
international system of transportation at 
sea from the constant threat of crimi-
nals, terrorists, and pirates, and to pro-
ject power ashore in support of stability�
Admiral Michael Mullen’s “1,000-ship 
navy” concept, the Global Maritime 
Partnership (GMP), and the 2007 mari-
time strategy “A Cooperative Strategy 
for 21st Century Seapower” (as well 
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as Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus’s 
2015 revision of the same) then provide 
the thematic foundation for the book’s 
articles on cooperation and partnership�
This anthology initiates a discussion of 
which types of missions and tasks are 
included in GMP� Collectively, they can 
be developed into a naval cooperation 
operations framework or operating con-
cept, as described in the U�S� maritime 
strategy� GMP missions can be concep-
tualized across a scale of complexity 
from combat operations at sea, through 
maritime operations in support of 
combat operations ashore and freedom-
of-the-seas operations that include naval 
operations to secure seaborne commerce 
and trade, to training activities such 
as multinational or bilateral exercises 
and military-to-military engagement�
In a 2014 article, Admiral Jonathan 
Greenert and Rear Admiral James 
Foggo consider the employment of 
a “Global Network of Navies” in the 
execution of GMP� Their concept does 
not focus on the specific number of 
ships engaged in maritime partnership 
activities during a specific period, but 
rather concentrates on the collective 
effect of a flexible network of partners 
engaged in cooperative operations 
and independent national and naval 
tasking in the maritime environment�
Other contributors argue that GMP can 
be used to accomplish common naval 
tasks among navies, thereby conserving 
resources by replacing one state’s maritime 
forces with international naval forces�  
For example, in an article originally pub-
lished in 2013, Rear Admiral Michael 
Smith, USN, argues that U�S� naval plan-
ners should include allied and partner 
navy contributions in operational plans� 
The opposing view envisions GMP 
as an employment that diverts forces 
and resources from national military 
commitments and operations into mis-
sions that build partnership capacity�
Naval Cooperation brings the “wheel 
book” analogy to life� It inspires reflec-
tion on previous arguments and obser-
vations regarding maritime partnership 
and cooperation by providing a collec-
tion of ideas from the past� This col-
lection enables a comparative or trend 
analysis of the objectives and impact of 
U�S� maritime strategy over time� This 
edition stimulates further evaluation 
of the effectiveness of partnership and 
cooperation activities and their progress 
toward those objectives� This book will 
stimulate a reader’s thoughts on the 
opportunities and challenges of global 
maritime partnership and coopera-
tion among international navies�
SEAN SULLIVAN
Fields of Blood: Religion and the History of Vio-
lence, by Karen Armstrong� New York: Knopf, 
2014� 512 pages� $30�
Karen Armstrong’s Fields of Blood 
may be an unconventional choice for 
traditional military historians; it is more 
a work of comparative religion than a 
work of military history, and attention 
to military matters of strategy, opera-
tions, or tactics is thin� Nevertheless, 
for historians interested in the causes of 
wars, the social and cultural history of 
war, or the relationship between religion 
and violence more broadly, Armstrong 
delivers an important addition to a 
growing interdisciplinary literature�
Armstrong, though not an academic, is 
well known for her sweeping, expansive 
works on comparative religion, with a 
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particular emphasis on the Abrahamic 
traditions� Known for books such as A 
History of God (1993) and A Case for 
God (2009) as well as Islam: A Short His-
tory (2000) and Muhammad: A Prophet 
for Our Time (2006), Armstrong has 
staked her claim with religious apolo-
gists� In Fields of Blood, Armstrong takes 
on Western secularist critics who argue 
that religion is a fundamental source 
of violence in the modern world (and 
was in the premodern world as well)�
Instead, Armstrong argues, our modern 
conception of “religion” is inadequate for 
understanding the intimate relationship 
between the sacred and the secular that 
existed before the early modern period 
and the development of the secular state� 
Armstrong instead sees the origins of 
systemic, structural violence as inherent 
in the development of agrarian civiliza-
tions, which she explores in chapters 
on Eurasia, the Indus valley, China, and 
Mesopotamia� Armstrong contends 
that emerging religious systems served 
both to explain and to rationalize, and 
in some cases to reject, the violence 
endemic to the maintenance of empire�
In the second part of the book, Arm-
strong explores the development of 
Christianity and Islam and concludes 
with a long chapter on the traditions of 
crusade and jihad� Armstrong rejects 
an essentialist version of either Chris-
tianity or Islam that would mandate 
violence, and instead places both into 
a more nuanced political context�
In the final part of the book, which 
covers the ground most familiar to the 
average reader, Armstrong details the 
development of the modern Western 
idea of “religion” as being personal and 
private; the advent of Lockean political 
philosophy that advocated the separa-
tion of church and state; and the rise of 
the liberal, secular nation-state� The last 
several chapters are devoted to under-
standing religious backlash against this 
trend of secularization� Even here, Arm-
strong rejects the premise that “funda-
mentalism” is inherently violent, writing, 
“Only a tiny proportion of fundamental-
ists commit acts of terror; most are sim-
ply trying to live a devout life in a world 
that seems increasingly hostile to faith” 
(p� 303)� In this last part of the book, 
Armstrong also seeks to make sense of 
terrorism and “global jihad�” Unsurpris-
ingly, Armstrong places culpability for 
both at the feet of colonialism, moder-
nity, and political struggle, and suggests 
that “religion” may motivate actors on 
nearly any side of a given conflict� She 
writes, “Identical religious beliefs and 
practices have inspired diametrically 
opposed courses of action” (p� 393)�
Fields of Blood is a survey; certainly 
scholars of any region and era will find 
details with which to quibble, and they 
may believe that one important event 
or another is treated too cursorily� 
Yet as an introduction to the complex 
historical relationships between the 
world’s major religious traditions and 
violence, it serves its purpose quite 
well� And given the recent attention 
to religious extremism and the rise of 
Daesh (also known as ISIS, ISIL, or the 
Islamic State), Armstrong’s work should 
be taken seriously by any who wish 
to understand the complex interplay 
among religion, politics, economics, and 
violence� Although Armstrong rejects 
the view that religion is inherently vio-
lent, this work takes an important step 
toward understanding religion as simply 
epiphenomenal to political violence�
JACQUELINE E� WHITT
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Rich Barbuto is professor of history and has served as the deputy director of the Department of 
Military History at the U�S� Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kan-
sas, since 2004� A 1971 graduate of the U�S� Military Academy at West Point, he served for twenty-
three years as an armor officer, with tours of duty in Germany, Korea, and Canada� He authored 
Niagara 1814: America Invades Canada, and Long Range Guns, Close Quarter Combat, as well as a 
chapter in Daily Lives of Civilians in Wartime Early America� 
Neal H. Bralley, Colonel, USA (Ret�), is the Supervisory Assistant Professor, Department of Lo-
gistics and Resource Operations at the U�S� Army Command and General Staff College, the Army 
University, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas� He is a 1997 Naval War College graduate�
Edward Erwin serves as command chaplain of Naval Air Station Sigonella, Sicily� He holds a PhD 
in theology and ethics from Duke University�
Derrill Goldizen is an associate professor of joint maritime operations at the Naval War College� 
He is a retired Air Force officer with experience supporting Army ground and aviation operations 
and Air Force intelligence operations� He has taught at the graduate level in two disciplines, space 
physics and joint military operations�
Thomas Grassey is a retired Navy Reserve captain� A graduate of Villanova University, he received 
a PhD in philosophy from the University of Chicago� He served on the faculty of the Naval War 
College and is a former editor of the Naval War College Review�
Alexander B. Gray is currently senior adviser to a member of the U�S� House of Representatives’ 
Committee on the Armed Services� The views expressed here are his alone�
John E. Jackson, Captain, USN (Ret�), has done extensive research in the areas of lighter-than-air 
flight and unmanned aircraft� His latest book is U.S. Naval Institute on Naval Innovation, published 
by Naval Institute Press in November 2015� He has flown five different commercial airships and 
wrote the chapter on Navy airships entitled “Ships in the Sky” in the book One Hundred Years of 
U.S. Navy Air Power, published in 2010 on the occasion of the centennial of Navy aviation�
Richard J. Norton is a faculty member in the National Security Affairs Department of the Naval 
War College� He holds a doctorate from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and is a retired 
naval officer with more than twenty years of active service�
Grant Rhode serves as assistant professor in the Strategy and Policy Department at the Naval War 
College� He holds master’s and doctoral degrees in international relations from the Fletcher School 
of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, as well as a master’s degree in the social anthropology of 
Chinese society from the University of Oxford� He is coauthor of Treaties of the People’s Republic 
of China and articles on Chinese foreign policy, ethnic relations in Japan, and U�S�-Chinese educa-
tional exchange�
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Cynthia K. Sexton is an associate professor of national security affairs in the College of Distance 
Education at the Naval War College� She earned a master’s of arts in national security and strategic 
studies from the Naval War College and a master’s in logistics management from Wright State 
University, Ohio� She retired in 2005 as a lieutenant colonel in the U�S� Air Force�
Jeffrey Shaw is an associate professor of strategy and policy in the College of Distance Education at 
the Naval War College�
Sean Sullivan is an associate professor at the Naval War College and a retired naval officer who 
served as an operations officer and staff planner in ships, destroyer and amphibious squadrons, 
and the Third Fleet, participating in the planning and execution of allied and coalition activities in 
the Pacific Ocean and the Arabian Gulf�
Karl Walling served as an interrogator in the U�S� Army, 1976–80� He was awarded a double 
doctorate in social thought and political science from the University of Chicago in 1992� He has 
been a research fellow at the Program on Constitutional Government at Harvard University and 
the Liberty Fund� He has been a professor of strategy at the Naval War College, first in Newport 
and currently in Monterey, from 2000 to the present� His publications include Republican Empire: 
Alexander Hamilton on War and Free Government and (together with Bradford Lee) Strategic Logic 
and Political Rationality�
Jacqueline Whitt is an associate professor of strategy at the Air War College at Maxwell Air Force 
Base in Montgomery, Alabama; before that she taught history at the United States Military Acad-
emy� She is the author of Bringing God to Men: American Military Chaplains and the Vietnam War, 
and is currently working on a project on narratives of national security since 1945� Her research 
and teaching interests are in the cultural and social history of war and strategy�
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REFLECTIONS ON READING
Professor John E. Jackson of the Naval War College is the Program Man-
ager for the Chief of Naval Operations Professional Reading Program.
By provoking us to free our minds of constraint and convention, worthy 
science fiction allows us to create a mental laboratory of sorts. In this 
place, we can consider new problems we might soon face or contemplate 
novel ways to address old problems. It sparks the imagination, engenders 
flexible thinking, and invites us to explore challenges and opportunities 
we might otherwise overlook.
GENERAL MARTIN DEMPSEY, USA (RET�) 
FORMER CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
 The Chief of Naval Operations Professional Reading Program (CNO-PRP) ex-ists to encourage sailors to read books that are relevant to their careers and, 
in a greater sense, books that unleash the power of reading to improve their lives 
in and out of uniform� The eighteen nonfiction books in the current program 
should be merely a starting point for literary exploration� There are scores of 
reading lists to be found on the Internet, each with a particular focus or purpose 
or both� Some strict list compilers limit their recommendations to nonfiction 
books, somehow believing them to be more appropriate to whatever agenda they 
are addressing�
I would argue that in many circumstances stories told in fictional contexts can 
be even more effective in shaping one’s thoughts and in developing one’s ability 
to think and act creatively� Since the CNO-PRP was launched in 2006, featured 
books have included Orson Scott Card’s Ender’s Game, Robert Heinlein’s Star-
ship Troopers, Khaled Hosseini’s The Kite Runner, Patrick O’Brian’s Master and 
Commander, and many other works of fiction� Without question, fiction can be 
powerful�
General Dempsey’s comments cited above speak to fiction’s ability to create a 
“mental laboratory” in which new and unconventional ideas can be considered� 
His thoughts appear in the foreword to a recently published book by the Atlantic 
Council’s Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security, which produces a 
wide range of possible future war-fighting scenarios� The Center’s Art of Future 
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Warfare project seeks to investigate how emerging antagonists, disruptive technol-
ogies, and novel war-fighting concepts could shape tomorrow’s conflicts. Its fasci-
nating new e-book entitled War Stories from the Future is available for free download 
(in multiple formats) at www.atlanticcouncil.org/publications/books/war-stories 
-from-the-future. The price is right, and the ideas are stimulating.
The CNO-PRP recommends another stunning consideration of future war-
fare, Ghost Fleet: A Novel of the Next World War by P. W. Singer and August Cole, 
as a Title of Interest. The Reuters news agency describes the book as
[f]ascinating. . . . Though it is fiction, the authors have taken great pains to keep 
their storytelling realistic. . . . Ghost Fleet has a certain weight. Cole and Singer are so 
steeped in future wars that they depict the fighting—on the ground, in space and on 
the Internet—with an air of indisputable authority. . . . Ghost Fleet is full of wonderful 
moments. It’s got space pirates, drug-addled hackers out of a William Gibson novel 
and American insurgents fighting occupation in Hawaii. Cole and Singer make these 
fantastical elements work, and weave them into the story.
Admiral James Stavridis, USN (Ret.), Supreme Allied Commander, NATO, 
2009–13, and current dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts 
University, has written the following about Ghost Fleet: 
Global war between China and the United States—unimaginable? Hardly. In Ghost 
Fleet, Peter Singer and August Cole lay out a plausible, frightening, and pitch-perfect 
vision of what such a war could look like in the near future. This page-turning marvel 
is the best source of high-tech geopolitical visioneering since Tom Clancy’s Red Storm 
Rising and Sir John Hackett’s The Third World War. A startling blueprint for the wars 
of the future, and therefore it needs to be read now!
And Admiral Jonathan Greenert, the thirtieth Chief of Naval Operations, calls 
the book “[a] page turner. . . . Thoughtful, strategic, and relevant.” Ghost Fleet is a 
great read, and a great idea generator. While it is unquestionably a work of fiction, 
it includes over four hundred footnotes that describe the emerging technologies 
employed by both sides of the postulated conflict and link readers to sources for 
further research. It is a complete package.
Inquisitive minds from every age group frequently ask, “Will you tell me a 
story?” Skillful writers of fiction can respond to this request in ways that can be 
eye-opening, challenging, and rewarding.
JOHN E. JACKSON
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